Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In this appeal the issue before the Supreme Court concerned whether the affidavit filed in support of a search warrant supported a magistrate's finding of probable cause. The affidavit described a confidential source as "past proven and reliable" without explaining the basis for that statement. In addition, the affidavit described the activities of a "drug detection K-9," but it did not state that the dog was trained and certified. Notwithstanding these omissions, the totality of the circumstances supported the magistrate's decision authorizing the search warrant. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Elizabeth, Edmond, John and James Plummer appealed a Superior Court order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee R.T. Vanderbilt Co., Inc. Vanderbilt moved to dismiss the Plummers' appeal as untimely. Vanderbilt took the position that the Superior Court's June 28, 2011 dismissal order was the final order in the matter below. Thus, Vanderbilt contended, the Plummers' notice of appeal filed on September 6, 2011 was untimely under Supreme Court Rule 6(a)(i). Vanderbilt argued in the alternative that if the June 28 Order was not the final order, the appeal is interlocutory and any appeal must await entry of a final order. The Plummers contended that their appeal was timely and not interlocutory because a Special Master's August 9, 2011 order dismissing nine defendants and not the June 28 Order, constituted the final order. The Plummers contended that under accepted Superior Court practice, the June 28 Order was not understood to be final. After its review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the June 28 Order was the only final order in this case and that no court error contributed to the Plummers' delayed filing of this appeal. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the Plummers' appeal as untimely under Supreme Court Rule 29(b).

Defendant-Appellant Maurice Williams appealed his Superior Court conviction and sentence for Violation of Probation. Defendant contended on appeal that the Superior Court abused its discretion when it found him in Violation of Probation following his escape from Level IV custody, because he would not have been in custody but for an illegal sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no merit to Defendant's appeal and affirmed his conviction and sentence.

This case centered on whether a Justice of the Peace properly granted a search warrant based on the information in the affidavit of probable cause placed before her. "When reviewing a motion to suppress the evidence police discovered while executing a search warrant, Superior Court judges should give substantial deference to the magistrate's finding on the existence of probable cause. Resolution of this case require[d] elaboration about the meaning of 'substantial deference.' Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "substantial deference" means that if some facts in the affidavit of probable cause support the inference that evidence of criminal activity exists in a particular place, the Superior Court judge should affirm the issuance of a search warrant. Consequently, the Court reversed the Superior Court's judgment granting the motion to suppress, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Pro se prisoner Defendant-Appellant Damar Smith appealed his conviction and sentence for Rape in the Third Degree, Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree, and Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited. His notice of appeal was received by the Supreme Court on February 28, 2012, one day after the thirty-day deadline to appeal from his January 27, 2012 sentence. The Court directed Defendant to show cause as to why his appeal should not have been dismissed under Rule 29(b). The Court then directed the State to file a supplemental memorandum addressing whether the Court should re-examine its holding in "Carr v. Delaware" and adopt the Federal "mailbox rule" set forth in "Houston v. Lack." The State took the position that the Court should again decline to adopt the federal prison mailbox rule. Amicus curiae argued that the Court should adopt the rule, in light of changed prison mail procedures and for the policy reasons set forth in "Houston" and subsequent cases. Last year, in "Hickman v. Delaware," the Delaware Supreme Court considered the same issue and declined to adopt the federal prison mailbox rule; it reached the same conclusion in this case. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Defendant's appeal as untimely.

Plaintiff Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. appealed a Chancery Court judgment granting Defendant Vulcan Materials Company relief on its counterclaims, and an accompanying injunction. The Chancery Court enjoined Martin for a four month period from continuing to prosecute its pending Exchange Offer and Proxy Contest to acquire control of Vulcan. That injunctive relief was granted to remedy Martin's adjudicated violations of two contracts between Martin and Vulcan: a Non-Disclosure Letter Agreement (the "NDA") and a Common Interest, Joint Defense and Confidentiality Agreement (the "JDA"). Finding that the Chancery Court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the equities favored Vulcan, the Supreme Court affirmed that court's decision.

Three officers completed a traffic stop, making "ancillary, permissible inquiries." A probation officer continued to question one of the car's passengers, a probationer, even though the officer testified he had no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Officers testified that the car was leaving a "drug area." And drugs were found in the car following the stop. The passenger-probationer was on probation for drug charges. He was ultimately arrested following that stop, and he challenged his arrest on the grounds that officers lacked probable cause to make the arrest. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed: "[a]n officer who pulls a car over for speeding does not thereby gain free rein to ask as many questions, for as long a time, as he might wish. Further investigation requires further justification. . . . [the Defendant's] continued detention constituted an impermissible seizure, and the questioning itself violated even the limited rights possessed by a probationer."

Petitioner-Appellant Vanessa Wright appealed a Family Court decision that awarded alimony to Respondent-Appellee David Wright as a result of divorce proceedings. On appeal, Wife contended that: (1) the Family Court abused its discretion and violated her rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 1 of the Delaware Constitution by reducing her tithing when calculating her monthly expenses; and (2) the Family Court erred in its analysis under title 13, section 1512(c) of the Delaware Code by reducing the Husband's earning capacity calculation, and thus requiring the Wife to pay more in alimony. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that both of the Wife's arguments were without merit.

Plaintiff-Appellant Stephanie Smith appealed a Superior Court's award of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Delaware State University ("DSU") on her claims of wrongful termination under the Delaware Whistleblowers' Protection Act, of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and of common law defamation. Plaintiff raised three arguments on appeal: (1) that the Superior Court erred in finding that Plaintiff failed to present evidence that she was constructively discharged from DSU, sufficient to support a claim under the Act; (2) that the Superior Court erred in failing to consider whether a threat to worsen her working environment could give rise to a claim under the Act; (3) that the Superior Court erred by granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's defamation claim based on her failure to produce any evidence of damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court recognized that a constructive discharge could give rise to a Whistleblower Act claim, but concluded that the Superior Court properly granted summary judgment based on the facts alleged in this case. Because Plaintiff's defamation claim was governed by New York law, it was barred by New York's one-year statute of limitations. Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DSU.

Defendant Bruce Rowan appealed his conviction on 56 counts of breach of condition of release. Defendant was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child, and five counts of fourth degree rape, but he did not challenge those convictions. With respect to the breach of condition convictions, Defendant argued that the Superior Court erred in: 1) denying his motion to dismiss; 2) admitting into evidence tape recordings of his telephone calls from prison to the victim; and 3) admitting into evidence certain bond paperwork from the Justice of the Peace Court. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found find no merit to these arguments, and affirmed Defendant's convictions.