Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder of his estranged wife, the attempted first degree murder of her boyfriend, the armed kidnapping of his stepdaughter, and armed burglary. At issue was whether the prosecutor's improper statements during closing arguments entitled defendant to a new trial; whether juror misconduct entitled defendant to a new penalty phase; whether the trial court erred in finding the prior violent felony aggravator; whether defendant's death sentence was unconstitutional because the aggravating circumstances were not alleged in the charging document; whether the trial court erred in finding the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel; whether the trial court erred in finding the murder cold, calculated, and premeditated; and whether defendant's death sentence was not proportionate. Upon review of the record, the court held that competent, substantial evidence existed to support defendant's murder conviction on either theory of first degree murder, as well as his convictions for attempted first degree murder, armed kidnapping, and armed burglary of a dwelling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and sentences.

Defendant was convicted for possession of a firearm by a felon and sentenced to ten years in prison. At issue was the scope of the pre-interrogation warnings required by the Fifth Amendment of the United States, as described in Miranda v. Arizona, and by article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution, as described in Traylor v. State. The court held that, in light of the decision of the Supreme Court, the Miranda warnings at issue in this case sufficiently advised defendant of his rights as required by the Fifth Amendment and article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution. Therefore, the court quashed the decision of the Second District and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

Appellant was convicted and sentenced to death in 1986 for the murder of a certain individual and sentenced to death on direct appeal. This appeal followed from the denial of postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in the second penalty-phase proceeding. At issue was whether appellant had ineffective assistance of penalty-phase counsel for failing to investigate, prepare, and present mitigating evidence and in failing to object to improper remarks made by the prosecutor in closing argument. The court held that, based on a review of the evidentiary hearings and the new penalty-phase trial, in light of the aggravators and mitigators, appellant had not demonstrated that confidence in the outcome of the penalty-phase proceeding had been undermined and therefore, appellant had not demonstrated prejudice. The court also held that while the prosecutor at length described the choices that appellant had made in his life, arguably improper comments, they were relatively brief and were not emphasized by the prosecutor. Accordingly, the court concluded that appellant had not demonstrated prejudice on this claim and therefore, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.

Appellant appealed an order of the circuit court denying his motion to vacate his convictions of first-degree murder and sentences of death filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus. At issue was whether appellant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because he failed to investigate, develop, and present available mitigating evidence that would have legally precluded an override of the jury's life recommendation. The court held that it was clear that trial counsel's failure to investigate, develop and present available mitigation evidence not only undermined confidence in the outcome of the trial proceedings, but also precluded the court from making a proper disposition of the case on direct appeal. The court also held that a new sentencing proceeding before a trial court was unnecessary in postconviction jury override cases, just as it was unnecessary to direct appeal jury override cases. Accordingly, the court affirmed the postconviction court's denial of rule 3.850 relief with respect to the first-degree murder convictions but reversed the court's denial of relief with respect to the death sentences. The court vacated appellant's death sentence and remanded for imposition of a life sentence on each of the first-degree murder counts and the trial court had discretion to impose the sentences concurrently or consecutively.

Defendant was adjudicated guilty of the sale and possession of cocaine, a second degree felony, and sentenced as a habitual felony offender ("HFO") to thirty years in prison and received a split sentence where he was to serve the first 20 years of his sentence in prison and the remaining portion as a suspended sentence to be satisfied by probation. After 12 years, defendant was released from prison and subsequently committed technical violations of his probation twice by testing positive for cocaine. At issue in a certified question was whether defendant lost his status as an HFO if the trial court did not repeat this status at the sentencing hearing on violation of probation ("VOP") where defendant had been declared to be an HFO before the imposition of his initial split sentence and when he later violated probation and had his probation revoked. The court held that the absence of any clear intent of designating defendant as an HFO and the trial court's subsequent imposition of an HFO status to his VOP judgment and sentence after he began serving his sentence violated double jeopardy and amounted to an illegal sentence and manifest injustice. Because defendant's sentence was illegal, the district court was proper in correcting it and therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision and answered the certified question in the affirmative.

Petitioner received a 30 year sentence for burglary, a 10 year sentence for auto theft, and a life sentence for kidnapping where petitioner's sentences stemmed from his theft of a vehicle in which a two-year-old child was asleep in the backseat. At issue was whether petitioner committed the additional crime of kidnapping if he did not know the child was in the backseat before or during his commission of the auto theft, which was the underlying felony used to support his kidnapping conviction. The court held that, because the State failed to produce sufficient evidence demonstrating petitioner's awareness of the victim before or during his execution of the underlying felony, critical statutory requirements for the kidnapping offense were not satisfied. Therefore, the district court's decision relying on the Faison v. State three-part test to affirm the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal was erroneous.