Justia Entertainment & Sports Law Opinion Summaries

by
Marvin Jackson attended a World Wrestling Entertainment (WWE) event and alleges that a pyrotechnics blast caused him to lose most of his hearing in his left ear. The tickets were purchased as a surprise gift by his nephew, Ashton Mott, on SeatGeek.com. All ticket purchases required agreement to various terms and conditions, including an arbitration agreement, and stated that entry to the event would constitute acceptance of these terms. Jackson sued WWE in Texas state court for negligence, but WWE moved the case to federal court and requested arbitration per the ticket agreement. The district court granted WWE’s motion, stating that Mott acted as Jackson's agent and that Jackson was therefore bound by the terms of the ticket, including the arbitration agreement.Jackson appealed the decision, arguing that Mott did not have the authority to act on his behalf and therefore the arbitration agreement should not be enforceable against him. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with Jackson's argument. The court held that although Mott purchased the tickets without Jackson's knowledge or control, he acted as Jackson’s agent when he presented the ticket on Jackson's behalf for admittance to the event. The ticket's terms and conditions were clear that use of the ticket would constitute acceptance of the arbitration agreement. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision to compel arbitration, as the arbitration agreement is enforceable against Jackson. View "Jackson v. World Wrestling" on Justia Law

by
In this case, a minor identified as M.U., through her parents, filed a complaint against Team Illinois Hockey Club, Inc. and the Amateur Hockey Association of Illinois, Inc., alleging that they violated Section 5-102(A) of the Illinois Human Rights Act by discriminating against her due to her disability. M.U. claimed that Team Illinois excluded her from participating in its activities at Seven Bridges Ice Arena, a public accommodation, due to her mental health conditions, thereby denying her full and equal enjoyment of the facilities and services.The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that M.U.'s allegations pertained to her exclusion from the team and its activities, not a place of public accommodation. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court, however, reversed this decision, stating that Team Illinois, by its lease and operation of Seven Bridges, could not deny M.U., based on her disability, the privilege of participation in athletic events held at places of public accommodation.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the appellate court's judgment. It held that the Act did not delineate between “portions” of a place of public accommodation subject to its provisions. The court noted that, while Team Illinois itself might not be a place of public accommodation, it operated within one and was thus subject to the Act. The court concluded that M.U.'s allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action under Section 5-102(A) of the Act. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "M.U. v. Team Illinois Hockey Club, Inc." on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court of Alabama has reversed a lower court's decision in a case involving claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, and violation of the Alabama Right of Publicity Act. The lawsuit was filed by Jennifer South, individually and as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Jules Pierre Gillette, against Regional Prime Television and Tommy Dwayne Hubbard. The case arose from an episode of a show titled 'Ghostly Encounters' that was filmed in a former school building where South and Gillette had lived. The episode included allegations that Gillette had a drinking problem, was paranoid, abused little boys, physically abused South, and locked her in a closet in their home. The Supreme Court found that South did not present substantial evidence to support her defamation claim and that the estate failed to prove that the use of Gillette's indicia of identity in the episode was "for the purposes of trade". The court rendered a judgment in favor of Hubbard and Regional Prime on the estate's right-of-publicity claim and South's defamation claim, and remanded the case for a new trial as to South's invasion-of-privacy and tort-of-outrage claims. View "Regional Prime Television v. South" on Justia Law

by
In California, VFLA Eventco, LLC (VFLA), a music festival organizer, sued Starry US Touring, Inc., Kali Uchis Touring, Inc., Big Grrrl Big Touring, Inc., and William Morris Endeavor Entertainment, LLC (WME) over the return of deposits paid to secure the performances of Ellie Goulding, Kali Uchis, and Lizzo at VFLA’s music festival scheduled for June 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and government restrictions, VFLA cancelled the festival and demanded the return of the deposits from WME, who negotiated the performance contracts and held the deposits as the artists’ agent. VFLA claimed its right to the deposits under the force majeure provision in the parties’ performance contracts. The artists refused VFLA’s demand, claiming VFLA bore the risk of a cancellation due to the pandemic. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the artists and WME.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the artists and WME. The court interpreted the force majeure provision as not reasonably susceptible to VFLA’s interpretation, and favoring the artists. The court also held that the artists’ interpretation did not work an invalid forfeiture or make the performance contracts unlawful. View "VFLA Eventco, LLC v. William Morris Endeavor Entertainment, LLC" on Justia Law

by
In a dispute over the naming of a thoroughbred racehorse, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, which held that the decision by the California Horse Racing Board (CHRB) precluded the plaintiffs' legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First Amendment violations. The plaintiffs, who owned the horse named Malpractice Meuser, brought the action after the CHRB refused their horse's registration due to its name, which they believed violated specific rules. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the district court was wrong to conclude the CHRB's decision precluded the plaintiffs' § 1983 action. The court reasoned that for a state administrative agency decision to have the same preclusive effect as a state court judgment, the administrative proceeding must be conducted with sufficient safeguards and satisfy fairness requirements. In this case, the CHRB lacked the authority under California law to decide constitutional claims, and thus, its decision had no preclusive effect. Furthermore, the court ruled that the plaintiffs' decision not to seek review of the CHRB's decision in state court did not endow that decision with preclusive effect. The court found that requiring the plaintiffs to go to state court before filing a suit under § 1983 would amount to an improper exhaustion prerequisite. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "JAMGOTCHIAN V. FERRARO" on Justia Law

