Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Darth Heald was convicted by jury of unlawful sexual contact with a nine-year-old child and related charges. The alleged contact occurred when Heald brushed the back of his hand over the child’s clothed “private parts” during a “tag”-like game in which the player who is “it” chased the other players, who, if caught, are tickled rather than tagged. The prosecution’s case was centered more on what the child had reported to others than what she said on the witness stand. By contrast, the defense focused on testimony from other children who were present or nearby at the time of the alleged offense: accounts that contradicted the complainant’s version of important facts, and Heald’s testimony denying the essential elements of the charged offenses. This appeal addressed the Superior Court’s admission of evidence throughout the trial, sometimes over Heald’s objections and sometimes in the absence of any objection. The Delaware Supreme Court found no reversible error in the court’s evidentiary rulings. But the Court addressed Heald’s claim that improper comments in the prosecution’s opening statement and again in its closing argument cast doubt on the fairness and integrity of his trial. The Supreme Court found that because none of the challenged comments drew an objection from the defense, it was limited to reviewing them for plain error. The Court found several of the prosecutor's comments were indeed improper, and their cumulative effect compromised the fairness of Heald's trial. Consequently, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "Heald v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Appellant Jarreau Ayers was convicted on: one count of Riot; two counts of Assault First Degree; four counts of Kidnapping First Degree; and one count of Conspiracy Second Degree. These charges arose from his participation in the February 1-2, 2017 inmate takeover of C Building at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (JTVCC). Ayers was found guilty of these offenses following a sixteen-day jury trial. On appeal, he contended the trial judge erred by not curing prosecutorial misconduct which occurred during the State’s rebuttal argument. At trial, Ayers claimed that he was not a participant in the planning and execution of the takeover and was outside of C Building in the recreational yard when the takeover took place. The alleged improper argument came when the prosecutor said to the jury, “[y]ou spent the better part of the last month with Jarreau Ayers. What about Mr. Ayres suggests that . . . he’s not going to do exactly what he wants to do, which is to go inside and join in what’s happening there.” Ayers contended that this part of the rebuttal argument was improper because it asked the jury to consider Ayres’ character in the courtroom as observed by the jury during the trial. Ayers objected to the prosecutor’s statement, but his objection was overruled. After consideration of the record and the parties’ arguments, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded the trial judge’s failure to take steps to cure any alleged prejudice caused by the prosecutor’s comment, if error, was harmless error. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Ayers v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant Naifece Houston was charged with drug offenses following a traffic stop, and moved to suppress evidence on various grounds, including that the arresting officers impermissibly extended the stop to allow time for a drug-sniffing dog to arrive. In his motion to suppress, defendant asked the superior court to hold a Daubert hearing so that he could contest the admissibility of testimony from one of the arresting officers that he could detect an odor at the scene emanating from the defendant’s car - a “chemically smell” that the officer associated with large amounts of cocaine. Because the officer’s testimony was based on his training and experience as a police officer, according to defendant, it was “expert in nature,” triggering the trial court’s gatekeeping function under Daubert and its progeny. The superior court disagreed, concluding that the officer’s testimony was not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, but, rather, was lay opinion testimony admissible under Delaware Rule of Evidence 701. On that rationale, defendant appealed, arguing the superior court erred. And had defendant’s motion been granted, he contended the State would have been left with no evidence that he was guilty of the drug offenses with which he was charged. The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that both defendant and the State, and ultimately the Superior Court, mistakenly framed the issue in the proceedings below as hinging upon the admissibility of the officer’s testimony under the rules of evidence governing opinion testimony. "Thus, the true question before the superior court was whether the challenged testimony was sufficiently reliable to justify the officer’s suspicion that there was cocaine in the defendant’s car." The Supreme Court concluded the trial court’s admission of the officer’s testimony was not an abuse of discretion. Thus, judgment was affirmed. View "Houston v. Delaware" on Justia Law

