Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Following a jury trial, Michael Moore was found guilty of malice murder, felony murder, attempt to commit a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, and various other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Leo Fletcher during a drug deal. On appeal, he argued that his trial counsel was ineffective. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moore v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Justin Moore was found guilty of felony murder and various other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Brandon Thomas. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial and that his trial counsel was ineffective. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moore v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Kenneth Victor Ramirez was convicted of the murder of Thomas Branch. He appealed the conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence was legally sufficient and therefore affirmed Ramirez's conviction. View "Ramirez v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Tony Van was found guilty of murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. He appealed, arguing that the trial court gave the jury coercive instructions regarding the completion of the verdict form which favored a conviction and that the verdict form was improper. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Van's conviction. View "Van v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Lecester "Buddy" Woodall, Jr., was convicted of felony murder and armed robbery in connection with the September 4, 2000 shooting deaths of his uncle John Lavelle Lynn and Robert Van Allen. Appellant raised various claims of error at trial on appeal to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction. View "Woodall v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Stanquise Ramon Bell was sentenced to life imprisonment plus five years upon the jury's verdict finding him guilty of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the 2010 shooting death of Anthony Carter. Bell appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant's sentence. View "Bell v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in this case to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in its determination that the public duty doctrine insulated the City of Doraville from liability arising from the response of a Doraville Police Department ("DPD") officer to a vehicle emergency on an interstate highway which culminated in a multi-vehicle accident injuring Kenyatta Stevenson. Stevenson sued the City and a DPD Officer, asserting that the officer was negligent in failing to redirect traffic away from Stevenson's disabled car and in causing traffic to move in Stevenson's direction by engaging his vehicle's blue emergency lights while stopped near the outer lane of the highway behind and to the right of Stevenson. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants, finding official immunity shielded the officer from liability and that the public duty doctrine precluded Stevenson's claims against the City. Stevenson appealed, arguing that the public duty doctrine did not apply to his case because he alleged affirmative acts of negligence and that, even if the doctrine did apply, he fell within the special relationship exception identified in "City of Rome v. Jordan," (426 SE2d 861) (1993)). The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding Stevenson's arguments lacked merit. Although it appeared that the appellate court based its rejection of Stevenson's first argument on a finding that "there [was] nothing in the record . . . showing any active negligence on the part of the officer," the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, but wrote to clarify the public duty doctrine. The doctrine "does not apply to limit liability where a claim of active negligence (misfeasance), rather than a mere failure to act (nonfeasance) is alleged." View "Stevenson v. City of Doraville" on Justia Law

Appellant Alvando Givens, Sr., was convicted of malice murder for the death of Voncetta Render. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial, and that the trial court erred in its jury charge and arriving at his eventual sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court indeed erred in calculating appellant's sentence: it sentenced appellant to serve, concurrently to his life sentence on malice murder, life sentences on counts two through ten which were "merged" by the trial court. Since the charges of felony murder were vacated as a matter of law and the remaining charges merged as a matter of fact, there was no reason for the trial court to sentence appellant on any conviction other than malice murder. Accordingly, the life sentences on counts two through ten were vacated. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in ll other respects. View "Givens v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the limitation period for a claim of pain and suffering in this wrongful death action could be tolled for fraud under OCGA 9-3-96. The victim, Sparkle Reid and Rajeeve Rai, the son of appellant Chiman Rai, married when their daughter was five months old. Within a month of the wedding, the victim was murdered in their apartment in the presence of the daughter. Rajeeve was at work at the time. The victim's father, Bennet Reid and his wife took custody of the child and later adopted her. Rajeeve abandoned the child, and never challenged the adoption nor the consequent termination of his parental rights. The crime went into cold case status until 2004 when, while investigating an unrelated matter, police spoke to a woman who said she was present at the murder and identified the hired killers. This information led eventually to appellant. Appellant was convicted of the murder. Reid filed a complaint and subsequently an amended complaint for wrongful death as the minor child's next friend and for pain and suffering as administrator of the victim's estate. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict, awarded $2.5 million to the child on the wrongful death claim and $100,000 to Reid as estate administrator for the victim's pain and suffering. Appellant's motion for new trial was denied. Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals divided evenly by a vote of six to six on the issue of whether appellant had committed fraud that would trigger the tolling provisions of OCGA 9-3-96, and thus, prevent the estate's claim for pain and suffering from being time-barred by the statute of limitation for personal injury actions. The appellate court ultimately reversed those portions of the trial court's judgment relating to the tolling of the limitation period for the pain and suffering claim, but affirmed the remainder of the judgment, finding that actual fraud was the gravamen of Reid's claim for pain and suffering and was not supported by the record or the law. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with much of the position advocated by the appellate court. That portion of the final judgment entered on the jury's verdict against appellant and in favor of Reid, as administrator of the victim's estate, for pain and suffering was reversed, but the remainder of the final judgment entered on the jury's verdict for wrongful death against appellant and in favor of Reid, as next friend of the victim's minor child, was affirmed. View "Rai v. Reid" on Justia Law

Mary Jane Nelson and other litigants appealed a trial court's order granting summary judgment to the Georgia Sheriffs Youth Homes and other entities in a quiet title action. In their sole contention of error in this appeal, Nelson argued the trial court erred in granting summary judgment without the final report of the special master being filed. As the Georgia Supreme Court has recognized, "[i]f no demand for a jury trial is filed prior to the time he hears the case, the special master is the arbiter of law and fact and decides all issues in the case." And, as in this case, there was a demand for a jury trial filed before the special master holds a hearing, the trial court had jurisdiction to proceed to trial. The fact that a demand for a jury trial was filed pursuant to OCGA 23-3-66 does not mean that the trial court cannot grant summary judgment when warranted. Accordingly, Nelsons did not show an error in the trial court's grant of summary judgment. View "Nelson v. Georgia Sheriffs Youth Homes, Inc." on Justia Law