Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Ronald Luttrell appealed his convictions for one count of Attempted Rape in the First Degree, three counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, one count of Attempted Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, and two counts of Indecent Exposure. Luttrell raised two claims in a direct appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) the Superior Court abused its discretion when it failed to grant his motion for a bill of particulars, because the indictment did not clearly delineate the acts for which he was being prosecuted or when they occurred, and therefore it did not allow him to adequately prepare a defense or protect him from double jeopardy; and (2) the Superior Court committed plain error when it allowed impermissible "vouching" evidence to be presented to the jury. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying Luttrell’s motion for a bill of particulars. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the admission of vouching evidence constituted plain error. The matter was remanded for a new trial. View "Luttrell v. Delaware" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the robbery of a Family Dollar store in Dover in 2012 three men. The State charged defendant Cameron Norwood as one of the three. But Norwood denied being the third man. Norwood sought to create a reasonable doubt about his guilt by arguing that another man, Khalil Dixon, had been the third man who robbed the store. In support of that defense, Norwood tried to introduce evidence that Dixon and the same two perpetrators had also robbed the same Family Dollar earlier that same year, and attempted to rob it again a few days later. The State objected, and the Superior Court excluded the evidence at the State's request. The Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court's decision to exclude the evidence was an abuse of discretion, given the substantial similarities between the prior crimes and this one. The Superior Court's decision was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "Norwood v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Lamonte Butler appealed his convictions of Attempted Robbery First Degree, Assault Second Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Conspiracy Second Degree, Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon, Resisting Arrest, Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, and misdemeanor drug possession. Butler raised two claims on appeal: (1) that his convictions were barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause because the trial judge took a series of improper actions that impelled defense counsel to move for a mistrial; and (2) the Trial Judge abused her discretion by denying his post-trial Motion for Recusal without conducting the analysis required by "Los v. Los." The Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the Trial Judge did not intend to preside over Butler's trial before the already empaneled jury; and (2) the Trial Judge took a series of actions intended to ensure that the trial would not take place. For those reasons, Butler's convictions were reversed. "In so concluding, we note that this appeal presents aberrational circumstances that markedly depart from the serious priority the Superior Court gives to trying felony criminal cases. . . . The outcome is regrettable, but it is dictated by the need to respect Butler's constitutional right." View "Butler v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellant Kenneth Chambers was arrested in 2013 after he failed a field sobriety test and was determined to have a blood alcohol level more than twice the legal limit. Chambers was indicted for driving under the influence of alcohol. Because Chambers had two prior alcohol-related driving offenses, the State filed a notice that it would seek to have him sentenced as a felon for third offense DUI. Chambers filed a motion to preclude the felony prosecution, arguing that the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution1 barred his two prior alcohol-related driving offenses from counting as qualifying offenses and prevented his prosecution for felony third offense DUI in this case. Because Chambers was prosecuted for an offense that he committed in 2013, after the July 1, 2012 effective date of the applicable amendments to the sentence enhancement ultimately applied to him, the Supreme Court concluded Chambers' argument that the State extended a previously expired statute of limitations in violation of the ex post facto clause was without merit. View "Chambers v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Nathaniel Banks appealed his conviction by jury of assault in the third degree, carrying a concealed weapon and endangering the welfare of a child. He raised one issue on appeal to the Supreme Court: the trial court abused its discretion when it restricted his ability to call witnesses to testify about certain prior acts of the complainant, and thereby violated his federal Constitutional right to present a defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded defendant's claim was without merit. Therefore, the Court affirmed Banks' conviction. View "Banks v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Keith Wynn appealed his conviction by jury of one count of Burglary in the Second Degree and two counts of Felony Theft. Wynn raised two claims on appeal: (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct by stating that Wynn was not permitted on the second floor of a dwelling; and (2) the prosecutor argued for an application of Delaware’s burglary statute that was not supported by the record evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that both of Wynn’s arguments lacked merit. View "Wynn v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Jermaine Wright appealed a Superior Court order that denied his fourth motion for postconviction relief, and for reimposing Wright's conviction and sentence. Wright was convicted by jury in 1992 for first-degree murder, first-degree robbery and related weapons charges in connection with the death of a liquor store clerk. Wright was then