Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Sheriff of Sussex County plaintiff-appellant Jeffrey Christopher sought a declaratory judgment regarding the powers of the sheriff in Delaware, particularly the Sheriff in Sussex County. He also sought a determination that recently enacted House Bill 325 ("HB 325") was unconstitutional. The nature of the Sheriff's complaint centered on whether he had arrest powers in criminal cases as a core or fundamental tool to perform his constitutional designation as a "conservator of the peace." The Superior Court issued a Memorandum Opinion granting Summary Judgment to Sussex County and the State, holding "that the common law authority and responsibilities of the Sheriff are subject to modification and restriction" by statutory enactments of the General Assembly, therefore HB 325 was constitutional. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Sheriff argued that the phrase "sheriff shall be the conservator of the peace" contains a constitutional right under the Delaware Constitution, and that arrest power is a core tool of the "conservator of the peace" as it applies to the sheriff because a peace officer cannot "[conserve] the peace" without the ability to arrest. By stripping him of arrest powers, the General Assembly violated the Delaware Constitution because it took away a tool indispensable to his constitutional obligation to act as a "conservator of the peace." The Supreme Court held that the General Assembly may not abrogate a constitutional office or take away the core duties of a constitutional officer without enacting an amendment pursuant to the Delaware Constitution. However, the Court also held that because the common law arrest power of a sheriff was not fundamental, but was merely incidental, to his role as a "conservator of the peace" when the 1776, 1792, 1831, and 1897 Delaware Constitutions were adopted, the arrest power can be modified or even eliminated by statute. Therefore, the Superior Court's judgment was affirmed on that basis. View "Christopher v. Sussex County, et al." on Justia Law

Dawn Locke, on behalf of minor appellant, Kimberly Foth, appealed a Superior Court final judgment in favor of Foth and minor appellee, John Barlow, III, and an order that granted Barlow's motion to enforce the parties' settlement agreement wherein Foth and Barlow would each receive $7,500. The Supreme Court had vacated the Superior Court's Order entering final judgment and remanded the case for a minors' settlement hearing. On remand, the Superior Court considered testimony from both minors and their mothers, and reviewed the minors' medical records. Then the court issued a Report on Remand in which determined that an equal division of the $15,000 settlement proceeds between the minors was fair and reasonable. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the Superior Court's focus should have been on whether the division of funds was fair (i.e., enforcing the settlement agreement: "Title 12, section 3926 mandates that court approval of a minor settlement always starts with a 'clean slate' by providing that no person dealing with the receiver of a minor can rely upon the receiver's authority to settle tort claims. The statute requires an independent judicial determination about whether the settlement agreement for a minor should be approved and specifically rejects the concept that such an agreement can be specifically enforced if the court has reservations." In this case, the record reflected that the Superior Court did not make an independent determination because it stated that, if it disregarded the settlement agreement and started on a "clean slate," it would have awarded Foth $10,000 instead of the $7,500 in the settlement agreement. View "Barlow, et al. v. Finegan, et al." on Justia Law

