Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1993, Demarcus Sears was convicted of kidnapping with bodily injury and armed robbery in connection with the death of Gloria Wilbur, who was kidnapped and robbed of her automobile in Georgia, raped in Tennessee, and murdered in Kentucky. The jury recommended a death sentence for the kidnapping with bodily injury after finding multiple statutory aggravating circumstances, including that the kidnapping with bodily injury was committed while Sears was engaged in the commission of the capital felony of murder. After affirming each of his convictions and the life sentence for the armed robbery, the Supreme Court remanded the case for proceedings related to Sears' claim of jury misconduct at the sentencing phase. In 2000, Sears filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging among other claims, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. In an order filed in early 2008, the habeas court denied Sears' petition, and the Supreme Court denied Sears' application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal upon concluding that it lacked “arguable merit.” However, in a per curiam opinion, the United States Supreme Court granted Sears' petition for a writ of certiorari and held that, with regard to Sears' ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the habeas court failed to conduct a proper prejudice analysis under "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U. S. 668 (1984)). The federal Supreme Court then vacated the Georgia Court's order denying Sears' application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion. In 2011, after a new habeas judge was assigned to the case and after a hearing, the habeas court entered a new order which adopted the 2008 Order with regard to all of Sears' claims except for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, once again denying him relief on those claims. With regard to the ineffective assistance claim, the habeas court concluded that, even if he could prove that trial counsel rendered deficient performance, Sears had failed to prove that he was constitutionally prejudiced as a result. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Sears' application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal from the 2011 Order. After review of the 2011 order, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Sears' habeas petition. View "Sears v. Humphrey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in "Greenway v. Northside Hosp., Inc." (730 SE2d 742) (2012)), to determine if the appellate court erred in its evaluation of Deputy Sheriff Terry Roper's claim that he was entitled to official immunity from liability in connection with the euthanization of two dogs. Greenway was taken by ambulance from his home to a hospital; two dogs remained at the home. While Greenway was in the hospital's emergency department, and uncertain whether he would live, he was pressured to sign an “Owner Release Form” regarding his dogs; the form was given to him by Roper and authorized Forsyth County Animal Control to destroy the dogs. At the time he signed the form, Greenway was unable to read it without his eyeglasses and understood that his dogs were going to the Humane Society; the dogs were euthanized before Greenway was able to recover from his illness and take further action. Greenway sued Roper, the hospital, the Sheriff, and the County's animal shelter provider. The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed as to Roper, the hospital, and the animal shelter operator. As to Roper, the Court of Appeals found that the doctrine of official immunity insulated him from liability from his decision to ask Greenway to sign the form, but not from his execution of that decision. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred, the Supreme Court reversed that court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Roper v. Greenway" on Justia Law

A jury acquitted Christopher Roesser of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault, but was unable to reach a verdict on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. When the State sought to retry Roesser for voluntary manslaughter, he filed a plea in bar asserting double jeopardy based on collateral estoppel. The trial court denied the plea, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibited the State from retrying Roesser for voluntary manslaughter. Therefore, the Court reversed. View "Roesser v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Warden sought review of the grant of habeas relief to appellee Ryan Smith. Appellee was convicted of malice murder and sentenced to life in prison in 2002. Appellee subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging his trial/appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the State's proof of venue, allowing an un-redacted indictment to go out with the jury, and for failing to challenge the seating of an alternate juror. The habeas court granted appellee relief on all of his claims, set aside appellant's conviction and sentence, and remanded the case to the trial court. After its review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the habeas court's decision and reversed that decision in its entirety. View "O'Donnell v. Smith" on Justia Law

This case concerned one of the exceptions to the Georgia Tort Claims Act known as the "discretionary function" exception. The guardians of two infant boys sued the Department of Human Services (DHS), alleging that the Clayton County Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS) was negligent in several respects in its investigation of a report that the boys were neglected by their parents. On motion of DHS, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the “discretionary function” exception properly applied, but the Court of Appeals disagreed, and it reversed the dismissal. The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to consider whether the "discretionary function" exception applied in this case, and concluding that it did, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Georgia Dep't. of Human Svcs. v. Spruill" on Justia Law

