Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. The jury recommended death by a vote of ten-to-two. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. Defendant later filed an amended motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant appealed and petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief and denied the habeas petition, holding (1) the postconviction court properly denied relief on Defendant’s Rule 3.851 motion; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to habeas relief. View "Bogle v. State" on Justia Law

After a second jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of both first-degree premeditated murder and felony murder, with burglary as the underlying felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but vacated his death sentence, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial based on juror misconduct; (2) the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to support the first-degree premeditated murder conviction and the first-degree felony murder conviction; (3) the trial court did not commit reversible error by allowing the instruction on felony murder based on burglary to go to the jury; (4) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for change of venue; and (5) Hurst error occurred because the recommendation of death in this case was not unanimous, and the error was not harmless. Remanded for a new penalty phase proceeding. View "Dubose v. State" on Justia Law

Hojan was charged with armed robbery, armed kidnapping, attempted murder, and two murders arising out of the 2002 robbery of and shooting of employees at a Waffle House. A surviving victim gave law enforcement officers a taped statement, in which she identified Mickel and Hojan, known to her, as being involved. The jury recommended death by a vote of nine to three, and the trial court followed that recommendation, finding six aggravators, one statutory mitigator, and two nonstatutory mitigators. After an unsuccessful direct appeal, Hojan sought post-conviction relief, arguing that the survivor’s statement to an officer was not an excited utterance; the trial court improperly treated Hojan’s waiver of the opportunity to present mitigating evidence in the penalty phase as a waiver of his opportunity to present motions challenging the death penalty; his confession should have been suppressed; Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the denial of relief, finding no error under Hojan’s asserted claims, that sufficient evidence exists, and that the death sentence is proportional. The court nonetheless granted Hojan a new penalty phase, based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Hurst v. Florida. View "Hojan v. Florida" on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury found Knight guilty of two counts of first-degree murder for the deaths of his housemate, Stephens, and her four-year-old child. Police, responding to a 911 call about noises in the apartment, found the bodies. All of the doors were locked and the apartment had not been ransacked. Knight was found outside, with cuts and bloodstains. Fingernail scrapings taken from the victim contained Knight’s DNA profile; the victim’s blood was found on Knight’s clothing. In jail, Knight described the crime to another inmate. The jury unanimously recommended a death sentence for each murder. The court sentenced Knight to death, finding that the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt statutory aggravating circumstances: a previous conviction of another violent capital felony, that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and that one victim was under 12 years of age. The court found no statutory mitigating circumstances but found eight nonstatutory mitigators. After unsuccessful appeals, Knight sought post-conviction relief, arguing he was improperly denied access to public records; the one-year deadline in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure was unconstitutionally applied to him; he was denied adversarial testing at the guilt and penalty phases; the rule prohibiting juror interviews is unconstitutional; and Florida’s lethal injection protocol is unconstitutional. The circuit court denied all of Knight’s claims. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed, rejecting several claims of ineffective assistance, claims of Brady violations, and challenges to the death penalty. View "Knight v. Florida" on Justia Law

In 1999, Mack’s family found Mack’s body, naked from the waist down, with a cord wrapped around her neck. Durousseau’s DNA was found inside Mack’s vagina. In 2003, Durousseau was indicted for first-degree murder for the deaths of five women. The similar methodology of the crimes caused investigators to conclude that Mack was one of Durousseau’s victims. Durousseau was convicted of Mack’s murder. The jury voted to impose a death sentence. The court found four aggravating factors: Durousseau was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence; the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery or sexual battery, was committed for pecuniary gain, and was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The court did not find any statutory mitigating circumstances, but found 16 nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and sentenced Durousseau to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. Durousseau sought post-conviction relief, arguing that counsel was ineffective for failing to request additional physical and psychiatric testing and for failing to conduct meaningful voir dire. Before the hearing, Durousseau abandoned his first claim. The court denied Durousseau’s claim. While his appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hurst v. Florida (2016), holding that Florida’s death penalty sentencing statute violated the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief but vacated Durousseau’s sentences under Hurst because the jury did not make any of the requisite factual findings beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Durousseau v. Florida" on Justia Law