by
In this case, the National Hockey League and associated parties (plaintiffs) sued their insurer, Factory Mutual Insurance Company (defendant), over losses incurred due to the COVID-19 pandemic under a commercial insurance policy. The plaintiffs claimed that their policy covered physical loss or damage to property due to COVID-19 and sought to overturn a lower court order that struck down most of their coverage theories.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, found that while the plaintiffs had adequately alleged physical loss or damage from the coronavirus, their insurance policy's contamination exclusion unambiguously excluded coverage for losses due to viral contamination. The court concluded that the policy excluded both the physical loss or damage caused by viral contamination and the associated business interruption losses.The plaintiffs had alleged that the virus physically damaged their property by changing the chemical composition of air and altering the molecular structure of physical surfaces. They also claimed that they had to close their hockey arenas, cancel games, limit fan access, and undertake various remedial measures to mitigate the virus's impact. However, under the terms of their insurance policy, the court found that these losses were not covered because they resulted from viral contamination, which was excluded from coverage under their policy. Thus, the court denied the plaintiffs' petition for review. View "San Jose Sharks, LLC v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

by
Thomas was recruited to play on the women’s soccer team at the University of California, Berkeley (UCB), played on the team during her freshman year and, in the spring of that year, was released from the team. She sued UCB, the team’s head coach (McGuire), and the Director of Athletics (Knowlton), alleging that she turned down a scholarship to another school based on McGuire’s recruitment efforts and that McGuire failed to disclose his “abusive” coaching style and the team’s culture of intimidation and fear. After her federal suit was dismissed, Thomas sued in state court, alleging claims against McGuire and Knowlton for violation of the Unruh Act and negligence; against McGuire for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud; and against UCB under Government Code section 815.2.The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit, reinstating only a claim of sexual harassment (Civil Code section 51.9) against McGuire and UCB. Thomas failed to state a negligence claim against McGuire, Knowlton, or UCB. Thomas cites no authority imposing on a university a duty to protect students from harm of a non-physical nature. Nor did Thomas establish a breach of fiduciary duty. The court also rejected claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation. View "Thomas v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff Jefferey Lurner was a member of Marbella Golf and Country Club (Marbella) where he played golf. Defendants American Golf Corporation and Root’N USA Corporation owned and operated Marbella. At some point after plaintiff joined Marbella, he was diagnosed with pulmonary arterial hypertension (PAH). Given this disability, plaintiff claimed he had to drive his golf cart to wherever his ball landed on the golf course. But for safety reasons, Marbella had rules governing where golfers could drive their golf carts. Some of those restrictions applied to all members, including golfers with disabilities. Plaintiff filed suit alleging defendants failed to accommodate his disability and denied him full and equal enjoyment of the golf course. After the case proceeded to trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants. The jury found defendants did not “discriminate against or deny [plaintiff] full and equal access to and enjoyment of accommodations or advantages or facilities or services at [Marbella] at any time after May 14, 2016.” The court subsequently denied plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and motion for new trial. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court: "Assuming, without deciding, Marbella’s policies had a discriminatory effect in practice, there was substantial evidence defendants modified their policies for plaintiff. Any error regarding the testimony of defendants’ expert witness also did not result in a miscarriage of justice. We therefore affirm the judgment." View "Lurner v. American Golf Corp." on Justia Law

by
The Ohio Valley Conference ("the OVC" -- a collegiate athletic conference) appealed a judgment dismissing its official-capacity and individual-capacity claims against Randall Jones, the Chair of the Board of Trustees of Jacksonville State University ("JSU"), and Don C. Killingsworth, Jr., the President of Jacksonville State University. On February 3, 2021, JSU informed the OVC that it intended to resign its OVC membership effective June 30, 2021. OVC filed this action against JSU, Jones, and Killingsworth, seeking a declaratory judgment and alleging breach of contract -- focusing solely on JSU's failure to pay the conference-resignation fee described in Article 4.5.3 of the OVC Constitution. The complaint also asserted one count against JSU -- conversion -- focusing solely on the OVC's allegation that JSU had failed to pay $15,000 for tickets received from the OVC for the OVC's 2021 conference championship basketball tournament. The complaint also asserted two counts against JSU -- promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment -- that incorporated both the conference-resignation fee and the value of the tickets to the conference championship basketball tournament as elements of damages. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded: the OVC's claims against Jones and Killingsworth in their official capacities seeking payment for the liquidated amount of the conference-resignation fee and for the value of the tickets JSU received for the OVC's 2021 conference championship basketball tournament did not constitute claims against the State, and, therefore, they were not barred by State immunity. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in dismissing the OVC's official-capacity claims against Jones and Killingsworth. However, the Court found the OVC failed to state individual-capacity claims against Jones and Killingsworth for which relief could be granted because Jones and Killingsworth lacked any duty apart from their official positions to make the payments the OVC sought to recover and because the OVC's complaint did not supply the factual allegations necessary to support those individual-capacity claims. View "Ohio Valley Conference v. Jones, et al." on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff was a high-level high-school basketball player who wanted to play in the NBA. After graduating high school, Plaintiff committed to the University of Louisville. However, subsequently, Plaintiff's father accepted a bribe in relation to Plaintiff's decision to play for Louisville. As a result, Plaintiff lost his NCAA eligibility. Plaintiff filed RICO claims against the parties who were central to the bribery scheme. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, finding that Plaintiff did not demonstrate an injury to his business or property, as required for a private civil RICO claim.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Congress made the civil RICO cause of action for treble damages available only to plaintiffs “injured in [their] business or property” by a defendant’s RICO violation. Without such an injury, even a plaintiff who can prove he suffered some injury as a result of a RICO violation lacks a cause of action under the statute. The Fourth Circuit rejected Plaintiff's claims that the loss of benefits secured by his scholarship agreement with Louisville; the loss of his NCAA eligibility; and the loss of money spent on attorney’s fees attempting to regain his eligibility constituted a cognizable business or property injury. View "Brian Bowen, II v. Adidas America Inc." on Justia Law