Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In a foreclosure action, the trial court granted partial summary judgment to bankruptcy trustee J. Coleman Tidwell against National City Mortgage Company. Addressing its jurisdiction sua sponte, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the grounds that PNC Bank, N.A. was not a party to the foreclosure and therefore lacked standing to appeal the order entered against National City. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that PNC Bank lacked standing to appeal on behalf of its predecessor National City Mortgage Company. Because the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the appeal must be dismissed due to the trial court's failure to substitute or join PNC Bank as a party under OCGA 9-11-25 (c), the Court reversed and remanded the case for the Court of Appeals to address issues raised in this appeal. View "National City Mortgage Co. v. Tidwell " on Justia Law

While still a minor, appellant Marcus More was indicted on two counts of malice murder and other crimes relating to two fatal shootings. The State gave appellant notice of its intent to seek the death penalty and of the aggravating circumstance supporting the death penalty on which it intended to rely. A jury found appellant guilty on all charges, and rather than proceed to sentencing, he entered a negotiated plea agreement in which he agreed (inter alia) to waive his rights to appeal and all post-conviction review of his convictions and sentences. For that waiver, the State recommended (and the trial court accepted) a life sentence without the possibility of parole on one malice murder county, and consecutive sentences on the remaining counts. Four years after appellant received his sentence, the federal Supreme Court decided "Roper v. Simmons" (543 U.S. 551 (2005)). Based on that holding, appellant filed a motion to correct void sentence, claiming that Roper removed the death penalty as a sentencing option due to appellant's age. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding both that appellant waived his right to challenge his sentence and even if he had not waived the right, Roper did not apply so as to retroactively invalidate his sentence of life without parole. After its review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded: (1) appellant, despite signing the plea agreement, cannot, according to Georgia case law, "bargain away" the right to challenge an illegal and void sentence; (2) appellant's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was void as a sentence not allowed by law and the trial court's order denying the motion to correct void sentence was reversed. View "Moore v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether Georgia's expert witness statute permits a physician in a medical malpractice action to testify as to the standard of care applicable to a nurse midwife, where the physician regularly renders the medical treatment at issue, but did not supervise the midwife in accordance with the statute. The Supreme Court construed the statutory language in light of the legislative purposes behind the law and concluded that the statute did not permit such testimony, even if the physician satisfied the "active practice" requirement. To be qualified to give expert medical testimony, a physician or other health care provider (regardless of her experience in "active practice") must satisfy either the "same profession" or "supervision" requirement of the statute. View "Hankla v. Postell" on Justia Law

After being found guilty of murder, felony murder and several other crimes, Willie Bryant appealed his convictions, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to obtain a DNA expert to counter the State's evidence against him. In reviewing the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that trial counsel made the determination that, rather than call a separate expert that would reiterate testimony already presented by the State she would focus her cross-examination of the State's own DNA expert to show that the results of the testing were highly inconclusive. As such, the Supreme Court determined trial counsel acted reasonably and did not render ineffective assistance. View "Bryant v. Georgia " on Justia Law

Derrick Bell pled guilty to malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Dominic King. Bell filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and later filed a motion to vacate void sentence. The trial court denied both motions, and he appealed. Finding that the trial court properly denied Bell's motions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bell v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Joseph Andrews was found guilty by jury of malice murder and felony murder in connection with the shooting death of Cornelius Lowe. On appeal he contended that his trial counsel was ineffective, that the trial court erred by allowing incriminating hearsay statements from his co-defendants to be admitted into evidence at trial, and that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Andrews v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this called for the Court to decide the correct approach for determining whether a new sentence, imposed after the defendant's initial sentence has been vacated, constitutes a harsher sentence and thereby triggers a presumption of vindictiveness under "North Carolina v. Pearce," (395 U.S. 711 (1969)). More than three decades ago, the Georgia Supreme Court adopted what is known as the "count-by-count" approach. The majority of federal and state appellate courts adopted the alternative "aggregate" approach. In light of the momentum supporting Georgia's adoption of the aggregate approach, the Court granted certiorari to settle the issue with this case. View "Georgia v. Hudson" on Justia Law

Appellant Andrew Solomon was convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Levy Daniel. The only issue that Appellant raised on appeal was procedurally defaulted, and therefore the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. However, the Court vacated his conviction and sentence for aggravated assault, because the conviction for that offense merged with the murder conviction. View "Solomon v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Darian Scandrett appealed his conviction for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, contending that the trial court admitted improper evidence and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Scandrett v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The State appealed the trial court's grant of a motion for new trial on the ground that the evidence was legally insufficient for the jury to convict appellee Marcus Jackson of murder and related charges for the death of the victim Brandon Horton. Because the trial court was reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence pursuant to "Jackson v. Virginia," (443 U.S. 307 (1979)) and not pursuant to OCGA 5-5-21, the trial court was not acting as the Òthirteenth jurorÓ and could not weigh the evidence or otherwise exercise itÕs own discretion. Rather, the Supreme Court applied the standard of review as listed in "Manuel v. Georgia,"(711 SE2d 676) (2011)). Applying this standard, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Georgia v. Jackson" on Justia Law