Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was living with his romantic partner, C.P., when an argument escalated into physical and verbal abuse. During the incident, he forcibly cut C.P.’s hair, took her designer handbags and jewelry, threatened to harm her and her family if she reported him to police, forced her to withdraw cash from an ATM, and left with her possessions and car. C.P. reported the incident roughly a week later.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia indicted the defendant on eleven counts, but the jury convicted him of only two: first-degree theft and threatening to injure or kidnap a person. The court sentenced him to concurrent terms of twenty-eight months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised release, and ordered restitution of $3,638.60 for stolen property. The court also imposed assessments of $1,000 for each conviction under the Victims of Violent Crime Compensation Act (VVCCA). The defendant did not object to the VVCCA assessments at sentencing but timely appealed, arguing that the assessments constituted excessive fines in violation of the Eighth Amendment.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. Applying the gross disproportionality standard articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Bajakajian, the court considered the nature and gravity of the offenses, the statutory penalties, the defendant’s culpability, and the harm suffered by the victim. The court concluded that the $2,000 in VVCCA assessments was not grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant’s offenses, especially given the statutory maximum fines and the significant harm caused. The court therefore held the assessments were constitutional and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Delgado v. United States" on Justia Law

A police officer in Washington, D.C., recovered a loaded handgun from the waistband of an individual during a patrol in a high-crime area. The officer initiated a pat-down after observing an unexplained L-shaped bulge in the individual's groin area, which he suspected to be a firearm based on his training, experience, and prior knowledge of the individual’s history with firearm-related arrests. The officer’s interaction began as a casual conversation, and several people present walked away freely. The officer noted the bulge after the individual sat, and subsequent questioning led to evasive responses before the officer conducted the frisk and discovered the firearm.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed the individual’s motion to suppress the evidence, which argued that the pat-down violated Fourth Amendment protections. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the officer credible and concluded that the L-shaped bulge observed and the individual’s evasive behavior provided reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the frisk. The court also determined that there was no seizure prior to the officer’s observation of the bulge, as the individual was not physically restrained, blocked, or subjected to threatening or accusatory questioning. Following denial of the suppression motion, a second Superior Court judge convicted the individual on three firearm-related charges.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case, applying de novo review to the Fourth Amendment issues while deferring to the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous. The court held that the officer’s observation of an L-shaped bulge, its concealed location, the individual’s evasive responses, and contextual factors including prior arrests and recent criminal activity supported reasonable articulable suspicion for a frisk. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion and the convictions. View "Frazier v. United States" on Justia Law

Police officers in the District of Columbia stopped a man on the street after receiving a tip from a confidential informant that a man with a gun was in a particular area, wearing specific clothing and carrying a bag. The tip was relayed between officers, and one officer sent another a screenshot taken from a surveillance camera. The officer who received the tip from the informant did not testify at the suppression hearing. The only testifying officer could not provide details about the informant's reliability or how the tip was obtained, and the description from the informant was generic, lacking specifics such as physical attributes.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, reasoning that the officer’s knowledge of the informant’s reliability could be imputed to the officer who made the stop, and that the informant’s tip was corroborated by finding the defendant at the described location wearing the described clothing. The government argued that the police had reasonable articulable suspicion, and the trial court agreed, endorsing the government’s argument and allowing the evidence recovered after the stop to be used at trial. A jury subsequently convicted the defendant of several firearm-related offenses.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the suppression ruling de novo, finding that the government failed to provide the court with sufficient facts to independently assess the reliability of the informant’s tip. The court held that conclusory assertions about the informant’s reliability were inadequate, that corroboration of innocent details alone was insufficient, and that the government had not established reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop. The court reversed the defendant’s convictions and remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. United States" on Justia Law

