Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Based on unethical actions during the 2004-2005 hurricane season, the Legislature enacted Section 626.854(6), Florida Statutes: A public adjuster may not directly or indirectly through any other person or entity initiate contact or engage in face-to-face or telephonic solicitation or enter into a contract with any insured or claimant under an insurance policy until at least 48 hours after the occurrence of an event that may be the subject of a claim under the insurance policy unless contact is initiated by the insured or claimant. An adjuster sued. The trial court upheld the law, accepting an interpretation that it prohibited only in-person or telephonic communication, that it primarily regulates conduct, not speech, and furthers an important governmental interest. The appeals court reversed, finding that the section regulates commercial speech and that the Department failed to demonstrate that prohibiting property owners from receiving information from public adjusters for 48 hours is justified by the possibility that some public adjuster may unduly pressure traumatized victims or otherwise engage in unethical behavior. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute unconstitutionally restricts commercial speech and was not narrowly tailored to serve interests in ensuring ethical conduct by public adjusters and protecting homeowners.

Petitioner was found guilty of armed robbery of a convenience store when he was 19-years-old and was sentenced to life in prison as a habitually violent offender. At issue was the summary denial of an evidentiary hearing in postconviction proceedings under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The court concluded that the district court misapplied the court's precedent and in so doing erred in affirming the summary denial of petitioner's successive motion for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence. Accordingly, the court quashed the decision below and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the newly discovered evidence claim involving only the affidavit of the codefendant.

Petitioner sought review of the Third District's summary dismissals of his unfair labor practice (ULP) claim. The court concluded that because it found that the actions alleged in petitioner's claim were sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of Florida Statute 447.501, the court concluded that the Third District incorrectly affirmed the Public Employees Relations Commission's dismissal of petitioner's charges; the totality of the circumstances alleged in petitioner's charge were sufficient to demonstrate prima facie evidence that he suffered from an adverse employment action; petitioner's allegations regarding his transfer provided sufficient evidence of adverse employment action to survive summary dismissal; and petitioner sufficiently alleged a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Petitioner, an inmate in state custody, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction and sentence. The court dismissed the petition in this case by way of an unpublished order, determining that the petition was unauthorized pursuant to Baker v. State. In disposing of the petition, the court expressly retained jurisdiction to pursue possible sanctions against petitioner. After considering petitioner's show cause response, the court concluded that it failed to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. Petitioner's unauthorized petition was a frivolous proceeding and petitioner had compiled a history of pro se filings that were devoid of merit or inappropriate for review.

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated battery with a weapon. At issue was whether the trial court erred in failing to inform the jury of its right to request a read-back in response to the jury's request for trial transcripts during deliberations. Because the trial judge did not instruct the jury to clarify which portion of the transcript the jury wanted to review, the court could not determine whether the jury was confused regarding specific testimony in this case. As in Johnson v. State, the court would have to engage in pure speculation as to the effect of the trial court's failure to inform the jury of the possibility of a read-back or the trial court's failure to ask which portion of the testimony it wanted to review. Therefore, the trial court committed reversible error and petitioner was entitled to a new trial.

Respondent was convicted of first-degree murder of a victim whose body was never discovered. At issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the jury's request for specific trial transcripts during deliberations without advising the jury of the possibility of a read-back. In light of the court's decision in Hazuri v. State, the trial court improperly (1) used language that may have mislead the jury into believing read-backs were prohibited; and (2) informed the jury that there were not transcripts available without informing the jury of the availability of a read-back request. Because the court was unable to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the guilty verdict, respondent was entitled to a new trial.

Defendant appealed the denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. In his motion, defendant challenged his convictions and sentences, including a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of death, based on the recantation testimony of an accomplice, which defendant submitted to the trial court as newly discovered evidence. Because the court found competent and substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's conclusion that the recantation was untruthful, the court's denial of relief was affirmed.

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence of death for the first degree murder of his 64-year-old stepfather. On appeal, defendant raised eight claims: (1) the trial court erred in admitting a statement that could imply that he committed a prior murder; (2) the court erred in permitting the State to present certain victim impact evidence: (3) the court erred in denying the motion to suppress the statements that defendant made to an informant; (4) the court erred in finding that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated; (5) the court erred in finding the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; (6) the court erred in giving little weight to the evidence pertaining to defendant's cocaine addiction; (7) the death sentence was disproportionate; and (8) the court should consider whether Florida's death penalty scheme was unconstitutional. The court addressed each claim and denied relief, affirming defendant's conviction and sentence.

Defendant appealed an order of the circuit court denying his motion to vacate his conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. He also petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus. Defendant raised the following arguments: counsel was ineffective for failing to object or otherwise prevent Livia Romero from being referred to or portrayed as divorced from defendant and married to the victim; counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and uncover mental health mitigation; and the postconviction court erred in summarily denying three ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The court denied relief on defendant's claims, affirming the denial of postconviction relief and also denying the habeas petition.

This case was before the court for review of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Snipes v. Telli, which held that the Florida Constitution permitted Broward County to impose term limits on the office of the county commissioner. Because the court receded from its decision in Cook v. City of Jacksonville, the court approved the Fourth District's decision and held that Broward County's term limits did not violate Florida's Constitution.