Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A State Trooper stopped a Hells Angels member for speeding. When asked where he was going, the defendant "cordially" declined to answer. The State Trooper informed the defendant he would pat him down, and the defendant revealed he possessed two handguns. The State appealed the trial court's ultimate decision to suppress evidence of the handguns that were used to support two counts of carrying a concealed weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court judge's grant of defendant's motion to suppress because under the totality of the circumstances, no particularized, reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant was armed and dangerous existed. View "Delaware v. Abel" on Justia Law

A passenger in a car stopped by the police for illegally tinted windows claimed to have no identification and provided the officer with a false identity. The driver was not permitted to operate the car further, and officers were prepared to allow the passenger to drive so long as he had his license. After a database search returned no results, the officer handcuffed the passenger and recovered a gun during a pat down. The passenger was later charged by a grand jury of possessing a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, receiving a stolen firearm, and criminal impersonation. The passenger appealed his convictions, maintaining that officers lacked probable cause for detaining and arresting him, and the that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence the officers found that was ultimately used against him. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the officer possessed probable cause to arrest the passenger for criminal impersonation. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial judge's denial of a motion to suppress the gun. View "Stafford v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant Dallas Drummond, Jr., directly appealed to the Supreme Court after having been convicted by a Superior Court jury on two counts of First Degree Rape and one count of Unlawful Conduct Against a Child by a Sex Offender. Defendant claimed that the trial court reversibly erred by denying his (and the State's) joint motion to sever the Rape charges from the Unlawful Conduct charge. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided "Monceaux v. State" which relevantly held that a trial court "must use a bifurcated procedure in all future [Unlawful Conduct Against a Child by a Sex Offender] cases." Because "Monceaux" controlled this case, the Court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Drummond v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Solomon Collins appealed his convictions by a jury of Murder First Degree, two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and three counts of Reckless Endangering First Degree. Collins was charged with the shooting death of Tommear Tinnin. At trial, the State offered into evidence two out-of-court statements that identified Collins as the shooter of Tinnin. The declarants, Violet Gibson and Shakira Romeo, denied making the statements during their in-court testimony. The statements were admitted into evidence based upon the testimony of Detective Patrick Conner, the officer who interviewed Gibson and Romeo. After eleven hours of deliberation, the jury reported to the trial judge that they were deadlocked. The trial judge gave an "Allen" charge and instructed the jury to deliberate further. Two hours later, the jury returned the guilty verdicts. Collins raised three claims on appeal: (1) there was an insufficient foundation to admit into evidence the out-of-court statement of Gibson; (2) there was an insufficient foundation to admit into evidence the out-of-court statement of Romeo; and (3) that the trial judge erred in administering an Allen charge, which, as administered, was coercive. "Gibson and Romeo were classic turncoat witnesses." The Supreme Court concluded that the testimony at trial presented a sufficient foundation for the admission of their out of-court statements: the record showed that their out-of-court statements were given voluntarily, they were each subject to cross examination at trial, and their in-court testimony touched on both the events perceived and the content of their prior statements. The Court also concluded that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in giving an Allen charge. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Collins v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Cookie A. Hunter appealed his judgments of conviction, after a Superior Court jury trial, of Assault in the Second Degree, Resisting Arrest with Force or Violence, and Driving Under the Influence, First Offense. Defendant raised two issues in his direct appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) it was error for the trial judge to admit the results of his blood alcohol content (BAC) blood test into evidence because the foundational requirements necessary to admit that scientific evidence were not met; (2) the trial judge erred by not granting his motions for judgments of acquittal on the Assault and Resisting Arrest charges, because the State failed to preserve the videotape that recorded the events that led to those charges. