Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder with a firearm. During the trial, the State presented evidence of Defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence and argued that the jury should consider this silence as evidence of Defendant’s consciousness of guilt. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that because Defendant did not testify at trial, the use of her pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was precluded as a matter of state constitutional and evidentiary law. The Supreme Court approved of the Court of Appeal’s decision, holding (1) use of a defendant’s silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Florida constitutional right against self-incrimination; and (2) as a matter of Florida evidentiary law, the State is precluded from using that silence to argue a defendant’s consciousness of guilt. View "State v. Horwitz" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of one count of robbery with a firearm while wearing a mask. Appellant was twenty years old when he committed the crime but twenty-one years old when he was tried and sentenced. If Appellant had been sentenced under the youthful offender statute, he faced a six-year cap as to his sentence. Instead, Appellant was sentenced to the statutory maximum of life in prison. Appellant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The motion was deemed denied. The Court of Appeal affirmed the sentence. Before the Supreme Court, Appellant raised a facial challenge to the constitutionality of Fla. Stat. 958.04(1)(b), arguing that the statute (1) violates equal protection because the age-at-sentencing classification creates arbitrary and irrational distinctions between otherwise eligible defendants, and (2) violates due process because, in attempting to be eligible for youthful offender sentencing, a defendant may forgo certain constitutional rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because section 958.04(1)(b), as amended, bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government objective, it does not violate equal protection; and (2) the statute does not violate due process because it serves a legitimate state interest. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant entered an open plea to the charge of armed burglary of a dwelling. Before sentencing, the State filed a sentencing memorandum recommending that the court consider a new charge pending against Defendant for burglary of a vehicle. The trial court considered the subsequent charges pending against Defendant at sentencing, declined to sentence him as a youthful offender, and instead sentenced him to twelve years in prison. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed Defendant’s sentence, concluding that the trial court did not violate Defendant’s due process rights during sentencing for the primary offense by considering his subsequent arrest without conviction. The Supreme Court quashed the Fourth District’s decision, holding that a trial court may not consider a subsequent arrest without conviction during sentencing for the primary offense. View "Norvil v. State" on Justia Law

This workers’ compensation case involved the statutory attorney’s fees provision declared unconstitutional in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Castellanos v. Next Door Co. Pursuant to the fee schedule in Fla. Stat. 440.34, the judge of compensation claims was constrained to award the claimant’s attorney $19.44 per hour for 90 hours of work. The First District Court of Appeal was compelled to affirm the $1,750 statutory fee award. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with Castellanos, which held that the conclusive statutory fee schedule is unconstitutional as a denial of due process under both the Florida and United States Constitutions. View "Richardson v. Aramark/Sedgwick CMS" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual battery against a child by a person eighteen years of age or older and lewd and lascivious molestation on a child by a person eighteen years of age or older. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment plus forty years and designated him a sexual predator. The First District Court of Appeal ultimately affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The First District then certified a question to the Supreme Court asking whether case law requires preservation of an evidentiary deficiency where the State proved only a lesser included offense and the sentence required for the greater offense would be unconstitutional as applied to the lesser offense. The Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative but remanded the matter on the grounds that Defendant’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move for judgment of acquittal of the greater offenses during or after trial. View "Monroe v. State" on Justia Law

This workers’ compensation case involved the statutory attorney’s fees provision declared unconstitutional in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Castellanos v. Next Door Co. Pursuant to the fee schedule in Fla. Stat. 440.34, the judge of compensation claims was constrained to award the claimant’s attorney $13.28 per hour for 120 hours of work, over twenty-five times less than the $350 hourly rate found to be a reasonable fee. The First District Court of Appeal was compelled to affirm the fee. The Supreme Court quashed the First District’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with Castellanos, which held that the conclusive statutory fee schedule is unconstitutional as a denial of due process under both the Florida and United States Constitutions. View "Diaz v. Palmetto Gen. Hosp." on Justia Law

Petitioner, who was injured in the course of his employment with Respondent, prevailed in his workers’ compensation claim through the assistance of his attorney. The fee awarded to Petitioner’s attorney amounted to only $1.53 per hour. Petitioner had no ability to challenge the reasonableness of the hourly rate, and both the Judge of Compensation Claims and First District Court of Appeal were precluded by Fla. Stat. 440.34, which mandates a conclusive fee schedule for awarding attorney’s fees to the claimant in a workers’ compensation case, from assessing whether the fee award was reasonable. The First Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of section 440.34, which creates an irrebuttable presumption that precludes any consideration of whether the fee award is reasonable to compensate the attorney. The Supreme Court held that the mandatory fee schedule in section 440.34 is unconstitutional under as a violation of due process under both the state and federal Constitutions. Remanded for entry of a reasonable attorney’s fee. View "Castellanos v. Next Door Co." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the murders. Defendant filed a motion to vacate his convictions and sentences, arguing that he was denied a fair guilt phase because of counsel’s deficient performance and that he was denied a fair penalty phase because counsel provided ineffective assistance. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied relief on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s order denying postconviction relief on all claims, holding that Defendant’s counsel provided constitutionally effective assistance during both the guilt phase and the penalty phase. View "Rigterink v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder. Defendant moved to suppress any statements he made to law enforcement and any evidence obtained as a result of those statements, asserting that he was in custody when he was questioned and was not read the Miranda warnings and that he was improperly denied access to his attorney. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding (1) Defendant was not in custody when he initially confessed to the murders, but (2) once Defendant confessed and was read the Miranda warnings, he was in custody and should have been informed that the attorney retained on his behalf was at the sheriff’s office where Defendant was being interrogated and was available to speak to Defendant. The Supreme Court quashed the Second District’s decision and remanded, holding (1) when a person is questioned in a non-public location and an attorney retained on his behalf appears at the location, due process requires that law enforcement notify the person with regard to the presence and purpose of the attorney, regardless of whether the person is in custody; and (2) the Miranda violation in this case constituted harmful error. View "State v. McAdams" on Justia Law

June Dhar was a short-term renter of an automobile that was detected by an automated traffic camera running a red light. The vehicle was registered to Dollar Rent A Car Systems, Inc. Dollar was sent a notice of violation. Dollar responded by sending an affidavit identifying Dhar as the person having control of the vehicle at the time of the violation. Thereafter, Dhar was issued a uniform traffic citation. Dhar filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that as a short-term renter of the motor vehicle she was treated unequally because she was not initially issued a notice of citation under Fla. Stat. 316.0083(1)(b)1.a and therefore could not avoid the payment of added court costs by paying the statutory penalty of $158. The trial court granted Dhar’s motion, concluding that the unequal treatment of short-term renters violated equal protection. The court of appeal affirmed the lower court’s order granting Dhar’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Fla. Stat. 316.0083 is unconstitutional as applied to short-term vehicle renters such as Dhar. View "City of Fort Lauderdale v. Dhar" on Justia Law