Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from the Superior Court's denial of his untimely motion to suppress. On appeal, defendant contended that the Superior Court abused its discretion by not permitting him to move to suppress, out of time, his incriminating statement to a police officer on grounds that he was arrested without probable cause and that his incriminating statement was involuntary. Defendant had not shown that the motion was based on evidence not available as of the deadline for motions to suppress, or that extraordinary circumstances precluded the filing of a timely motion. Therefore, the court concluded that defendant's contention was without merit because the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely where defendant was not precluded from seeking relief pursuant to a Rule 61 motion for post-conviction relief.

The court consolidated appeals concerning accomplice testimony to determine whether a trial judge must give a cautionary instruction on testimony offered by a witness who claimed to have been defendant's accomplice, even if the defense did not request it, and to determine the appropriate content of an accomplice instruction. The court held that a trial judge who failed to give an instruction about accomplice testimony committed plain error. The court also held that trial judges must give a modified version of the instruction from Bland v. State whenever the State offered accomplice testimony against the accused. Combined, these two holdings provided clear guidance to trial judges: give the modified Bland instruction or commit plain error.

Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery in the first degree and sentenced to 25 years at level V. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the following: (1) the trial judge erroneously denied him a missing evidence instruction; (2) an officer's out of court identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive and unreliable; (3) the trial judge abused his discretion by asking the prospective jury panel two voir dire questions pertaining to mental illnesses and illicit drug use; (4) the manner in which the trial judge conducted his colloquy violated defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial; (5) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction; (6) the trial judge erred by not, sua sponte, expounding upon the wording of the statue or providing a single-theory unanimity instruction; (7) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; (8) defendant's conviction and sentencing for both attempted carjacking and attempted robbery first degree constituted prohibited cumulative punishment in violation of constitutional protections against double jeopardy; and (9) the trial judge made an erroneous finding of fact by concluding that defendant had rejected the State's modified plea agreement. The court found that the issues defendant raised had no merit and therefore affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed from a Family Court sentencing order initially entered when he was a juvenile where he robbed a woman with a BB gun. Defendant contended that the Family Court did not have the authority to sentence him, at the outset, to twelve months of adult probation following his juvenile commitment. Because the statute the Family Court relied upon affirmatively provided only two circumstances, not present in this case, where the Family Court could sentence a juvenile to adult probation, the court found that the General Assembly intended to limit the authority of the Family Court to impose adult consequences on the juvenile. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a correction of the sentence order.

Defendant was convicted of attempted murder in the first degree, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, and possession of ammunition by a person prohibited. On appeal, defendant argued that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the Superior Court admitted into evidence hearsay statements by persons who did not testify at the trial. The court concluded that the erroneous admission of the testimonial hearsay evidence was harmless and therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed.

Appellant Roger Johnson was convicted of two counts of robbery in the first degree and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and one count of conspiracy in the second degree. Johnson filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging, in pertinent part, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction under Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 274 (a 274 jury instruction). The superior court denied Johnson's petition in 2007. Johnson subsequently filed a second petition for postconviction relief, again arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a 274 jury instruction and citing the Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Allen v. State. The superior court denied Johnson's motion as procedrually barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court properly denied Johnson's second postconviction motion as procedurally barred, and (2) the issue of the 274 jury instruction did not warrant exceptional consideration.

Defendant, a Tier I sex offender, was arrested for violating 11 Del. C. 4120(f) by failing to register his wife's Bridgeville address. At issue was whether the term "residence" should be defined for purposes of a sex offender registration statute, and whether there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for violating the statute. The court held that the term "residence" should be given its commonly accepted dictionary definition - a place where one actually and habitually lived, as opposed to a place where one stays temporarily. The trial court decided that "residence" meant a permanent or temporary place of abode, and instructed the jury accordingly. Using the dictionary definition, the court concluded that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant had changed his residence where defendant went "back and forth" between his wife's house in Bridgeville and his parents' house in Georgetown.

Defendant was found guilty of Conspiracy to Commit First-Degree Murder, but acquitted of First-Degree Murder and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony. Defendant appealed from the Conspiracy conviction, claiming that the Superior Court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the evidence was legally insufficient. The court held that a rational juror could infer from the evidence that defendant wanted a co-conspirator to retaliate, that he knew the co-conspirator intended to use a deadly weapon to accomplish that retaliation, and that the shooter (whether defendant or the co-conspirator) carried out the plan exactly as intended. Given those reasonable inferences from the evidence introduced at trial, a rational juror could have also concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant conspired to commit First-Degree Murder. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed from his convictions for Reckless Burning, Burglary in the Third Degree, two counts of Criminal Trespass in the Third Degree, and three counts of Arson in the Second Degree. At issue was the trial judge's decision allowing a latent fingerprint examiner, who had also been trained in tire track and shoeprint analyses, to testify as an expert that boot and tire tracks at arson scenes were consistent with defendant's boot and tire on his mountain bike. The trial judge found the examiner to be qualified by his knowledge, skill, training, experience or education under Rule 702 of the Delaware Rules of Evidence. The court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of three counts of issuing a bad check greater than $1,000. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial judge erred by failing to grant a motion for a new trial after discovering that Juror No. 8 was a victim in a pending criminal case and by failing to conduct a sufficient post trial inquiry. The court held that when a juror serving on a criminal trial was an alleged victim of a crime and was contemporaneously represented by the Attorney General's office in the prosecution of the alleged perpetrator of the crime against the juror "victim," a mere inquiry by deposition into whether the jury knew the prosecutor or anyone in his office insufficiently probed the ability of that "juror/victim" to render a fair and objective verdict as a matter of law. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded.