Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Delaware Supreme Court
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Heather Juliano was a passenger was passenger in an SUV that was stopped because of a suspected seat-belt violation. One of the investigating officers detected an odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. Based on that odor alone, the occupants of the vehicle, including Juliano, were immediately ordered out of the vehicle and placed under arrest. The police searched Juliano at the scene and then transported her to their station where they told her that they intended to perform a strip search, prompting Juliano to admit that she had concealed contraband— marijuana and cocaine—in her pants. Juliano was then escorted to another room where she retrieved and handed over the drugs. Juliano was then charged with several drug offenses. Juliano moved to suppress the drugs that the police seized from her, claiming, among other things, that her arrest and the ensuing searches were not supported by probable cause. The State responded that the odor of marijuana emanating from the area of the vehicle where Juliano was seated and on her person provided probable cause for Juliano’s arrest. And, the State argued, because the arrest was lawful, the searches of Juliano at the scene and at the station were incident to her arrest and hence lawful. In two separate orders, one following the suppression hearing and the other on remand by the Delaware Supreme Court of that first order, the Family Court agreed with the State and denied Juliano’s motion. On appeal, Juliano contended that, although the odor of marijuana could support the extension of a traffic stop or serve as a factor contributing to probable cause to search a person or vehicle, it did not, standing alone, authorize a full custodial arrest. The Supreme Court found that under the totality of the circumstances presented by the State in this case, including the vagueness of the officers’ description of the marijuana odor, the timing of their detection of that odor, and the absence of any other observations indicative of criminality, Juliano’s arrest was unreasonable and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution. "It follows that the evidence obtained following Juliano’s unlawful arrest should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. This being so, we reverse." View "Juliano v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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Diamonte Taylor was convicted by jury for gang-related murder and violent felonies. On direct appeal, Taylor claimed the superior court should have suppressed evidence from his smartphones collected under an unconstitutional search warrant. After review, the Delaware Supreme Court determined that unlimited in time and scope, the general warrant to search Taylor’s smartphones violated Taylor’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution, and the particularity requirement under Delaware statutory law. The evidence should have been suppressed and the error was not harmless. The Court therefore reversed his convictions and remanded to the superior court for a new trial without the taint of the improperly seized evidence. View "Taylor v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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Prior to sentencing, defendant Jerry Reed sought to withdraw his guilty plea, but his counsel refused to file a motion to do so, apparently under the belief that no grounds justifying a plea withdrawal were present. The Superior Court refused to consider his pro se motion because he was represented by counsel. As Reed put it, he became stuck in a Catch-22 due to the operation of two Superior Court Criminal Rules. The Delaware Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant’s control of the objectives of the representation prior to sentencing required counsel either obey an instruction to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, or seek leave to withdraw so that the defendant could file the motion with other counsel or pro se. Because the factual record in this case was incomplete, and because some of the Superior Court’s factual findings were not supported by the record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for additional fact-finding necessary to determine whether Reed’s claims for ineffective assistance of counsel had merit. View "Reed v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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In 2019, Jason White was convicted of eight crimes related to possessing and dealing narcotics. White filed a timely direct appeal, arguing that the Superior Court abused its discretion by allowing the State to admit text messages without proper authentication, and that the prosecutor made improper comments during his rebuttal summation by misstating the burden of proof, denigrating the role of defense counsel, and vouching for evidence. Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and record on appeal, and after oral argument, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment: the State provided sufficient evidence to authenticate the text messages, and the prosecutor did not make improper remarks warranting reversal during his rebuttal summation. View "White v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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Appellant Kili Mayfield was convicted at a bench trial of Rape in the First Degree (two counts), Rape in the Second Degree (four counts), Kidnapping in the First Degree (one count), Strangulation (one count), and Assault in the Third Degree (one count). In pre-trial proceedings, he was initially represented by counsel from the Public Defender Division of the Office of Defense Services. Several months before trial Mayfield filed a motion indicating he wished to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. The Superior Court held a hearing and granted the motion. On appeal, Mayfield did not dispute that the Superior Court committed no error in granting his motion to waive counsel and proceed pro se. At a conference held the day before his scheduled trial date, however, Mayfield informed the trial judge for the first time that he had decided that representing himself was not in his best interest. He requested time to retain private counsel. In the alternative, he requested that the Public Defender’s Office be reappointed to represent him at trial. After fully considering Mayfield’s requests, the judge determined that granting either request would necessitate a trial delay. He also determined that the trial should go forward as scheduled the next day, that the continuance that either of Mayfield’s requests would entail should be denied, and that his request for counsel should, therefore, be denied. The trial did commence the next day, with Mayfield representing himself. Mayfield claimed on appeal the trial judge’s denial of his request for reappointment of the Public Defender’s Office to represent him at trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected Mayfield’s claim and affirmed the Superior Court judgment. View "Mayfield v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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Murad Diggs was convicted of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a person prohibited. In his direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, Diggs claimed the Superior Court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized from him - the firearm and ammunition - following an investigative detention and frisk that was, in Diggs’s view, unsupported by reasonable suspicion. More specifically, Diggs challenged the court’s conclusion that the tip upon which the police were acting came from a “citizen informant” and therefore was presumptively reliable. Diggs also contended the Superior Court’s suppression-hearing factual determinations were flawed because the court failed to draw a “lost and/or missing evidence” inference as a result of the police’s failure to collect and preserve certain evidence. Although the Supreme Court agreed, in part, with Diggs’s criticism of the Superior Court’s “citizen-informant” analysis, it disagreed with his conclusion that his seizure was not supported by sufficient reasonable suspicion. Likewise, the Court rejected Diggs’s contention that the Superior Court’s failure to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution - an inference that Diggs did not urge the court to draw at trial - was plainly erroneous. Hence, the Court affirmed the Superior Court judgment. View "Diggs v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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Appellant Kili Mayfield was convicted at a bench trial for two counts of first-degree rape, four counts of second-degree rape, one count of first-degree kidnapping, one count of strangulation, and one counts of third-degree assault. In pre-trial proceedings, he was initially represented by counsel from the Public Defender Division of the Office of Defense Services. Several months before trial, Mayfield filed a motion indicating he wished to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. The Superior Court held a hearing and granted the motion. On appeal, Mayfield did not dispute that the Superior Court did not err in granting his motion to waive counsel and proceed pro se. At a conference held the day before his scheduled trial date, however, Mayfield informed the trial judge for the first time that he had decided that representing himself was not in his best interest. He requested time to retain private counsel. In the alternative, he requested that the Public Defender’s Office be reappointed to represent him at trial. After fully considering Mayfield’s requests, the judge determined that trial should go forward as scheduled the next day, that a continuance should be denied, and that his request for counsel should, therefore, be denied. The judge noted that Mayfield had been "vigorous" in his own defense, his filings showing he had "gone through all the discovery materials and prepared himself." The court concluded, “Mayfield’s request and the basis for his request are not outweighed by the other prejudice that would be visited by a continuance.” Mayfield’s bench trial began as scheduled the next day and resulted in the aforementioned convictions. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, finding the Superior Court acted within its discretion when it denied Mayfield’s request for counsel and a continuance. View "Mayfield v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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In January 2006, two armed assailants fatally shot Tameka Giles in the back after a botched robbery attempt while she was walking with her husband. After multiple police interrogations in the two years following the murder, Ronald Harris repeatedly told police he knew nothing about the crime and had not been involved. But on the eve of trial and after jury selection, Harris was offered and accepted a plea deal in exchange for testimony against Mark Purnell. Purnell’s court-appointed trial attorney was the same advocate who represented Dawan Harris in a weapons prosecution earlier in the murder investigation. The trial judge did not permit him to withdraw when he brought the conflict to the State’s and court’s attention. Trial counsel failed to investigate evidentiary leads implicating Dawan Harris, did not call him as a witness, and failed to present even then-known or obvious evidence and argument to the jury that would have inculpated his former client. The jury convicted Purnell of Second Degree Murder and all other charges after more than a day of deliberation, and he was sentenced to forty-five years of unsuspended Level V incarceration. In 2009, based on narrow issues presented to the Delaware Supreme Court (which did not include the conflict), his conviction and sentence were upheld. Following the denial of his direct appeal, Purnell filed a pro se Rule 61 motion raising ten grounds for relief, of which the first was an objection to his trial counsel’s conflict of interest. Postconviction counsel filed an amended motion asserting only three grounds, and did not include the conflict claim. The Superior Court denied Purnell’s motion and, again without having the conflict brought to the Supreme Court's attention, the Supreme Court affirmed that denial in 2014. Because postconviction counsel died a few weeks prior to oral argument before the Supreme Court in 2014, it was unknown why the conflict issue was not included in the amended motion. Due to that omission, the conflict claim went before the Supreme Court as one of Purnell’s grounds in an untimely, successive Rule 61 motion. "Ordinarily, having clarified the standards for newness and persuasiveness necessary for relief, we would remand the matter to the Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing and a decision guided by those rulings. But because Purnell has spent more than fourteen years in prison for murder based on a manifestly unfair trial and conviction, and based on his new evidence, viewed as a part of the entire evidentiary record, we are convinced that in this extraordinary case remand for an evidentiary hearing would serve no useful purpose. Instead, we reverse and remand for a new trial." View "Purnell v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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Following a bench trial, A.J. McMullen was convicted of Murder in the First Degree and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”). McMullen appealed his convictions, arguing the superior court improperly admitted cumulative statements from witnesses pursuant to 11 Del. C. 3507, and that the superior court’s verdict was supported by insufficient evidence identifying McMullen as the shooter who took the victim’s life. After review of the record, the Delaware Supreme Court found no merit in either of McMullen’s claims of error. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s decisions and judgment of conviction. View "McMullen v. Delaware" on Justia Law

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Appellant Jarreau Ayers was convicted on one count of Riot, two counts of Assault First Degree, four counts of Kidnapping First Degree, and one count of Conspiracy Second Degree for his participation in the February 1-2, 2017 inmate takeover of C Building at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (JTVCC). Ayers was found guilty of these offenses following a sixteen-day jury trial. On appeal, he contended the trial judge erred by not curing prosecutorial misconduct which occurred during the State’s rebuttal argument. At trial, Ayers claimed he was not a participant in the planning and execution of the takeover and was outside of C Building in the recreational yard when the takeover took place. The alleged improper argument came when the prosecutor said to the jury, “[y]ou spent the better part of the last month with Jarreau Ayers. What about Mr. Ayers suggests that . . . he’s not going to do exactly what he wants to do, which is to go inside and join in what’s happening there.” Ayers contended this part of the rebuttal argument was improper because it asked the jury to consider Ayers’ character in the courtroom as observed by the jury during the trial. Ayers objected to the prosecutor’s statement, but his objection was overruled. After review, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge’s failure to take steps to cure any alleged prejudice caused by the prosecutor's comment, if error, was harmless error. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Ayers v. Delaware" on Justia Law