In 1997, Aaron sustained a catastrophic brain injury at birth due to the negligence of employees at Lee Memorial. The family retained the law firm, under a contingency fee agreement providing for payment of 40 percent of any recovery if a lawsuit was filed, plus costs, and stating that if "one of the parties to pay my claim for damages is a governmental agency, I understand that Federal and Florida Law may limit the amount of attorney fees ... in that event, I understand that the fees owed ... shall be the amount provided by law.” A jury awarded the child $28.3 million, the mother $1.34 million, and the father $1 million. Because the hospital was an independent special district of the state, the court enforced the sovereign immunity damage limitations and entered a judgment for $200,000, which was affirmed. The firm pursued a two-year lobbying effort to secure a claims bill from the Legislature. In 2012 the Legislature passed a claims bill, directing Lee Memorial to pay $10 million, with an additional $5 million to be paid in annual installments to a special needs trust for Aaron, stating that payment of fees and costs from those funds shall not exceed $100,000. No funds were awarded for the parents. The firm petitioned the guardianship court to approve a $2.5 million for attorneys’ fees and costs. The court denied the request. On appeal, the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed, holding that the fee limitation in the claims bill is unconstitutional and may not stand when such a limitation impairs a preexisting contract. View "Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley. v. Florida" on Justia Law

Housemates McCumbers, Junk, Blair, and Markus invited three women to their garage/recreation room to socialize. At 12:20 a.m. Officers Prendergast and Edu were dispatched to a noise disturbance, which had dissipated before they arrived. Prendergast testified that as he approached Markus, who was outside, he smelled marijuana. Prendergast identified himself and asked Markus to stop. Markus dropped his cigarette, raised both hands and walked backward. Prendergast instructed Markus to stop. Prendergast claimed Markus turned and ran into the garage/recreation room. The officers followed. Prendergast later testified that Markus was on the couch and resisted the officers. Additional officers arrived; they pulled Markus down. Prendergast straddled Markus to apply handcuffs, turned Markus on his side, and was alerted that there was a pistol in Markus’ waistband. McCumbers, who was in the home, testified that he handed Markus a tobacco cigarette and lit it before Markus walked outside to talk to men who were standing along the road, and that, when approached by the officers, Markus raised his hands and walked backward at a slow pace until he reached the couch. The officers had their Tasers drawn and pushed Markus, so that he “spun around.” Others testified that the officers were rough with the other occupants and that they searched the bedrooms. Markus was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed. The totality of the circumstances must be considered in evaluating Fourth Amendment cases. The exigent circumstance exception of hot pursuit does not justify a warrantless home entry, search, and arrest when the underlying conduct for which there is probable cause is only a nonviolent misdemeanor and the evidence of the alleged misdemeanor is outside the home. View "Florida v. Markus" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder of Raul Lopez and separately sentenced to death for the murder of law enforcement officer Steven Bauer. The Supreme Court affirmed in both cases. During the postconviction proceedings in both cases, Defendant alleged that he was intellectually disabled and therefore could not be executed pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia. The circuit courts denied Defendant’s intellectual disability claims. The Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court held that the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Cherry of Florida’s intellectual disability statute was unconstitutional. Defendant filed successive motions for postconviction relief, arguing that the Florida Supreme court’s prior rejections of his claims were based on Cherry, an interpretation of the intellectual disability statute that the United States Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Hall v. Florida, and asserting that he was entitled to an additional evidentiary hearing on his claim. The circuit court summarily denied both motions. The Supreme Court remanded both cases to the circuit court for a single evidentiary hearing, holding that Defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his intellectual disability claim pursuant to Hall. View "Franqui v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Mark James Asay was found guilty of two counts of murder. The jury recommended a death sentence. The trial court imposed a sentence of death for each conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed on appealed. Here, Asay appealed from the summary denial of his second successive postconviction motion and also filed two petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of postconviction relief and denied the petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, holding (1) Hurst v. Florida does not apply retroactively to Asay’s case, in which the death sentence became final before the issuance of Ring v. Arizona; and (2) Asay failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to relief as to any of his claims. View "Asay v. State" on Justia Law

After a nonjury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, burglary of a dwelling, and grand theft of an automobile. Appellant was sentenced to death for the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death, presenting twenty-one claims for relief. The postconviction court denied all of Appellant’s claims. Appellant appealed the denial of his postconviction motion and petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s denial of relief and denied habeas relief, holding (1) penalty phase counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; (2) Appellant was not deprived of his right to self-representation; (3) Appellant’s claims that his waivers of guilt phase counsel and both guilt and penalty phase juries were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary were procedurally barred; and (4) as to Appellant’s habeas claims, his arguments regarding the effective assistance of appellate counsel were without merit. View "Knight v. State" on Justia Law