Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault in the first degree and one count of risk of injury to a child where his convictions stemmed from his sexual assault of his step-granddaughter over a two year period. Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction and raised several issues of error on appeal. The court held that the trial court neither abused its discretion nor violated defendant's confrontation rights by precluding him from questioning the physician that had examined the victim hypothetically about the likelihood of injury. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the undisclosed portion of department of children and families records contained in the court file either irrelevant or cumulative of the disclosed portions and declining to provide it to defendant. The court further held that, to the extent there was any impropriety in the prosecutor's remark, it was not sufficiently prejudicial as to require reversal of the conviction. The court finally held that the trial court's jury instructions did not prejudice the defendant. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed directly from the judgment of conviction of one count of murder in violation of General Statutes 53a-54a. On appeal, defendant claimed that the trial court, in fashioning his sentence, improperly considered his trial testimony relative to his drug dealing and thus burdened defendant's right to testify in his own defense. The court held that the question of the trial court's consideration of that testimony was irrelevant because that court clearly relied on other independent sources for the fact of defendant's drug dealing, meaning that it could not possibly have penalized defendant for testifying at trial. Accordingly, the court held that defendant's claim lacked merit and affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff sued defendants alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and General Statutes 7-465 when defendants terminated plaintiff from his employment as a senior field engineer in defendants' information technology department after it had determined that he was responsible for disruptions in its computer network. At issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding defendants a portion of defendants' attorney's fees that it incurred in defending against plaintiff's action. The court held that the trial court acted well within its discretion in awarding attorney's fees where plaintiff continued to litigate his claims against defendants after it became clear that those claims were groundless.

Defendant, then age sixteen, was arrested and charged with ten offenses and arraigned as a youthful offender under General Statutes 54-76c et seq. Following the arraignment, the state filed a motion to transfer defendant's case to the regular criminal docket. At issue was whether the Appellate Court, sua sponte, properly dismissed for lack of a final judgment the interlocutory appeal of defendant from an order of the trial court transferring his case from the youthful offender docket of the Superior Court to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court pursuant to sections 54-76c(b)(1). The court held that the trial court's order was not an appealable order under State v. Curcio where it did not conclude the rights of defendant regarding his status as a youth offender. Accordingly, the Appellate Court properly dismissed defendant's appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Defendant appealed from the decision of the trial court granting the state's motion to transfer defendant's case from the youthful offender docket to the regular criminal docket pursuant to General Statutes 54-57c(b)(1). At issue was whether the trial court improperly granted the state's motion to transfer without first holding a hearing on the motion in violation of defendant's right to due process under the federal constitution. The court held that section 54-76c(b) required a hearing on the adult docket prior to the finalization of the transfer of a case from the youthful offender docket to the regular criminal docket, that this statutory requirement satisfied due process, and that neither section 54-76c(b)(1) nor due process entitled defendant to a hearing before the court on the youthful offender docket.