Police officers observed an individual walking past their cruiser and believed, based on the shape protruding from his waistband, that he was carrying a handgun. The individual entered a carry-out restaurant, and when he exited, the officers followed him, repeatedly calling out to get his attention. The individual did not respond and eventually fled, at which point the officers chased and tackled him, recovering a handgun from his person. The officers had no prior information about him, were not responding to a reported crime, and did not know if he had a permit or license to carry the firearm.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the individual’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop, concluding that there was reasonable, articulable suspicion for the officers to believe he was engaged in criminal activity. The court credited the officer’s testimony that he recognized the outline of a firearm and relied on the individual’s flight as suggestive of consciousness of guilt. Following trial, the individual was convicted of multiple weapon offenses.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and analyzed whether the stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion as required by the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that, in light of recent constitutional and statutory changes—including Supreme Court decisions affirming a right to carry firearms—the mere possession of a handgun does not, without additional evidence, provide reasonable suspicion for a stop. The court also determined that the circumstances surrounding the individual’s flight reduced its value as an indicator of criminal wrongdoing. The court therefore held that the officers lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop, vacated the convictions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Quarles v. United States" on Justia Law

Two activists participated in demonstrations outside the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C., protesting Israel's military actions in Gaza. Over several months, three incidents occurred involving Rabbi Herzfeld, a local rabbi and community leader, and the activists. During these incidents, the activists alleged that Rabbi Herzfeld and his companions made provocative and upsetting remarks, engaged in intimidating behavior, and, in one instance, initiated a federal lawsuit and media coverage that the activists felt endangered them. The activists felt harassed and took steps to increase their personal security after these events.Following the third incident, the activists filed petitions for anti-stalking orders in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging that Rabbi Herzfeld’s conduct constituted stalking under D.C. law. Rabbi Herzfeld moved to dismiss the petitions, arguing that his actions were protected by the First Amendment and did not meet the statutory definition of stalking, citing precedent from Mashaud v. Boone. The trial court held a summary trial and ultimately denied the petitions, finding that the conduct did not amount to threats or surveillance within the meaning of the statute and was constitutionally protected speech. Rabbi Herzfeld later sought attorney’s fees under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act and, alternatively, for alleged bad faith.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the denial of the anti-stalking petitions, holding that Rabbi Herzfeld’s conduct did not constitute “true threats” and was protected political speech, not actionable as stalking. The court vacated the award of attorney’s fees, finding the trial court had applied the wrong legal standard under the Anti-SLAPP Act and had not given proper notice for a bad-faith fee award. The matter was remanded for further proceedings regarding attorney’s fees. View "Rokhvand & Barmada v. Herzfeld" on Justia Law

Police officers observed an African-American man walking past their parked cruiser and believed they saw the imprint of a handgun magazine under his clothing at his waistband. The officer, with extensive firearms experience, was not certain whether the object could have been a wallet or a bag. The officers followed the man after he left a restaurant, calling out to him. When he did not respond and instead ran, the officers chased and tackled him, recovering a handgun from his hip. The officers were not responding to any report of crime and had no prior information about the man. They did not know whether he was lawfully carrying the firearm.After a hearing, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the firearm, finding that the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal conduct based on the officer’s testimony and the defendant’s flight, which was interpreted as consciousness of guilt. The defendant was subsequently convicted of several weapon offenses.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and considered de novo whether reasonable, articulable suspicion existed. The appellate court held that, in light of recent constitutional and statutory developments, mere possession of a handgun, without more, does not provide reasonable, articulable suspicion for a stop in the District of Columbia. The court also found that the circumstances of the defendant’s flight did not significantly increase suspicion, given the context of the police approach. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the appellate court concluded that the officers lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion and that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. The court vacated the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Quarles v. United States" on Justia Law

Officers observed Trevon Hatcherson-Ross walking on a sidewalk in the late afternoon when one officer noticed an “L-shaped” bulge in his waistband, suspecting it was a firearm. When the officers approached to investigate, Hatcherson-Ross fled, leading them on a short foot chase that ended with him climbing into the backyard of a private residence and hiding under a porch. After the officers found and detained him, they searched the backyard and discovered a gun in a storage bin under the porch, as well as ammunition in Hatcherson-Ross’s pocket.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed Hatcherson-Ross’s pretrial motion to suppress the gun and ammunition as the fruits of an unlawful seizure. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that Hatcherson-Ross had abandoned the firearm in the backyard, thereby relinquishing any expectation of privacy in it. The court did not make specific findings as to whether or when the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop him, relying instead on the abandonment theory. After trial, a jury convicted Hatcherson-Ross of firearm-related offenses.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals considered whether Hatcherson-Ross had been unlawfully seized before he entered the backyard and whether the search of the backyard and storage bin implicated his Fourth Amendment rights. The court held that Hatcherson-Ross was not seized until officers physically detained him under the porch, at which point he did not contest that reasonable suspicion existed. The court further held that Hatcherson-Ross had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a stranger’s backyard or storage bin, making the abandonment issue irrelevant. The court affirmed both the denial of the suppression motion and Hatcherson-Ross’s convictions. View "Hatcherson-Ross v. United States" on Justia Law

