Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved questions of law regarding probation revocation for failure to pay future restitution. The court held that before a trial court could properly revoke probation and incarcerate a probationer for failure to pay, it must inquire into the probationer's ability to pay and determine whether the probationer had the ability to pay but willfully refused to do so. Under Florida law, the trial court must make its finding regarding whether the probationer willfully violated probation by the greater weight of the evidence. The court also held that an automatic revocation of probation without evidence presented as to ability to pay to support the trial court's finding of willfulness violated due process. Accordingly, the State must present sufficient evidence of willfulness, including that the probationer has, or has had, the ability to pay, in order to support the trial court's finding that the violation was willful. Once the State has done so, it was constitutional to then shift the burden to the probationer to prove inability to pay to essentially rebut the State's evidence of willfulness. However, while it was constitutional to place the burden on the probationer to prove inability to pay, the aspect of section 948.06(5), Florida Statutes, that required the probationer to prove inability to pay by the heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence was unconstitutional.

Defendant appealed from the denial of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and fundamental error with respect to the admission of a 45-caliber revolver. The Fourth District held that the trial court properly admitted the revolver, which was recovered from defendant when he was arrested five years after the murder - even though the revolver was indisputably not connected to the crime. The Fourth District concluded that because the revolver was properly admitted, both defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and his fundamental error claim failed. The court held that the Fourth District erred in holding that a gun unrelated to the crime was admissible where the purported relevancy was outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues and misleading the jury. The court also held that the district court erred in admitting the bandana and latex gloves. Accordingly, the court quashed the Fourth District's decision and approved the Fifth District's decision in Moore v. State.

This case involved two certified questions related to the Jimmy Ryce Act, Sections 394.910-.932, Florida Statutes. The court held that a Jimmy Ryce respondent who had unsuccessfully objected to a continuance or filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court could challenge a violation of the thirty-day statutory time limit by way of filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus prior to trial or could choose to wait until the conclusion of trial to bring the challenge on direct appeal. The court also held that should respondent wait until after the trial to issue this challenge, he or she must demonstrate an impact on the fairness of the trial to be entitled relief. Therefore, the court held that defendant did not waive his claim by waiting to bring it until after the trial, he was not entitled to release and dismissal of the Jimmy Ryce proceedings because he was challenging the length of his pretrial detention and not alleging that the improper continuance had any impact on the fairness of his trial.

Defendant, a prisoner under sentence of death, appealed an order of the circuit court denying his initial motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death and petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, defendant raised the following claims: (A) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to develop and present mitigation; (B) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress his confession; (C) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have the jury view the entire confession tape; (D) trial counsel was ineffective in the guilt phase; (E) the postconviction court violated defendant's right to due process by summarily denying several claims; (F) the postconviction court erred in denying claims regarding the testimony of the fingerprint examiner; (G) the postconviction court erred in denying defendant's claim that the State committed a Brady violation by not conducting promised blood testing; (H) cumulative error deprived defendant of a fair trial; and (I) defendant may be incompetent to be executed. The court addressed each claim and subsequently affirmed the postconviction court's order denying relief and denied the habeas petition.

Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death for murder. Defendant subsequently appealed the denial of his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Defendant claimed that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the penalty phase, that the State withheld favorable information, that the State made a false statement during trial, and that the postconviction court erred during the evidentiary hearing. The court concluded that defendant's counsel was deficient for stipulating to the admissibility of a statement defendant made to law enforcement on May 7, 1982. The court also concluded that the State withheld favorable information, specifically the complete terms of a cooperation agreement with a codefendant. The court concluded, however, that because defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice on these claims and his remaining claims were without merit, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted on three counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death on each count. Defendant appealed an order denying a second successive motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, claiming that he was deprived of effective trial counsel during the penalty phase because that phase was conducted before a jury that returned a death recommendation in violation of Porter v. McCollum. The court held that the trial level postconviction court properly denied defendant's second successive postconviction motion because the decision in Porter did not constitute a fundamental change in the law that mandated retroactive application under Witt v. State. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death. Defendant raise six claims on appeal: (A) the trial court erred in denying several motions in limine; (B) the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a DNA analyst from defendant's first trial; (C) the trial court erred at the guilt phase in denying the jury's request to view the indictment or have the indictment read to them; (D) the trial court erred at the penalty phase by providing improper instructions to the jury; and (E) the death sentence was not proportionate. The court held that none of these claims warranted relief and affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence.

Defendant, a prisoner under sentence of death, appealed the denial of his amended and supplemental motions for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Defendant raised the following claims on appeal: (1) the postconviction court erred in denying his claims pertaining to comparative bullet lead analysis (CBLA) and certain testimony; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase; (3) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the introduction of gruesome photographs; (4) defendant's rights were violated when he was improperly shackled during his trial; (5) Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 was unconstitutional; (6) the penalty-phase jury instructions were unconstitutional; and (7) Florida's death penalty statute was unconstitutional. The court summarily denied claims 3, 4, and 6 as insufficiently pled. The court also denied without discussion of defendant's challenge pertaining to rule 3.852, based on the reasoning the court employed in ruling on his claim in defendant's postconviction appeal relating to the Domino's Pizza murders. The court further denied claim 7, challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty, based on the court's well-established precedent. Defendant had not made any additional allegations that would call into question the State's current methods of execution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the postconviction court's denial of relief and also denied defendant's habeas petition.

Petitioner, an inmate in state custody, filed a pro se petition for writ of mandamus with the court. Petitioner's petition was the twenty-seventh notice of extraordinary writ petition he had filed with the court since 2000. The court held that, because petitioner abused the limited judicial resources of the court, sanctions were warranted.

Defendant, a prisoner under sentence of death, appealed the denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. In the instant appeal, defendant primarily criticized his counsel's performance at trial for failing to adequately challenge the State's circumstantial case. Defendant argued that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for stipulating to the fact that DNA matching the victim's DNA was derived from blood as opposed to some other source. Defendant also contended that counsel was ineffective for failing to retain and call an expert to challenge the State's scratch-marks expert. Defendant additionally challenged counsel's presentation of mental health mitigation during the penalty phase. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief on these claims, as well as summarily denying relief on defendant's challenge to the rules prohibiting juror interviews. The court affirmed the postconviction court's denial of all claims.