Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Convicted of first-degree murder for causing the 2007 death of McKinness, Hampton was sentenced to death following the jury’s recommendation by a vote of nine to three. Hampton filed several motions seeking relief based on the allegation that one of the jurors was “under prosecution” at the time of his jury service. The trial court denied the motions. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the proportionality of the death sentence.

Section 893.13 of the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, provided that “it is unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance… or … to be in actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance.” The law did not specify the mental state required for conviction. In prior decisions, the Florida Supreme Court determined that knowledge of the presence of the substance and knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance were required. In response, the Legislature, in 2011, stated that the decisions were contrary to legislative intent. “The Legislature finds that knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is not an element of any offense under this chapter. Lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is an affirmative defense.” The statute does not eliminate the element of knowledge of the presence of the substance. Since the enactment, each court of appeal has ruled that the statute does not violate requirements of due process. The U.S. District Court (M.D. Fla.) concluded, however, that it is unconstitutional. Based on that decision, a trial court dismissed a case under the Act. The Florida Supreme Court reversed.

Defendant was sentenced to death for a drug-related 1988 murder. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's denial of post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate, develop, and present available mitigating evidence that would have legally precluded the trial court from overriding the jury's life recommendation. The evidence in question concerned the abuse defendant endured at the hands of his father and the extremely negative influence his father had on his life and that from a young age he witnessed violent acts being committed against his mother and others, including witnessing others being killed.

Delhall, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, unlawful use of a firearm, unlawful discharge of the firearm resulting in death or serious bodily harm, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At the jury trial the State presented evidence that Delhall murdered the victim because he was, at that time, the only known eyewitness to the murder of another individual (Bennett) with which Delhall’s brother was charged. The jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of eight to four, and the trial court entered an order sentencing Delhall to death. The Florida Supreme Court vacated the sentence, stating that the prosecutor, “by her overzealous and unfair advocacy, appeared to be committed to winning a death recommendation rather than simply seeking justice.” Her improper advocacy continued even after an objection was sustained. In one instance, the judge was forced to step in and specifically admonish her to stop it. Cumulative errors fundamentally tainted the guilt phase, which was especially significant in view of the fact that the jury recommended death by a vote of eight to four, a recommendation that was far from unanimous.

Butler was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the 1997 murder of his former girlfriend. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence on direct appeal. Butler filed a motion to vacate his conviction and death sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. The post-conviction court held three evidentiary hearings and denied relief. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting claims that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court; appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by abandoning the claim that a witness was incompetent to testify at trial; Florida’s lethal injection protocol constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and Butler’s right against cruel and unusual punishment will be violated because he may be incompetent at the time of execution.

Based on unethical actions during the 2004-2005 hurricane season, the Legislature enacted Section 626.854(6), Florida Statutes: A public adjuster may not directly or indirectly through any other person or entity initiate contact or engage in face-to-face or telephonic solicitation or enter into a contract with any insured or claimant under an insurance policy until at least 48 hours after the occurrence of an event that may be the subject of a claim under the insurance policy unless contact is initiated by the insured or claimant. An adjuster sued. The trial court upheld the law, accepting an interpretation that it prohibited only in-person or telephonic communication, that it primarily regulates conduct, not speech, and furthers an important governmental interest. The appeals court reversed, finding that the section regulates commercial speech and that the Department failed to demonstrate that prohibiting property owners from receiving information from public adjusters for 48 hours is justified by the possibility that some public adjuster may unduly pressure traumatized victims or otherwise engage in unethical behavior. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute unconstitutionally restricts commercial speech and was not narrowly tailored to serve interests in ensuring ethical conduct by public adjusters and protecting homeowners.

Petitioner was found guilty of armed robbery of a convenience store when he was 19-years-old and was sentenced to life in prison as a habitually violent offender. At issue was the summary denial of an evidentiary hearing in postconviction proceedings under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The court concluded that the district court misapplied the court's precedent and in so doing erred in affirming the summary denial of petitioner's successive motion for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence. Accordingly, the court quashed the decision below and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the newly discovered evidence claim involving only the affidavit of the codefendant.

Petitioner sought review of the Third District's summary dismissals of his unfair labor practice (ULP) claim. The court concluded that because it found that the actions alleged in petitioner's claim were sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of Florida Statute 447.501, the court concluded that the Third District incorrectly affirmed the Public Employees Relations Commission's dismissal of petitioner's charges; the totality of the circumstances alleged in petitioner's charge were sufficient to demonstrate prima facie evidence that he suffered from an adverse employment action; petitioner's allegations regarding his transfer provided sufficient evidence of adverse employment action to survive summary dismissal; and petitioner sufficiently alleged a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Petitioner, an inmate in state custody, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction and sentence. The court dismissed the petition in this case by way of an unpublished order, determining that the petition was unauthorized pursuant to Baker v. State. In disposing of the petition, the court expressly retained jurisdiction to pursue possible sanctions against petitioner. After considering petitioner's show cause response, the court concluded that it failed to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. Petitioner's unauthorized petition was a frivolous proceeding and petitioner had compiled a history of pro se filings that were devoid of merit or inappropriate for review.

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated battery with a weapon. At issue was whether the trial court erred in failing to inform the jury of its right to request a read-back in response to the jury's request for trial transcripts during deliberations. Because the trial judge did not instruct the jury to clarify which portion of the transcript the jury wanted to review, the court could not determine whether the jury was confused regarding specific testimony in this case. As in Johnson v. State, the court would have to engage in pure speculation as to the effect of the trial court's failure to inform the jury of the possibility of a read-back or the trial court's failure to ask which portion of the testimony it wanted to review. Therefore, the trial court committed reversible error and petitioner was entitled to a new trial.