Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Complainant, an attorney and private investigator, asked the town tax assessor to provide him with an exact electronic copy of the file that the department of motor vehicles had provided to the town pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 14-163 for use in preparing the town's motor vehicle grand list. The assessor denied the request, stating that the electronic file was protected from disclosure pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 1-217. The freedom of information commission ordered the town to provide to complainant an exact electronic copy of the electronic file. Several parties intervened as plaintiffs, and the trial court consolidated their administrative appeals. The court then dismissed the appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding that section 1-217 applies to motor vehicle grand lists and their component data provided to the town assessors pursuant to section 14-163.

Fanetta Arnold agreed to provide a guarantee in lieu of cash to satisfy the security deposit for an apartment for rent owned by Defendants, the Forvils. When Arnold attempted to move into the apartment on the agreed-upon date, Defendants prevented Arnold from taking possession because the security deposit had not been paid in cash. The Commission on Human Rights brought this action against Defendant on Arnold's behalf, alleging discrimination against Arnold based on her lawful source of income in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-64c. The trial court found in favor of the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that (1) because the judgment was rendered in a timely manner, the trial court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Defendants; and (2) a security deposit guarantee is a lawful source of income within the meaning of the housing discrimination statutes.

After a jury trial, Harry Gonzalez was convicted of felony murder, robbery in the first degree, and kidnapping in the first degree. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the trial court improperly denied in part Gonzalez's motion to suppress certain statements he had made to the police because he made those statements as a result of police interrogation while in custody and without having been informed of his Miranda rights, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) Gonzalez's constitutional right against double jeopardy was not violated by his convictions of and separate punishments for felony murder and first degree robbery. Remanded for a new trial.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of kidnapping in the second degree and one count of risk of injury to a child. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court as to one of the two kidnapping counts and remanded for a new trial on that charge, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to a jury instruction in accordance with State v. Salamon, which bars a jury from finding a defendant guilty of kidnapping if it finds that the restraint used in connection therewith was merely incidental to the restraint used in the commission of another offense, and (2) the trial court's failure to give such an instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in all other respects.

Letitia Kilby filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, claiming unlawful housing discrimination by Defendants, the town housing authority and a property management company. The Commission found reasonable cause to believe that unlawful discrimination occurred. The trial court then granted Defendants' request to file a civil action in the trial court. Kilby moved to intervene, claiming both intervention as of right and permissive intervention. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court reversed, concluding that although the statute at issue, Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-83(d)(2), did not expressly grant Kilby a right of intervention, it impliedly granted Kilby a right of intervention. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' petition for certification to appeal, but while the case was pending, the legislature enacted Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, which amended the text of section 46a-83 to allow a complainant to intervene as of right in a housing discrimination action brought by the commission on behalf of the complainant. The Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the significance of Defendants' appeal was substantially undermined by Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, and, thus, certification was improvidently granted.

Defendant Calvin Long was committed to the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board following a finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease of assault in the second degree. The state later petitioned to continue the defendant's commitment under Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-593(c), which the defendant challenged on equal protection grounds. The Supreme Court held that the legislature had a legitimate basis for providing review procedures for the continued commitment of insanity acquittees different from those afforded to civilly committed inmates. Following remand, the trial court granted the state's petition. The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly construed the Supreme Court's decision in the previous appeal to preclude his current equal protection challenge and that a higher level of scrutiny of the statutory scheme should apply to this claim than the Court had applied to his claim in the previous appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that its decision in the previous appeal precluded the defendant's present claims.

In 2000, the manager of the Goodspeed Airport cut down trees and woody vegetation on property owned by a land trust. A total of six actions were filed as a result of the clear-cutting. In addition to instituting two of three consolidated actions, the airport brought two federal actions, and the district court found in favor of the land trust in both actions. In state court three other actions were consolidated. The trial court concluded that (1) the airport parties' claims for substantive and procedural due process were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and (2) the airport parties' claims claims for first amendment retaliation and abuse of process were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that either the issues were actually litigated in the federal actions and thus are barred by collateral estoppel, or the claims could have been raised in the federal actions and thus are barred by res judicata.

Defendant was convicted of one count of sexual assault in the first degree and two counts of risk of injury to a child arising out of defendant's sexual abuse of his wife's son. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. The court held that the trial court reasonably determined that the results of the Abel Assessment of Sexual Interest test administered to defendant were not sufficiently reliable for admission into evidence and, in light of the circumstances, defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the test. Because the evidence that defense counsel proffered provided no basis on which the jury reasonably could have concluded either that the son had visited pornographic websites on his own or that he had viewed images of conduct similar to the conduct attributed to defendant, the trial court properly excluded the evidence. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the state's attorney to adduce testimony from an expert on the reporting of sexual abuse by child victims where defense counsel opened the door to redirect examination. The court further held that the comments the state attorney made were based on the evidence and were neither inflammatory nor inaccurate and therefore, defendant's claim of prosecutorial impropriety must fail. Finally, the state conceded that the sentence that the trial court imposed did not comply with General Statutes 53a-70(b)(3) because it included a period of probation rather than a period of special parole. Accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded for resentencing and the judgment was affirmed in all other aspects.

Defendant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault in the first degree and one count of risk of injury to a child where his convictions stemmed from his sexual assault of his step-granddaughter over a two year period. Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction and raised several issues of error on appeal. The court held that the trial court neither abused its discretion nor violated defendant's confrontation rights by precluding him from questioning the physician that had examined the victim hypothetically about the likelihood of injury. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the undisclosed portion of department of children and families records contained in the court file either irrelevant or cumulative of the disclosed portions and declining to provide it to defendant. The court further held that, to the extent there was any impropriety in the prosecutor's remark, it was not sufficiently prejudicial as to require reversal of the conviction. The court finally held that the trial court's jury instructions did not prejudice the defendant. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed directly from the judgment of conviction of one count of murder in violation of General Statutes 53a-54a. On appeal, defendant claimed that the trial court, in fashioning his sentence, improperly considered his trial testimony relative to his drug dealing and thus burdened defendant's right to testify in his own defense. The court held that the question of the trial court's consideration of that testimony was irrelevant because that court clearly relied on other independent sources for the fact of defendant's drug dealing, meaning that it could not possibly have penalized defendant for testifying at trial. Accordingly, the court held that defendant's claim lacked merit and affirmed the judgment.