Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Paul Porter applied twice to register a firearm, but the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) denied his applications, citing a previous weapons offense conviction in Maryland. The Maryland records were expunged in 2020, so the full details of the case are not available. However, it is known that Porter pleaded guilty in 2009 to transporting a handgun on a highway, was initially sentenced to three years of incarceration (suspended for probation), and later had his sentence reconsidered to probation before judgment in 2015.Porter sought review of MPD's denial from the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) at OAH overturned MPD's decision, reasoning that under Maryland law, a discharged sentence of probation before judgment is not considered a conviction and that failing to recognize this would deny Maryland law full faith and credit.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel the District to adopt Maryland's interpretation of "conviction" for firearm registration purposes. The court concluded that under District law, a sentence of probation before judgment constitutes a conviction for the purposes of firearm registration. The court emphasized that the legislative intent of the Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975 was to restrict firearm possession to individuals without disqualifying offenses, and allowing those with probation before judgment to register firearms would undermine this purpose.The court reversed OAH's order and upheld MPD's denial of Porter's application for a firearm registration certificate, holding that Porter "has been convicted" of a disqualifying offense under D.C. Code § 7-2502.03(a)(2), and that subsequent discharge of probation and expungement do not alter this conclusion. View "District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department v. Porter" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Mr. McClam, was charged with first-degree premeditated murder while armed and two counts of assault with intent to kill while armed (AWIKWA) following two shootings that occurred within seconds of each other. The first shooting involved Mr. McClam firing at a car as it drove away, and the second shooting occurred shortly after when the car circled back. One of the bullets from these shootings killed an eleven-year-old boy, K.B., who was in the car.At trial, the United States presented the case to the jury on the theory that the fatal shot was fired during the first shooting, while the shots giving rise to the AWIKWA charges were fired during the second shooting. The jury found Mr. McClam not guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and could not reach a unanimous verdict on the lesser-included homicide charges and the AWIKWA charges. Before the retrial, Mr. McClam moved to bar the United States from proceeding on the theories that the shots giving rise to the AWIKWA charges were fired during the first shooting and that the fatal shots were fired during the second shooting. The trial court denied this motion.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the United States from arguing at retrial that the fatal shot was fired during the second shooting, as the United States had elected to proceed at the first trial solely on the theory that the fatal shot was fired during the first shooting. The court also accepted the United States' concession that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes arguing that the shots giving rise to the AWIKWA charges were fired during the first shooting. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "McClam v. United States" on Justia Law