Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for his role in the 1987 killing of a correctional officer. Defendant subsequently appealed the circuit court's summary denial of his second successive motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Because defendant's claim originated from information that existed as early as this court's issuance of its direct-appeal decision in 1990, and because the juror affidavits at issue in this case related to matters that inhered in the verdict, the court affirmed the circuit court's denial of this claim as both untimely and based upon inadmissible evidence.

This case was before the court on appeal from a judgment of conviction of first degree murder and a sentence of death. The court held that the trial court properly limited the cross-examination of a State witness; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defense counsel's objection and denying a mistrial based upon the prosecution's statement; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 47 shell casings into evidence along with the other evidence to which they related; the trial court properly declined to conduct a Frye hearing on tool-mark identification; the trial court did not err in accepting the State's explanation for exercising a peremptory strike to remove a minority juror; and the death sentence was proportionate where, in addition to murdering the victim, defendant also kidnapped her from her home and raped her. Accordingly, the convictions and sentences were affirmed.

Defendant, a prisoner under sentence of death, appealed the denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Defendant asserted a destruction of evidence claim and Brady v. Maryland claim. The court affirmed the circuit court's denial of postconviction relief. Further, the court rejected the State's cross-appeal and affirmed the determination of the postconviction court that defendant's second claim satisfied the due diligence component of Rule 3.851(d)(2)(A). No motion for rehearing would be entertained by this court. The mandate should issue immediately. Defendant's request for a stay of execution was denied.

Defendant appealed his conviction for first degree murder and his sentence of death. Defendant claimed that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on finding the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravator for the murder of the victim and that defendant's death sentence was disproportionate. The court held that the jury instruction on the aggravator was not error when the victim was attending a party, defendant stormed in and demanded money with the threat of firing his AK-47, shot the victim multiple times, and the victim eventually died from the gunshot wounds. The court also concluded that the trial court did not err in finding the HAC aggravator because it was supported by competent substantial evidence. Considering the circumstances, the aggravating and mitigating factors weighed by the trial court, and other cases with similar facts, the court concluded that defendant's death sentence was proportionate. Further, the competent substantial evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. Therefore, the judgment was affirmed.

The North Port Road and Drainage District (NPRDD), a municipal dependent special district wholly contained within the City of North Port, levied non-ad valorem special assessments against nine parcels of real property owned by West Villages Improvement District, an independent special district of the State of Florida. The Second District held that NPRDD could not lawfully impose the special assessments on West Villages' real property without statutory authority. The court affirmed, but on the basis that NPRDD's home rule power under the Florida Constitution did not reach as far as it argued. Accordingly, because there was no way for West Villages to lawfully pay the special assessments, NPRDD's assessments fell within the limitations on home rule powers set forth in section 166.021(3), Florida Statutes.

Raymond Bright was convicted of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to death for the murders. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) sufficient evidence existed in the record for the jury to convict Bright of first-degree premeditated murder; (2) the prosecutor did not improperly comment on Bright's right to remain silent, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Bright's motion for a mistrial; (3) the trial court erred when it found and weighed as two separate aggravating circumstances Bright's prior felony conviction, but the improper double finding of the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance constituted harmless error; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding and affording the aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, great weight; and (5) the sentences imposed by the trial court were proportionate.

This case involved questions of law regarding probation revocation for failure to pay future restitution. The court held that before a trial court could properly revoke probation and incarcerate a probationer for failure to pay, it must inquire into the probationer's ability to pay and determine whether the probationer had the ability to pay but willfully refused to do so. Under Florida law, the trial court must make its finding regarding whether the probationer willfully violated probation by the greater weight of the evidence. The court also held that an automatic revocation of probation without evidence presented as to ability to pay to support the trial court's finding of willfulness violated due process. Accordingly, the State must present sufficient evidence of willfulness, including that the probationer has, or has had, the ability to pay, in order to support the trial court's finding that the violation was willful. Once the State has done so, it was constitutional to then shift the burden to the probationer to prove inability to pay to essentially rebut the State's evidence of willfulness. However, while it was constitutional to place the burden on the probationer to prove inability to pay, the aspect of section 948.06(5), Florida Statutes, that required the probationer to prove inability to pay by the heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence was unconstitutional.

Defendant appealed from the denial of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and fundamental error with respect to the admission of a 45-caliber revolver. The Fourth District held that the trial court properly admitted the revolver, which was recovered from defendant when he was arrested five years after the murder - even though the revolver was indisputably not connected to the crime. The Fourth District concluded that because the revolver was properly admitted, both defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and his fundamental error claim failed. The court held that the Fourth District erred in holding that a gun unrelated to the crime was admissible where the purported relevancy was outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues and misleading the jury. The court also held that the district court erred in admitting the bandana and latex gloves. Accordingly, the court quashed the Fourth District's decision and approved the Fifth District's decision in Moore v. State.

This case involved two certified questions related to the Jimmy Ryce Act, Sections 394.910-.932, Florida Statutes. The court held that a Jimmy Ryce respondent who had unsuccessfully objected to a continuance or filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court could challenge a violation of the thirty-day statutory time limit by way of filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus prior to trial or could choose to wait until the conclusion of trial to bring the challenge on direct appeal. The court also held that should respondent wait until after the trial to issue this challenge, he or she must demonstrate an impact on the fairness of the trial to be entitled relief. Therefore, the court held that defendant did not waive his claim by waiting to bring it until after the trial, he was not entitled to release and dismissal of the Jimmy Ryce proceedings because he was challenging the length of his pretrial detention and not alleging that the improper continuance had any impact on the fairness of his trial.

Defendant, a prisoner under sentence of death, appealed an order of the circuit court denying his initial motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death and petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, defendant raised the following claims: (A) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to develop and present mitigation; (B) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress his confession; (C) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have the jury view the entire confession tape; (D) trial counsel was ineffective in the guilt phase; (E) the postconviction court violated defendant's right to due process by summarily denying several claims; (F) the postconviction court erred in denying claims regarding the testimony of the fingerprint examiner; (G) the postconviction court erred in denying defendant's claim that the State committed a Brady violation by not conducting promised blood testing; (H) cumulative error deprived defendant of a fair trial; and (I) defendant may be incompetent to be executed. The court addressed each claim and subsequently affirmed the postconviction court's order denying relief and denied the habeas petition.