At issue in this case (among other things) was the constitutionality of the state's gang participation statute (11 Del. C. 616). Appellants argued the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it did not define the term "actively participates." Furthermore, they argued the statute was overbroad because it impinged on the right of free association. The Supreme Court held both arguments lacked merit. "A person of ordinary intelligence can understand what it means to actively participate in a criminal street gang's criminal conduct, and there is no constitutional right to assemble for the purpose of committing a crime." View "Taylor v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Robert Burns was convicted by a jury on several counts of varying degrees of sexual assault against children. The Supreme court previously affirmed Burns' conviction on direct appeal. Burns sought post-conviction relief, arguing that he received inadequate assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights when trial counsel: did not affirmatively recommend Burns take an plea deal; elicited testimony from an adverse witness that could have implied Burns invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence; waived certain foundational requirements to out-of-court statements; permitted a characterization of the complaining witnesses as "victims;" and failed to object to the State's summation. Burns claimed that the cumulative effect of his defense counsel's actions therefore resulted in an unfair trial. The Superior Court denied Burns' motion for post-conviction relief. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burns v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In a direct appeal, defendant raised one claim of error. In defendant's view, although he was charged with and convicted of felony Promoting Prison Contraband, the record reflected there was a rational basis for the jury to find him guilty of the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor Promoting Prison Contraband. Defendant argued the trial judge's failure to give that lesser-included instruction was reversible error. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant's argument was meritless. View "Mays v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court previously rejected defendant Gary Ploof's claims arising from his trial's guilt phase, but remanded the penalty phase claims for the post-conviction judge to reweigh aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances established at trial and in the post-conviction proceedings. Defendant contended his attorneys were ineffective because they failed to uncover evidence that the defendant's father sexually abused foster children staying with defendant's family and also physically abused defendant himself. Upon careful review, the Supreme Court held that defendant's attorneys should have investigated certain "red flags" indicating that defendant's childhood home was not as benign as initially portrayed. However, the Court concluded that the attorneys' failures did not prejudice defendant. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial judge's denial of defendant's post-conviction relief petition. View "Ploof v. Delaware" on Justia Law

A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant in this case of Failing to Stop at the Command of a Police Officer, Reckless Driving, and several other offenses. At issue in this appeal was the State's obligation to produce relevant material in response to a defendant's discovery appeal. The State failed to produce a recording of the officers' communications with the dispatcher in response to the defendant's discovery request. The recording contained evidence that the officers’ siren had not been activated, contrary to the officers’ testimony. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the dispatch recording fell within the scope of the defendant’s discovery request and Superior Court Criminal Rule 16, and that failure to produce this evidence prejudiced the defendant because the siren’s was material to the State’s case and impeached the credibility of its key witnesses. Accordingly, we the Court reversed the Superior Court's judgment and remanded for a new trial. View "Valentin v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellant John Nichols appealed a final Superior Court judgment affirming the order of the State Coastal Zone Industrial Board granting motions to dismiss filed by appellees Diamond State Generation Partners LLC and the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control in response to Nichols' appeal of the grant of a Coastal Zone industrial permit application. Nichols raised two claims on appeal: (1) the Board's vote on whether Nichols had standing to pursue the appeal failed due to the lack of a five-vote majority; and (2) that he possessed standing under the "any person aggrieved" standard of title 7, section 7007(b) of the Delaware Code, or, in the alternative, as a matter of common law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded both of Nichols' arguments lacked merit and therefore affirmed the Superior Court. View "Nichols v. State Coastal Zone Industrial Control Board, et al." on Justia Law

A group of Texas plaintiffs alleged that a corporation exposed two employees to chemicals that caused two of the employees' children to suffer from birth defects. The Superior Court judge excluded expert testimony as irrelevant under Delaware law because it would have been insufficient as a matter of Texas law. The judge did not reach the testimony's reliability under Delaware law. Because the plaintiffs waived their argument that California or Delaware substantive law applied, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court judge's ruling that Texas substantive law applies. But before the Court could address whether a judge may consider substantive sufficiency when analyzing procedural admissibility, the case was remanded for the Superior Court judge to determine in the first instance whether the testimony at issue is excludable on reliability grounds. View "Tumlinson, et al. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc." on Justia Law

Employee-appellant, Gary Andreason appealed a Superior Court judgment affirming two Industrial Accident Board decisions. The first decision awarded compensation to Andreason for his work-related knee and right shoulder injuries, but denied compensation for a separate and unrelated lower back injury. The second decision denied Andreason's reargument motion challenging the Board's denial of compensation for his lower back injury. Andreason argued on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) the Board erred as a matter of law when it determined that there was no implied agreement to compensate him for his lower back injury; (2) that title 19, section 2322(h) does not apply when compensation is paid as the result of a unilateral mistake. The Court concluded all of Andreason's arguments were without merit. View "Andreason v. Royal Pest Control" on Justia Law