sentenced to death. At trial, the State did not present any forensic evidence including fingerprints, shoe prints, or fibers placing Wright at the scene. Nor did the State present the murder weapon, shell casings, the getaway car, or eyewitnesses to identify Wright. Instead, a jury convicted Wright on his confession to the police while under the influence of heroin and the testimony (since recanted) of a prison informant who testified that Wright admitted the crime. In 2012, the Superior Court vacated Wright’s conviction and sentence because it had “no confidence in the outcome of the trial.” The Superior Court also found that Wright did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights because police obtained his confession through defective warnings. The remaining claims were denied. The State appealed, and a majority of the Delaware Supreme Court reversed, ordering Wright’s conviction and sentence reimposed, because the Miranda issue was procedurally barred and that, given his confession, the evidence about the Brandywine attempted robbery would not have led to a different result. After a reinstatement of his conviction and sentence, Wright now appealed his remaining claims originally denied by the Superior Court. “[W]hen the State withholds from a criminal defendant evidence that is material to his guilt or punishment, it violates his right to due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is exactly what happened here." The Supreme Court vacated Wright’s conviction and death sentence and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Wright v. Delaware" on Justia Law

RB Entertainment is one of a complicated web of at least seventeen different companies that Appellant Jeffrey Cohen allegedly owns and controls. Central to this appeal was one issue: whether the delinquency proceedings for Indemnity Insurance Corporation, RRG violated the constitutional due process rights of Cohen or Co-Appellant RB Entertainment Ventures. Co-Appellant IDG Companies, LLC (Indemnity's managing general agent), was also one of the Cohen-affiliated entities. After uncovering evidence that Cohen had committed fraud in his capacity as Indemnity's CEO and that Indemnity might be insolvent, the Delaware Insurance Commissioner petitioned the Court of Chancery for a seizure order. The Delaware Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act. Based on the detailed allegations and supporting evidence presented by the Commissioner, the Court of Chancery granted that seizure order, which, among other things, prohibited anyone with notice of the proceedings from transacting the business of Indemnity, selling or destroying Indemnity’s assets, or asserting claims against Indemnity in other venues without permission from the Commissioner. The seizure order also prohibited anyone with notice of the proceedings from interfering with the Commissioner in the discharge of her duties. Cohen, who founded Indemnity and had served as its President, Chairman, and CEO, resigned from Indemnity's board during the ensuing investigation and the board removed him from his managerial positions. After his resignation, Cohen interfered with the Commissioner's efforts to operate Indemnity in various ways. The Commissioner returned to the Court of Chancery several times, first seeking an amendment to the seizure order to address Cohen's behavior and then seeking sanctions against him. The Court of Chancery entered a series of orders that increased the restrictions on Cohen's behavior and imposed stiffer sanctions upon him. Cohen argued that he was denied due process at several junctures during the Court of Chancery proceedings. Because Cohen's claims alleged violations of his right to due process, the focus of the Supreme Court's opinion was on whether Cohen was given notice of the allegations against him and a fair opportunity to present his side of the dispute. Having carefully examined the record in this case, the Court concluded that he was given that opportunity: no violation of Cohen's or the affiliated entities' due process rights occurred. View "Cohen, et al. v. State of Delaware, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Donald Pellicone appealed a Superior Court judgment confirming that New Castle County had certain easements on Pellicone's property. The County sought the easements' validation to carry out a flood control project targeting Little Mill Creek in New Castle County. The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the Flood Control Project legally constituted a County project; (2) whether the County's condemnation of Pellicone's property fell within the County's statutory eminent domain authority; (3) whether the County's action was a taking of Pellicone's property for a public use as defined by law; and (4) whether the procedures set forth in Chapter 12, Article 7 adhered to. Answering all questions raised on appeal as "yes," the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. View "Pellicone v. New Castle County" on Justia Law

Two certified questions came before the Delaware Supreme Court in this case. The questions centered on whether lease provisions for apartments of a public housing authority that restrict when residents, their household members, and guests may carry and possess firearms in the common areas violate the right to keep and bear arms guaranteed by Article I, Section 20 of the Delaware Constitution. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found no violation of the Second Amendment or the Delaware Constitution. The certified questions were: (1) whether, under the Delaware Constitution, a public housing agency such as the WHA could adopt a firearms policy; and (2) whether under the Delaware Constitution, a public housing agency could require its residents, household members, and guests to have available for inspection a copy of any permit, license, or other documentation required by state, local, or federal law for the ownership, possession, or transportation of any firearm or other weapon, including a license to carry a concealed weapon. The Delaware court answered both questions in the negative. View "Doe, et al. v. Wilmington Housing Authority, et al." on Justia Law