Grant Murphy Ensley appealed his convictions and sentences for the malice murder of his father, possession of a firearm during the commission of felonies, and the unlawful handling of an explosive device. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but remanded for recalculation of Ensley's sentence. View "Ensley v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Kia Motors Manufacturing Georgia, Inc. instituted a "Quick Start Program" run in conjunction with the Technical College System of Georgia. Krystal Coleman, Sabrina Robinson Bolston, Tim Durden, and Darrell Strawbridge each submitted a request to the Technical College System pursuant to the Open Records Act, seeking to inspect certain records concerning Kia's hiring practices. The College System refused on several grounds to make the requested records available for inspection, and Coleman, Bolston, Durden, and Strawbridge filed suit to compel their production. In 2012, while the lawsuit was pending, the General Assembly amended the Open Records Act, and among other revisions, it added an exemption for certain records concerning the Quick Start program from public inspection. The Technical College System and Kia then moved to dismiss the lawsuit, asserting that exemption from the revised Act. Without deciding the extent to which paragraph of the revised Act applied to the requested records, the trial court denied the motions to dismiss, concluding that it would be unconstitutional in any event to apply the revision in a pending lawsuit. The Technical College System and Kia appealed, and after review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded in this case the applicable revised parts of the Act applied and that its application was constitutional. The trial court's decision was reversed, and on remand, the trial court was mandated to determine which of the pertinent records were subject to the revised Act. View "Deal v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Appellant Darrell Crowder sought review of his convictions for murder and related crimes for the shooting death of his estranged wife Catcilia Crowder. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial, and argued he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction, and that he did not make a showing he received ineffective assistance, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant's convictions. View "Crowder v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Alex Cowart and John Adams appealed their convictions for felony murder and other crimes related to the armed robbery of Sean Giroir, Michael Levi, John Silcox, and Miles Antle, and the subsequent shootings that killed Giroir and injured Levi. The Supreme Court affirmed Cowart's convictions but remanded his case for resentencing because he was improperly sentenced for two felony murder convictions based on the death of a single victim. The Court reversed Adams's convictions due to the erroneous and harmful admission of evidence bolstering the testimony of the key witness against him. View "Cowart v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, Maria Colon and Gwendolyn Warren filed separate lawsuits against their employer, Fulton County, pursuant to Georgia's whistleblower statute, OCGA 45-1-4. Colon and Warren alleged that they were retaliated against after they jointly disclosed to their supervisors and refused to cover up that County employees were violating laws, rules, and regulations, thereby wasting and abusing County funds and public money. The County moved to dismiss the actions based on sovereign immunity and moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the retaliation claims under the statute could not proceed against the County because the complaints did not relate to a "state program or operation." The trial court denied both motions. The Court of Appeals held that the cause of action set forth in OCGA 45-1-4 unambiguously expressed a specific waiver of sovereign immunity and the extent of such waiver, even though the statute does not expressly state that sovereign immunity is waived. Furthermore, the appellate court interpreted "state programs or operations" under the facts of this case and held that where an employer qualifies as a "public employer" under the statute only because it received funds from the state, the statute provides protection from retaliation only if the employee's complaints related to a "state-funded program or operation under the jurisdiction of the public employer." In Case No. S12G1905, Colon and Warren argued that the Court of Appeals erred in construing OCGA 45-1-4 such that employees of governmental entities may maintain an action under subsection (d) of the statute only if their complaints relate to "programs or operations" that are "funded at least in part by the state." In Case Nos. S12G1911 and S12G1912, Fulton County contended that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that OCGA 45-1-4 expressed a specific waiver of the County's sovereign immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decisions in Case Nos. S12G1911 and S12G1912, but reversed in Case No. S12G1905. View "Colon v. Fulton County" on Justia Law