Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The issue in this case was whether defendant-appellant William Morrison’s waiver of his right to trial counsel was “knowing, intelligent and voluntary.” Morrison was arrested on suspicion of trespassing or burglary. At the conclusion of a hearing, Morrison stated he wished to terminate his representation by appointed counsel. The trial judge conducted an inquiry and declined the request. The trial judge informed Morrison that he could either continue to be represented by the appointed defense counsel, or proceed pro se. After reviewing the “incomplete” colloquy between the the trial judge and Morrison, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant did not waive his right to counsel “knowingly.” Morrison’s conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "Morrison v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellant-defendant Steven Baynum and Manisha Baynum married in 2009. In 2012, the couple experimented with having an “open marriage” and shared an intimate experience with Dakota Holdren (“Dakota”). Thereafter, Manisha was romantically involved with Dakota. In 2013, Manisha filed for divorce. Manisha was granted a Family Court Order affording her exclusive use a property owned by Steven's grandparents. The Order prohibited Baynum from accessing the residence and, as a result, he often stayed with his grandparents at another residence, located on the same property the house now occupied by Manisha. In the early hours of October 24, Dakota and Manisha were at Manisha's home. Interested in “check[ing] out the place,” Baynum communicated with Manisha via text messages and phone calls regarding whether he could come. After being dissuaded by Manisha, Baynum temporarily refrained from going to the house, although he “decided to put a ladder at the base of [28 Harvest Lane’s] driveway . . . .” Later that evening, Manisha was awakened by noises emanating from the bathroom, later discovering Baynum, who jumped on the bed, pulled a blanket off of Dakota, and started punching him. After convincing Baynum to join her in the kitchen, Manisha dialed 9-1-1, but was unable to speak with an operator because Baynum “took the phone out of [her] hands” and “took the battery out of the phone.” Thereafter, Baynum “dragged” Manisha back to the bedroom, where he proceeded to “tie up” Dakota utilizing an ethernet cord. Baynum then pushed Manisha onto her stomach and attempted to tie her hands together using an iPhone charging cord. Manisha testified that she bit Baynum on his arm during the struggle. Baynum responded by punching her in the face and holding a knife to her throat. New Castle County police officers were dispatched to Manisha's house. The next day, Baynum appeared at his grandparents’ residence, explaining to his grandmother that “he had beat the crap out of the man that was living -- sleeping with his wife. And [Baynum] said [he] was just trying to defend [his] -- [his] wedding vows, reaffirming his marriage.” After Baynum left, his grandmother informed the police. The Superior Court denied Baynum’s Motion in Limine prior to his trial on charges stemming from the incident at Manisha's house. The ruling was issued following an evidentiary hearing conducted in connection with Baynum’s Motion, which sought dismissal of his case before trial or, in the alternative, a "Lolly" jury instruction, on the theory that the State failed to collect or preserve potentially material evidence. Baynum appealed his convictions and argued that the Superior Court erred in denying his Motion. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "Baynum v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Manuel Morales was found not guilty of Offensive Touching, but guilty of Robbery First Degree, relating to a 2013 incident at a cell phone store in Elsmere. Morales jumped over the counter and demanded money, indicating that, if the store's clerk did not comply, he would kill her. When the clerk opened the register, Morales took money out of it. As he ran out of the store, Morales collided with another woman who was entering the store through the front door. He was sentenced to ten years of incarceration at Level V, suspended after three years for decreasing levels of supervision. Seeking reversal of his conviction and sentence, Morales argued for the first time on appeal that the prosecutor’s statement to the jury during summation that he was “clearly guilty” denied him a fair trial. The Supreme Court concluded the prosecutor’s improper comment did not amount to plain or repetitive error requiring reversal, and therefore, affirmed Morales’s conviction and sentence. View "Morales v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In 1992 Jermaine Wright was convicted of first degree murder, first degree robbery, and related weapons offenses for his involvement in what was known as the "Hi-Way Inn murder/robbery." The Superior Court imposed the death penalty for his murder conviction. Prior to trial, Wright moved to suppress a statement he had given to police. He alleged that his waiver of Miranda rights was invalid and his statement was involuntary because he was high on heroin at the time. The Superior Court denied the motion, finding that Wright had been given the Miranda rights three times, by three different police officers, and that the State had “met