McArthur Risper was convicted by jury of first-degree murder, first degree conspiracy, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony for his role in the May 2018 shooting death of Corey Bailey. The superior court sentenced Risper to life plus 30 years in prison. The theory of the prosecution was that Risper intentionally killed Bailey as revenge for Bailey’s theft of drugs and a firearm belonging to Risper. Risper claimed that the evidence of Bailey’s theft and Risper’s subsequent efforts to recover the stolen drugs and firearm was prior-misconduct evidence, and therefore inadmissible under Delaware rules of evidence. Furthermore, Risper claimed he did not receive a fair trial because the State did not disclose in a timely manner evidence that was favorable to the defense as required under Brady v. Maryland and its progeny. According to Risper, the State’s belated disclosures (one on the day before trial was to begin and the other on the fourth day of trial) fundamentally undermined the fairness of his trial. The Delaware Supreme Court agreed with Risper as to his second contention, concluding that the State’s failure to produce, until the afternoon before Risper’s trial was to begin, a recorded interview of an individual who told the chief investigating officer that another person had confessed to her that he had killed Bailey and showed her the gun used in the shooting was a violation of the State’s obligations under Brady. "And because that violation undermines our confidence in the outcome of Risper’s trial, we reverse and remand to the Superior Court for a new trial." View "Risper v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Defendant Damon Anderson was convicted by jury on five felonies for his involvement in a Wilmington drug dealing enterprise. The Superior Court declared Anderson an habitual offender and sentenced him to an aggregate thirty-two years of incarceration. Anderson argued on appeal: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever his case from that of co-defendants Eric Lloyd and Dwayne White; (2) the trial court should not have admitted gun evidence seized from a co-defendant’s apartment; (3) the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress evidence discovered following search warrants for his home, car, and cell phones; and (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on two charges. The Delaware Supreme Court found no merit to any of these contentions and affirmed the Superior Court. View "Anderson v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Eric Lloyd was convicted by jury of six felonies stemming from his involvement in a Wilmington drug dealing enterprise. The Superior Court sentenced Lloyd to an aggregate of thirty years of incarceration without the possibility of early release. On appeal, Lloyd challenged his convictions and sentence, contending: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever his case from that of co-defendant Dwayne White; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial after an eyewitness to a shooting misidentified Lloyd as the gunman; (3) the trial court should not have admitted gun evidence seized from a co-defendant’s apartment and rap music videos created by other enterprise members; (4) the trial court erred by allowing testimony from Lloyd’s former attorney’s secretary about a drug transaction. Finally, Lloyd argued the trial court violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by imposing consecutive sentences, resulting in thirty years of incarceration, without the option for early release. Finding no merit to these claims, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Lloyd's convictions. View "Lloyd v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In 1994, the Delaware General Assembly enacted a statute, applicable to both criminal and civil proceedings, that eased the evidentiary burden on the proponent of controlled-substance-testing evidence. The statute, "Subchapter III," allowed for the admission of, and a favorable presumption relating to, written reports from a forensic toxicologist or forensic chemist, without the necessity of their appearance in court, so long as the report complied with certain requirements. After Stephen Hairston was indicted on several criminal offenses, including serious drug offenses, he served a written demand on the State, which, by the unambiguous terms of the statute, required the presence at trial of, among other individuals, the officer who seized and packaged the substances that formed the basis of Hairston’s drug offenses. Upon the State’s pretrial motion in limine, however, the Superior Court, believing that the seizing and packaging officer was unavailable, relieved the State of its obligation to produce him and permitted another officer who was present at the scene of Hairston’s apprehension to appear in the seizing and packaging officer’s stead. The Superior Court’s ruling, according to Hairston, erroneously relieved the State of a mandatory statutory duty and violated Hairston’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Delaware Supreme Court held the Superior Court’s interpretation of the statute in question was erroneous as a matter of law and that, absent the appearance of the witness identified in Hairston’s demand, it was error for the court to admit the forensic chemist’s report and testimony. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Hairston v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Walter Hines appealed his conviction and sentence for second-degree assault, possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony (“PDWDCF”), and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child (“EWC”). Hines’s issue on appeal related to an incident that occurred on September 27, 2018. At that time, Hines lived with Valeah Lewis, her mother Juliann Congo, and Lewis’s children D.L. and T.L. Michael Gibbs was Lewis’s ex-boyfriend and was D.L.’s father. As Lewis and Hines were leaving for work, Gibbs and his girlfriend, Putrice Barnes, arrived at the Lewis residence to pick up D.L. After a verbal exchange, Hines and Lewis drove a short way down the street then stopped. Barnes testified that she “flipped the bird” as Lewis drove past. Hines, Lewis, Barnes, and Gibbs all agree that an altercation ensued shortly thereafter, but their accounts differ regarding the key details. Lewis asserted that Gibbs swung a tire iron at Hines, while Hines asserted Gibbs did not take the tire iron from Barnes but instead tried to punch him. Both Hines and Lewis agreed Hines retrieved a baseball bat from the back seat and used it defensively against Gibbs in response to Barnes’s and Gibbs’s aggression. On appeal, Hines claimed the Superior Court committed plain error when it permitted the State’s final cross-examination question about his prior convictions for Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance (“PWID”) and Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”). Finding no reversible error, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Hines' convictions. View "Hines v. Delaware" on Justia Law

In 1996, two masked and camouflaged men crashed through the glass patio door of Kenneth Warren’s home. Warren was fatally shot in front of his wife and child during the subsequent struggle. Tina Warren, Kenneth’s wife, observed one assailant appeared to have been shot in the shoulder. The investigation went cold until Bridget Phillips, ex-wife of co-defendant Adam Norcross, contacted Delaware State Police in 1999. She explained that Norcross and appellant Ralph Swan had planned to rob a house, but found it occupied. Phillips added that the victim fired a shot and died because he tried to play hero. Police arrested Norcross and Swan in 2000. Both were indicted on three counts of first degree murder; one count of first degree robbery; one count of first degree burlgary; one count of second degree conspiracy; and multiple counts of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. Swan was ultimately convicted on all charges, for which he was sentenced to death. Swan obtained new counsel and first filed for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 in 2006. He lodged several additional post-conviction motions, including applying for habeas relief. Final memoranda were filed in 2020; on February 21, 2020, the Superior Court denied Swan's motion for postconviction relief. The Delaware Supreme Court concluded, after review of the procedural history of this case, that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Swan's motion for postconviction relief, nor did it err in denying a motion for the Superior Court judge to recuse. Thus, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. View "Swan v. Delaware" on Justia Law

After Harold Daniels pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol, the Superior Court sentenced him to a mandatory term of imprisonment as a third-time offender. The court based its finding that Daniels had committed two prior offenses, in part on its determination that Daniels had been convicted in New Jersey in 2012 under a statute that was “similar” to Delaware’s driving-under-the-influence statute. On appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, Daniels argued that, because the New Jersey statute under which he was convicted prohibited conduct that was not against the law in Delaware — permitting another person to operate a vehicle while under the influence — the Superior Court erred by counting the New Jersey conviction against him. To this, the Supreme Court agreed with Daniels and vacated his sentence. View "Daniels v. Delaware" on Justia Law