Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a Tier I sex offender, was arrested for violating 11 Del. C. 4120(f) by failing to register his wife's Bridgeville address. At issue was whether the term "residence" should be defined for purposes of a sex offender registration statute, and whether there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for violating the statute. The court held that the term "residence" should be given its commonly accepted dictionary definition - a place where one actually and habitually lived, as opposed to a place where one stays temporarily. The trial court decided that "residence" meant a permanent or temporary place of abode, and instructed the jury accordingly. Using the dictionary definition, the court concluded that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant had changed his residence where defendant went "back and forth" between his wife's house in Bridgeville and his parents' house in Georgetown.

Defendant was found guilty of Conspiracy to Commit First-Degree Murder, but acquitted of First-Degree Murder and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony. Defendant appealed from the Conspiracy conviction, claiming that the Superior Court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the evidence was legally insufficient. The court held that a rational juror could infer from the evidence that defendant wanted a co-conspirator to retaliate, that he knew the co-conspirator intended to use a deadly weapon to accomplish that retaliation, and that the shooter (whether defendant or the co-conspirator) carried out the plan exactly as intended. Given those reasonable inferences from the evidence introduced at trial, a rational juror could have also concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant conspired to commit First-Degree Murder. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed from his convictions for Reckless Burning, Burglary in the Third Degree, two counts of Criminal Trespass in the Third Degree, and three counts of Arson in the Second Degree. At issue was the trial judge's decision allowing a latent fingerprint examiner, who had also been trained in tire track and shoeprint analyses, to testify as an expert that boot and tire tracks at arson scenes were consistent with defendant's boot and tire on his mountain bike. The trial judge found the examiner to be qualified by his knowledge, skill, training, experience or education under Rule 702 of the Delaware Rules of Evidence. The court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of three counts of issuing a bad check greater than $1,000. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial judge erred by failing to grant a motion for a new trial after discovering that Juror No. 8 was a victim in a pending criminal case and by failing to conduct a sufficient post trial inquiry. The court held that when a juror serving on a criminal trial was an alleged victim of a crime and was contemporaneously represented by the Attorney General's office in the prosecution of the alleged perpetrator of the crime against the juror "victim," a mere inquiry by deposition into whether the jury knew the prosecutor or anyone in his office insufficiently probed the ability of that "juror/victim" to render a fair and objective verdict as a matter of law. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded.

A jury found that defendant and a co-defendant had crashed through patio doors of the Warren family, shot and killed Kenneth Warren in front of his wife and their nineteen-month-old-son. For that crime, defendant was sentenced to death. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial judge erred in admitting the out-of-court statements of his co-defendant; defense counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate DNA issues; certain evidence demonstrated that defendant was innocent, or alternatively, that a new trial was required; defense counsel was ineffective in failing to rehabilitate prospective jurors or to object to the trial judge's dismissal of them; his death sentence was unconstitutional; and defense counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct an adequate mitigation investigation and to present that mitigation evidence to the trial judge and jury. The court held that defendant was not entitled to postconviction relief or a new trial where defendant's first claim was procedurally barred; defendant's second claim failed because he had not shown prejudice; defendant's third claim failed for the same reason; defendant's fourth claim failed because he had not shown that defense counsel's performance was deficient; defendant's fifth claim was procedurally barred; and defendant's sixth claim failed because he had not shown prejudice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of several crimes arising from the death of his fiancee and defendant was sentenced to death. Defendant subsequently appealed his convictions and death sentence. The court held that the trial court properly applied this court's holding in Cooke v. State to the circumstances of this case and did not deprive defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find defendant guilty of Abuse of a Corpse beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further held that the judge in this case imposed the death sentence after adequately careful and deliberate consideration. The court finally held that defendant's death sentence, on the facts of this case, was not unlawfully disproportionate compared to the sentences imposed in similar cases. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

The police arrested defendant at a private party and based on evidence seized on the night of defendant's arrest, a magistrate issued a warrant to search his home. While executing the warrant, police discovered drugs and firearms in defendant's residence. Defendant was subsequently convicted of drug crimes committed on the evening of the arrest and defendant was later convicted of drug and firearm offenses related to the items seized at his home. Defendant appealed both his convictions, contending that the Superior Court judge erred by denying his motions to suppress. The court held that because the police illegally seized defendant when they obtained the drugs leading to his initial arrest, the evidence against him, including evidence seized from defendant's home, constituted inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree. Accordingly, the court reversed.

Defendant was convicted of crimes related to the attempted murder of the victim on January 26, 2006, and the subsequent murder of the victim on April 2, 2007. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's motion to sever the trial of the attempted murder case from the murder case; that his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury was violated when the evidence presented at trial did not clearly and convincingly establish the State's proffered "other crime" evidence of motive, due to the unwillingness of a State witness to testify; and his due process rights were violated when the trial judge denied his motions to suppress two separate pretrial eyewitness identifications. The court held that defendant's arguments were without merit and therefore, affirmed the judgments of the Superior Court.

Linda Thompson appealed from a Superior Court judgment reversing the determination of the Unemployment Appeals Board (UIAB) that good cause existed for Thompson's voluntary resignation and granting her unemployment benefits. Thompson contended that good cause existed for voluntarily terminating her employment, that she exhausted her administrative remedies, and that substantial evidence in the record supported the UIAB's decision. The court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court and held that substantial evidence did not support the UIAB's decision and the UIAB erred as a matter of law by concluding that Thompson was entitled to benefits pursuant to 19 Del. C. 3314(1).

Defendant was convicted of robbery first degree and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (PFDCF) for robbing Barbara Santana at gunpoint. At defendant's jury trial, defendant's counsel proffered evidence of a different bank robbery (Artisans' Robbery) that recently had occurred across the street from the bank were Santana was robbed. Counsel called the man who had pled guilty to that crime, Joseph Blevins, as a witness in defendant's trial in an attempt to create a reasonable doubt that defendant had robbed Santana. At issue was whether the trial judge abused his discretion by precluding defendant's proffer of exculpatory evidence to establish a reasonable doubt that someone else could have committed the crime charged. The court held that the exculpatory evidence could have been admitted where defense counsel could have presented the jury with the facts of the Artisans' Robbery and photographs of Blevins or where defense counsel could have presented the jury with the facts of the Artisans' Robbery and then have Blevins identified in court as an exhibit to avoid the concern that Blevins might invoke his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. The court held that if the trial judge had employed either of those methods, the probative value of the relevant evidence would not have been substantially outweighed by the dangers of confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. Accordingly, the court held that the evidence was admissible and reversed and remanded for a new trial.