its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and that his confession was voluntarily made.” Wright then filed a second pretrial motion to suppress his confession on other grounds. In its opinion denying that motion, the Superior Court again found that Wright had been given his Miranda rights three times. The confession was admitted into evidence at trial. On direct appeal, Wright’s convictions and sentences were affirmed. Between then and 2009, Wright filed four motions for post conviction relief. In the second postconviction proceeding, the Superior Court again rejected Wright’s contention that his waiver of Miranda rights was not valid. In 2014, in the fourth postconviction proceeding, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed Wright’s convictions on the ground that the State violated his rights under "Brady v. Maryland." The case was remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial. By the time the fourth motion for postconviction relief was filed, the original trial judge had retired and the case had been assigned to her successor. In the new trial proceedings, the successor judge granted a motion to suppress Wright’s confession on the ground that the Miranda rights he was given were inadequate, and that his waiver was, therefore, not valid. The last ruling was presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review. The Court concluded that the original Superior Court judge’s determination that Wright’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent necessarily included an implied determination that the warnings were adequately given. Those determinations are the law of the case. For this reason, the successor judge erred in reviewing the admissibility of Wright’s confession. The State also appeals the successor judge’s denial of a motion that he recuse himself. At oral argument, the State conceded that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction under 10 Del. C. 9902 to review that order. Therefore, the Court did not address the Superior Court’s ruling on recusal or express any opinion on recusal. View "Delaware v. Wright" on Justia Law

A masked gunman went into a Wilmington barbershop, shot his intended victim, and also shot and killed a five-year-old boy. The police arrested Chauncey Starling one month after the shooting, when the State’s key witness, Alfred Gaines, identified Starling as the shooter. In 2003, the State tried Starling for first degree murder, conspiracy, and related weapons charges. No physical evidence linked Starling to the crime. Instead, the State relied primarily on Gaines’ testimony and statements made to police by Starling’s brother and girlfriend. The State also relied on testimony from the victim’s girlfriend, who identified Starling as the shooter based on his eyes. A Superior Court jury convicted Starling of all charges, and the judge sentenced him to death. On direct appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but remanded the case for resentencing. After remand, the Superior Court again sentenced Starling to death. The Supreme Court again affirmed the death sentences. Starling then moved for postconviction relief, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective, that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence and that the prosecution engaged in misconduct at trial. Following years of discovery, evidentiary hearings, and briefing, the Superior Court denied Starling’s motion and this appeal followed. Starling renewed the same constitutional arguments on appeal. The Delaware Supreme Court's review of the record lead it to conclude that mistakes were made that "undermine[d] confidence in the fairness of the trial." The cumulative effect of these errors lead the Court to conclude that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different without the errors. Therefore Starling’s conviction was reversed and his case remanded for a new trial. View "Starling v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-Below, Appellant, Christopher Spence, appealed a Superior Court Order denying his Motion for a Mistrial. This case arose out of a shooting that occurred during an event at a party venue in Wilmington. During the shooting, Spence shot and killed Kirt Williams, and shot and wounded Kelmar Allen. Because Spence admitted to shooting Williams and Allen, the case centered on: (1) whether the State could prove each element of the indicted charges beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) whether Spence was guilty of lesser included offenses; and (3) whether Spence had a viable justification defense, either self-defense or defense of others. Moments before closing argument, the State provided defense counsel with a black and white copy of the PowerPoint presentation it intended to use during summation. The version of the PowerPoint presentation displayed to the jury was in color. At the end of closing arguments, Spence’s counsel moved for a mistrial based on the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct. The trial court reserved ruling on the motion until after trial. In the Motion and the Memorandum, Spence raised, for the first time, objections to: (1) two PowerPoint slides which referred to the victims as “helpless;” (2) PowerPoint slides containing alleged misstatements of the justification defenses; and (3) a PowerPoint slide containing the statement that “[t]he defendant is guilty of all the charges against him[.]” The trial court denied the Motion. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the ultimate holding of the trial court “based largely upon the well-reasoned Order denying Spence’s Motion.” View "Spence v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Kesler Stevens appealed a Superior Court Opinion affirming a Court of Common Pleas bench trial verdict which found him guilty of Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”). On appeal to the Supreme Court, Stevens argued: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to convict him of DUI; and (2) Delaware’s DUI law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution because it provided for a harsher punishment than Delaware’s Reckless Driving–Alcohol Related law even though both laws punish identical conduct. The Supreme Court found no merit to Stevens’ appeal and affirmed. View "Stevens v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In 2001, Alonzo Cannon was convicted by jury on offenses related to possession of cocaine and marijuana. At trial, the State introduced evidence that after being read his Miranda rights, Cannon confessed to police that the drugs were his and also where he obtained them. The trial judge sentenced Cannon to eighteen years unsuspended jail time followed by decreasing levels of supervision. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct appeal. The Superior Court denied Cannon’s first motion for postconviction relief, and the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal of the first motion as untimely filed. In 2015, with the assistance of counsel, Cannon filed a second motion for postconviction relief, claiming that the State’s failure to disclose misconduct in the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”) violated the State’s obligation under "Brady v. Maryland," and that an evidentiary hearing was required to explore the Brady issue further. The motion was a lengthy form motion filed in a number of cases raising misconduct at the OCME. The Superior Court summarily dismissed the motion, and found there was no evidence to support Cannon’s contention that the misconduct at the OCME was ongoing during his trial in 2001, or that the misconduct involved false chemical analysis reporting as opposed to theft. Cannon appealed again. The State responded that Cannon’s motion was barred by amended Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, and in any event, Cannon admitted to the crimes, and the drugs field tested positive for illegal substances, so the motion should be denied. After careful review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the issues on appeal were not fairly raised before the Superior Court, and Rule 61 barred Cannon’s claims because he did not allege actual innocence. "Even if we reached the merits of his claims, they would be barred due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented at trial. Therefore we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment." View "Cannon v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellant Xavier Broomer appealed the Superior Court’s March 2015 bench ruling denying his post-verdict Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. Broomer raised one argument on appeal. The jury acquitted Broomer of Aggravated Possession and Drug Dealing. However, the jury convicted Broomer of Conspiracy in the Second Degree. Broomer argued that his acquittal on the underlying offense of Drug Dealing precludes his conviction on Conspiracy in the Second Degree. After review, the Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. View "Broomer v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The issue common for forty-five defendants (whose cases were consolidated for this opinion) was whether a defendant who pled guilty after a colloquy and admitted to crimes involving the possession of illegal narcotics should have her conviction vacated because she was unaware of serious problems at the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (the “OCME”) involving the handling of narcotics evidence. The Superior Court answered that question no, and held that the defendants were bound by their pleas. A 2014 investigation by the Delaware State Police and the Department of Justice revealed that some OCME employees had stolen drug evidence stored at the OCME due in large part to flawed oversight and security. To date, those problems, although including substantial evidence of sloppiness and allegations of “drylabbing,” did not involve evidence-planting. Much of the uncovered misconduct seemed to be inspired by the reality that the evidence seized from defendants in fact involved illegal narcotics, and the temptation this provided to certain employees to steal some of that evidence for their personal use and for resale. In prior decisions, the Delaware Supreme Court made clear that if a defendant knowingly pled guilty to a drug crime, he could not escape his plea by arguing that had he known that the OCME had problems, he would not have admitted to his criminal misconduct in possessing illegal narcotics. In those prior decisions, the Court found that defendants' please did not invalidate their freely-made pleas. The Court reached the same conclusion after review of this case, and affirmed the Superior Court. View "Aricidiacono,et al. v. Delaware" on Justia Law