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the results of the BAC test were erroneously admitted into evidence. Therefore, the DUI judgment of conviction was reversed. Furthermore, the Court determined that Defendant's motions for judgments of acquittal on the Assault and Resisting Arrest charges were properly denied. Consequently, the judgments of the Superior Court were affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Hunter v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Pablo Melendez appealed his convictions after a Superior Court jury trial stemming from numerous actual and attempted robberies. Defendant was convicted of: eighteen counts of Robbery in the First Degree, thirty-three counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, eleven counts of Wearing a Disguise, six counts of Conspiracy in the Second Degree, six counts of Aggravated Menacing, eight counts of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, and one count of Reckless Endangering in the First Degree. In this appeal, Defendant claimed that the trial judge erred by admitting "improper witness bolstering and needlessly cumulative evidence when, despite their lack of personal knowledge, [two] police [officers] were allowed to provide their own interpretations and opinions of what happened during the [crimes]." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant waived his claim by failing to raise it at trial. Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court were affirmed. View "Damiani-Melendez v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellant George Sweeney appealed a superior court order that affirmed a Merit Employee Relations Board (MERB) order denying his appeal from the Delaware Department of Transportation’s (DelDOT) termination of his employment. While working as a Delaware government employee in a state government building, Sweeney made three postings on an internet forum about his personal political campaign. 29 Del. C. 5954 mandates that any government employee who engages in "political activity" at work must be terminated from his employment. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the Superior Court order determining that Section 5954 did not violate Sweeney’s First Amendment right to free speech. However, the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the Superior Court for further proceedings to consider: (1) what constitutes "political activity" under Section 5954; and (2) whether Section 5954 is unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. View "Sweeney v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Leslie D. Small appealed his convictions of two counts of First Degree Murder, three counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, First Degree Robbery, and Second Degree Burglary. The trial judge sentenced Small to death. Small made two arguments on appeal: (1) that the judge violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by allowing testimony that Small refused to discuss the crime during his mental evaluation; and (2) that the prosecutor’s characterization of mitigating circumstances as “excuses” jeopardized the fairness and integrity of the penalty hearing. Because the Supreme Court found the prosecutor’s repeated characterization of mitigating evidence as excuses to be plain error, the Court reversed the imposition of the death sentence and remanded the case for a new penalty hearing.

After a first trial, at which a jury convicted the Defendant Dallas Drummond of three crimes, the Supreme Court remanded for a new trial because the Superior Court judge failed to thoroughly inform the defendant about the significance of his decision to waive counsel. During retrial, the trial judge allowed the State to present a record of the testimony given at the first trial. Later, a prosecution witness referenced the defendant's criminal history while responding to a question on cross examination. After being convicted again, Defendant appealed, claiming that reading of the prior testimony, and the witness' reference, were admitted in error and warranted a new trial. Finding no merit to Defendant's argument, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Defendant-Appellant Earl Bradley, a former pediatrician, was found guilty of fourteen counts of Rape in the First Degree, five counts of Assault in the Second Degree, and five counts of Sexual Exploitation of a Child for acts of sexual and physical abuse committed against children. He was sentenced to fourteen mandatory life sentences and 164 years at Level V imprisonment for these crimes. Defendant raised two claims in his appeal, both relating to the Superior Court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during the execution of a warrant. Defendant argued that the warrant itself was defective because the affidavit in support of the search warrant application did not allege facts establishing probable cause that the patients' medical files would be found in an outbuilding on the property where he practiced, would be contained in digital format, or would relate to the crimes described in the search warrant application. Defendant also contended that the police exceeded the scope of the search warrant by proceeding with a general search to locate and seize evidence without probable cause. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the issuing judge had sufficient facts before him to make a practical, common-sense determination that evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime could be found in the patients' medical files, whether in paper or digital format. The Court also held that it was objectively reasonable to conclude that Bradley used the white outbuilding identified in the warrant for medical examinations, and that patient files could be found there. The Supreme Court held that the police acted reasonably in executing the warrant with respect to the evidence that was introduced at Bradley's trial. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Defendant's claims lacked merit and affirmed.