Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Leshawn Washington was convicted by jury on four counts of first-degree assault, second-degree assault, twelve counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and six counts of first-degree reckless endangerment. He appealed his convictions, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion by permitting the admission of certain evidence that the jury ultimately used to convict him. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no merit to Defendant's arguments, and affirmed his convictions. View "Washington v. Delaware" on Justia Law

A passenger in a car stopped by the police for illegally tinted windows claimed to have no identification and provided an officer with a false identity. After a database search returned no results, the officer handcuffed the passenger and recovered a gun during a pat down. The passenger challenged his conviction, arguing officers had no probable cause to arrest him, and moved to suppress evidence of the recovered gun. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the officer possessed probable cause to arrest the passenger for criminal impersonation, and affirmed the trial judge's denial of a motion to suppress the gun. View "Stafford v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Richard J. Sternberg, M.D. brought an action against Defendants-Appellees Nanticoke Memorial Hospital, its CEO and members of the hospital's Medical Executive Committee (MEC) (collectively "Nanticoke") for tortious interference with existing business relationships, defamation, and breach of the Medical Staff Bylaws. The suit arose from a precautionary suspension of his clinical privileges imposed by Nanticoke under its professional review procedures. Nanticoke asserted immunity under federal and state law and sought attorneys fees, citing state law and a fee-shifting provision of Nanticoke's Medical Staff Bylaws Credentials Policy. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court denied Sternberg's motion and granted Nanticoke's motion, awarding attorney's fees under state law without addressing Nanticoke's claim for costs and fees under the Credentials Policy. Sternberg appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed on the issue of immunity but reversed the award of attorney's fees under the applicable statute because Sternberg refuted the only fact supporting the requisite bad faith for an award under that law. Upon remand, the Superior Court awarded attorney's fees and costs based upon the Credentials Policy. Sternberg raised three claims on appeal: (1) he claimed that the Superior Court erred by granting Nanticoke's motion for summary judgment for attorney's fees under the Credentials Policy, because the bylaw violates public policy; (2) he claimed the Credentials Policy was unenforceable against him because Nanticoke materially breached the bylaws; and (3) he claimed that the Superior Court abused its discretion in determining the amount of attorney's fees and costs to be awarded. Finding no merit to any of his claims on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "Sternberg, M.D. v. Nanticoke Memorial Hospital, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Mother Charlene M. Hall filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of father Christopher Moore with regard to their child born August 24, 2005. The Family Court granted the Mother's petition. The Father raised two issues on appeal: (1) the Family Court violated his right to due process under the United States and Delaware Constitutions by not appointing new counsel to represent him, after it allowed his court-appointed attorney to withdraw; and (2) the record did not support the Family Court's decision to terminate his parental rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Father's due process rights were indeed violated, therefore the Court reversed and remanded the case to the Family Court for a new hearing after an attorney was appointed to represent the Father. View "Moore v. Hall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant the State of Delaware appealed a Superior Court order granting a motion to suppress by the Defendants-Appellees Michael Holden and Lauren Lusby on grounds that the search warrant affidavit approved by the magistrate failed to establish probable cause. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed to search Holden's home for contraband or evidence of a crime. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Superior Court judgment granting the motion to suppress. View "Delaware v. Holden" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a Superior Court judge’s decision to admit a blood analysis report without the testing chemist’s testimony violated Defendant–Appellant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. Here, the testifying laboratory manager who ultimately certified the report testified before the jury, but the manager neither observed nor performed the test. The Court held that the absent analyst’s testimonial representations were admitted for their truth on an issue central to the case, which violated the Defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Martin v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether a Superior Court judge abused his discretion when he granted defense counsel an overnight continuance to review an additional set of laboratory reports the State’s chemist produced while testifying on cross examination. The Court agreed with the Superior Court judge’s ruling that the State failed to comply with Superior Court Criminal Rule 16. However, the Court held that the trial judge abused his discretion by granting defense counsel a continuance for less than 24 hours to review the highly technical data in the reports. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. reverse. View "Oliver v. Delaware" on Justia Law

A state trooper stopped a member of Hells Angels for speeding. He refused to respond when asked where he was going. The trooper then informed him that he would be pat down. Defendant revealed he possessed two handguns. Defendant appealed his conviction on firearms charges, maintaining the trooper lacked probable cause to stop and arrest him. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the superior court judge who suppressed evidence of the firearms because, under the totality of the circumstances, there was no particularized, reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant was then armed and dangerous. View "Delaware v. Abel" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Frederick S. DeJohn, II appealed a Superior Court violation of probation ("VOP") sentencing order. On appeal, Defendant claimed that the Superior Court judge sentenced him with a closed mind and that the sentencing order contains a calculation error. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the sentencing order did contain a calculation error, and that that when this matter was remanded for a recalculation of Defendant's sentence, he should be resentenced entirely by another judge. Therefore, the Court did not reach Defendant's issue of whether the Superior Court judge's comments evidenced a closed mind. View "DeJohn v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Chancellor correctly interpreted 15 Del. C. Sec. 3306, which allows political parties to replace candidates who become incapacitated. The Court held that under the statute, the term "incapacity" includes situations where a candidate would be practically incapable of fulfilling the duties of office in a minimally adequate way. In determining whether the standard was met, the Chancellor could consider events that occurred after the candidate withdrew. In this case, the Court concluded the withdrawing candidate was incapacitated and therefore affirmed the Court of Chancery's judgment. View "Sussex County Dept. of Elections, et al. v. Sussex County Republican Committee, et al." on Justia Law