Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. The court affirmed the circuit court order that summarily denied relief on all defendant's claims, holding that the recent decision from the United States Supreme Court in Martinez v. Ryan did not provide defendant with any basis for relief.

Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and grand theft. Defendant entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment, which was the minimum sentence indicated on the Criminal Punishment Code sentencing scoresheet. At issue was whether the State was authorized under section 924.07, Florida Statutes, to appeal a sentence that was otherwise legal on the ground that the trial court improperly initiated a plea dialogue with a defendant without invitation of either party. The court held that the procedural error in disregarding the mandates of the habitual felony offender statute did not render defendant's sentence illegal or otherwise appealable by the State under section 924.07. For this reason, and because the court also concluded that the State was not authorized to appeal the sentence on the ground that the trial court improperly initiated a plea dialogue in this case, the court approved the result reached by the Fourth District.

Defendant was tried on three counts of armed robbery and three counts of false imprisonment with a weapon or firearm. At issue was the misapplication of the trial court and the First District of the procedure the court set forth in Melbourne v. State for eliminating discrimination during the exercise of peremptory challenges. In this case, the trial court erred in denying defense counsel's peremptory challenge to a female juror, notwithstanding the undisputed gender-neutral reason counsel proffered. The trial court mistakenly assessed defense counsel's reason as if it were assessing a challenge for cause and failed to perform the critical third step of the Melbourne procedure, which required an assessment of the genuineness of counsel's proffered reasons for the strike. Further, the trial court erroneously relieved the State of its burden to establish that the reason for the challenge was pretextual. The court concluded that the First District district perpetuated these errors and quashed the decision of the First District.

Petitioner entered a no contest plea to the charges of burglary of a dwelling, grand theft, and falsification of ownership to a pawnbroker. The court adjudicated her guilty of all three counts and sentenced her to five years imprisonment. However, the court suspended her sentence on the condition that she complete two years of community control followed by probation, as well as pay monetary restitution. Petitioner was subsequently charged with driving with a suspended license pursuant to section 322.34, Florida Statutes. After her arrest, petitioner paid the required restitution, and the DHSMV reinstated her license. However, petitioner still faced a charge of violation of probation based upon the charge of driving with a suspended license. The court held that the Fifth District correctly held that the State sufficiently established the knowledge requirement of the current version of section 322.34(2) because (1) the mailing of the written notice of suspension satisfied the notice requirement of section 322.251(1), and (2) the State proved that this was the address of petitioner at the time of the mailing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, disapproving Brown v. State and Haygood v. State to the extent that those decisions conflicted with the opinion of the court.

This case involved the application of Florida's Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act, 394.9135, Florida Statutes, commonly known as the Jimmy Ryce Act, to defendant, who had been detained by the State and awaiting a civil commitment trial pursuant to that Act since April 2002. The court held that (1) neither the Jimmy Ryce Act nor the Constitution entitled defendant to the treatment he sought as a noncommitted detainee; defendant failed to establish that the FCCC treatment program was constitutionally defective; and (3) because the delay in defendant's commitment trial had been made for tactical reasons at his own request, his detention did not result in a constitutional violation.

Defendant appealed the denial of his postconviction motion to vacate his convictions and sentences filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Defendant's convictions included a conviction of first-degree murder for which the trial court imposed a sentence of death. Defendant also petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The court rejected all of defendant's claims and affirmed the postconviction court's denial of defendant's rule 3.851 motion and denied defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder based on the shooting death of his wife. On appeal, defendant raised eight issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in permitting evidence of his prior bad acts; (2) whether the trial court erred in finding that the murders were committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without pretense of moral or legal justification; (3) whether the jury's recommendation at the penalty phase was tainted by improper victim impact evidence; (4) whether the trial court erred in overruling his objections and allowing introduction of evidence of his extramarital sexual relationship; (5) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charge; (6) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator; (7) whether his death sentence was proportional; (8) whether the trial court erred in sentencing him to death because section 921.141, Florida Statutes, unconstitutionally allowed the trial court to proceed without, among other things, a unanimous death recommendation from the jury in contravention of the Sixth Amendment. The State also raised two claims on cross-appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to find the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator, and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the State's motion in limine regarding the testimony of Dr. Elizabeth McMahon. The court addressed these claims and reviewed for sufficiency of the evidence to uphold the conviction and sentence, and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his conviction for first degree murder and his death sentence. In his direct appeal, defendant raised twelve issues challenging the effectiveness of his trial counsel and various rulings and conclusions made by the trial court at both the guilt and sentencing phases, including an issue regarding the proportionality of the death sentence. Defendant also challenged the constitutionality of Florida's capital sentencing scheme. After reviewing the issues brought on appeal and conducting the court's own independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence, the court affirmed defendant's convictions for first degree murder, burglary with a battery while armed with a firearm, animal cruelty, grant theft of a motor vehicle, and grant theft of a firearm and the sentences imposed for these offenses.

The facts in this case arose from an arrest after the driver failed a roadside sobriety test and then had her license suspended based on the refusal to submit to a breath test. The court was asked to answer two certified questions: (1) "Does a law enforcement officer's request that a driver submit to a breath, blood, or urine test, under circumstances in which the breath-alcohol test is the only required test, violate the implied consent provisions of section 316.1932(a)(A)(1)(a) such that the department may not suspend the driver's license for refusing to take any test?" and (2) "May a district court grant common law certiorari relief from a circuit court's opinion reviewing an administrative order when the circuit court applied precedent from another district court but the reviewing district court concludes that the precedent misinterprets clearly established statutory law?" The court answered the first certified question in the negative. The Second District properly found that there was no violation of the implied consent law under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the court approved the Second District's decision and disapproved the Fourth district's opinion in State Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Clark to the extent that it concluded to the contrary. The court answered the second question in the affirmative and held that a district court could exercise its discretion to grant certiorari review of a circuit court decision reviewing an administrative order, so long as the decision under review violated a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice, even if the circuit court decision was based on precedent from another district.

Defendant was found guilty of first-degree felony murder, second-degree murder, and aggravated child abuse. At issue was whether the merger doctrine precluded a first-degree felony-murder conviction predicated on a single act of aggravated child abuse that caused the child's death. Based upon legislative intent as evidenced by the plain language of the felony-murder statute, the court held that the merger doctrine did not preclude a felony-murder conviction predicated upon a single act of aggravated child abuse that caused the child's death. Accordingly, the court answered the certified question in the negative, receded from Brooks v. State to the extent that it held to the contrary, and quashed the First District's decision,