Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from her convictions for Assault Second Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During Commission of a Felony, and Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited. The court held that the superior court did not err in giving the jury flight instructions where the instructions were appropriate in light of the facts of the case and that the instruction was not a comment on the evidence in violation of Article IV, Section 19 of the Delaware Constitution. The court also held that the superior court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on Assault Third Degree. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was found guilty on multiple counts of robbery, conspiracy, and various possession offenses. Defendant appealed from the denial of his untimely motion to suppress, contending that the Superior Court abused its discretion by not permitting him to move to suppress, out of time, his incriminating statement to a police officer on grounds that he was arrested without probable cause and that his incriminating statement was involuntary. The court held that defendant failed to prove that exceptional circumstances prevented him from filing a timely motion to suppress. Defendant was not precluded from seeking relief pursuant to a Rule 61 motion for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

The State indicted defendant on four counts: possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, receiving a stolen firearm, and criminal impersonation. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and the trial judge found defendant guilty of all the offenses except receiving a stolen firearm. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial judge improperly refused to suppress the gun because an illegitimate search resulted in its seizure. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial judge where defendant gave the officer an improbable name and address, and therefore the officer had the power to arrest him and conduct a search incident to arrest.

Defendant was indicted on nine counts, including aggravated menacing, reckless endangering, and possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited (PDWBPP). At issue was whether the Superior Court properly applied Delaware's habitual offender statute when it imposed an enhanced minimum sentence on a person whose fourth felony was PDWBPP. Because the indictment identified a non-violent felony as the crime that made him a person "prohibited," defendant argued that his fourth conviction was not a violent felony. The trial court held otherwise and the court agreed. A person became a violent felon the first time that person was convicted of one of the statutorily designated violent felonies. Thereafter, the person retained the status of "violent felon" for any future convictions. Accordingly, defendant's PDWBPP conviction was a violent felony and his minimum sentence was the 8 year statutory maximum penalty for that offense.

Defendant appealed from the Superior Court's denial of his untimely motion to suppress. On appeal, defendant contended that the Superior Court abused its discretion by not permitting him to move to suppress, out of time, his incriminating statement to a police officer on grounds that he was arrested without probable cause and that his incriminating statement was involuntary. Defendant had not shown that the motion was based on evidence not available as of the deadline for motions to suppress, or that extraordinary circumstances precluded the filing of a timely motion. Therefore, the court concluded that defendant's contention was without merit because the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely where defendant was not precluded from seeking relief pursuant to a Rule 61 motion for post-conviction relief.

The court consolidated appeals concerning accomplice testimony to determine whether a trial judge must give a cautionary instruction on testimony offered by a witness who claimed to have been defendant's accomplice, even if the defense did not request it, and to determine the appropriate content of an accomplice instruction. The court held that a trial judge who failed to give an instruction about accomplice testimony committed plain error. The court also held that trial judges must give a modified version of the instruction from Bland v. State whenever the State offered accomplice testimony against the accused. Combined, these two holdings provided clear guidance to trial judges: give the modified Bland instruction or commit plain error.

Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery in the first degree and sentenced to 25 years at level V. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the following: (1) the trial judge erroneously denied him a missing evidence instruction; (2) an officer's out of court identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive and unreliable; (3) the trial judge abused his discretion by asking the prospective jury panel two voir dire questions pertaining to mental illnesses and illicit drug use; (4) the manner in which the trial judge conducted his colloquy violated defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial; (5) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction; (6) the trial judge erred by not, sua sponte, expounding upon the wording of the statue or providing a single-theory unanimity instruction; (7) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; (8) defendant's conviction and sentencing for both attempted carjacking and attempted robbery first degree constituted prohibited cumulative punishment in violation of constitutional protections against double jeopardy; and (9) the trial judge made an erroneous finding of fact by concluding that defendant had rejected the State's modified plea agreement. The court found that the issues defendant raised had no merit and therefore affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed from a Family Court sentencing order initially entered when he was a juvenile where he robbed a woman with a BB gun. Defendant contended that the Family Court did not have the authority to sentence him, at the outset, to twelve months of adult probation following his juvenile commitment. Because the statute the Family Court relied upon affirmatively provided only two circumstances, not present in this case, where the Family Court could sentence a juvenile to adult probation, the court found that the General Assembly intended to limit the authority of the Family Court to impose adult consequences on the juvenile. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a correction of the sentence order.

Defendant was convicted of attempted murder in the first degree, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, and possession of ammunition by a person prohibited. On appeal, defendant argued that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the Superior Court admitted into evidence hearsay statements by persons who did not testify at the trial. The court concluded that the erroneous admission of the testimonial hearsay evidence was harmless and therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed.

Appellant Roger Johnson was convicted of two counts of robbery in the first degree and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and one count of conspiracy in the second degree. Johnson filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging, in pertinent part, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction under Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 274 (a 274 jury instruction). The superior court denied Johnson's petition in 2007. Johnson subsequently filed a second petition for postconviction relief, again arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a 274 jury instruction and citing the Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Allen v. State. The superior court denied Johnson's motion as procedrually barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court properly denied Johnson's second postconviction motion as procedurally barred, and (2) the issue of the 274 jury instruction did not warrant exceptional consideration.