Late one night, three police officers responding to a report of a recent nearby shooting observed a man walking on the street. The man appeared to have an L-shaped bulge in his right jacket pocket, which the officers believed could be a firearm. When the officers pulled their marked cruiser alongside him and asked if he had a gun, the man did not respond and instead fled on foot, clutching and “fiddling” with his pocket as he ran. After a brief pursuit, he surrendered, and officers conducted a pat-down, discovering a handgun in his jacket pocket.Before trial in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the defendant moved to suppress the gun, arguing that it was found as a result of an unlawful seizure and search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the suppression motion, finding that the officers did not seize the defendant until after his flight and that, at that point, they had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop and frisk him based on his behavior, the observed bulge, his flight, and actions during the pursuit. The court then found the defendant guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm and related charges following a stipulated trial.On appeal, the defendant limited his argument to whether the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop and frisk him when he surrendered. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that, considering the totality of the circumstances—including the recent shooting in the area, the observed bulge consistent with a firearm, the defendant’s apparent panic and evasive behavior, his flight, and his actions while fleeing—officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the stop and frisk. The court affirmed the convictions, finding no Fourth Amendment violation. View "Doby v. United States" on Justia Law

One afternoon, a group of seven individuals, including the appellant, were standing near a breezeway at an apartment complex in Southeast Washington, D.C. Police officers, who were on routine patrol and not responding to any specific report of criminal activity, stopped near the complex and began approaching the group from about 100 feet away. Upon noticing the officers, the appellant and another man immediately fled at a full sprint through the complex. The officers pursued the appellant, who led them on a chase over fences and through yards, ultimately dropping a firearm as he was apprehended. The police recovered the weapon, and the appellant was charged with several firearm-related offenses.The case was first reviewed by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. At a suppression hearing, the appellant moved to exclude the gun, arguing the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for his seizure. The trial court found that the seizure occurred when an officer grabbed the appellant’s leg as he attempted to scale a second fence. The court concluded that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the seizure, relying on the appellant’s immediate flight upon seeing police, the extended and desperate nature of the chase, and testimony that the apartment complex was a high-crime area. The appellant was convicted at a stipulated trial after the suppression motion was denied.On appeal, a panel of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the convictions, finding an absence of reasonable suspicion. The court then granted en banc rehearing and vacated the panel’s opinion. The en banc District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to seize the appellant, primarily due to his unprovoked flight upon seeing police, the particularized testimony about crime at the complex, and the desperation evident in his flight. The court affirmed the convictions. View "D.W. v. United States" on Justia Law

Police officers discovered the appellant in possession of an unregistered semiautomatic firearm that was equipped with a magazine capable of holding thirty rounds. He was indicted for possessing a “large capacity ammunition feeding device,” possession of an unregistered firearm, carrying a pistol without a license, and unlawful possession of ammunition. The facts were largely undisputed; the firearm had a thirty-round magazine, was unregistered, and the appellant did not have a license to carry it.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia, presided over by a judge, denied the appellant’s motion to suppress evidence and his motion to dismiss, which had argued that the District’s firearm statutes violated the Second Amendment, focusing in part on the magazine capacity ban and the District’s registration and licensure schemes. The court reasoned that Supreme Court precedent, particularly New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, did not invalidate the District’s gun laws. The case proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated facts, and the appellant was convicted on all four counts.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The United States conceded the ban’s unconstitutionality, while the District continued to defend it. The court held that magazines capable of holding more than ten rounds are arms in common and ubiquitous use by law-abiding citizens, and there is no historical tradition of banning such arms. The court concluded that the District’s ban on these magazines violated the Second Amendment. It reversed all of the appellant’s convictions, holding that the unconstitutionality of the magazine ban also invalidated his convictions for possession of an unregistered firearm, carrying a pistol without a license, and unlawful possession of ammunition, since those charges depended on the magazine prohibition. View "Benson v. United States" on Justia Law