Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Following a jury trial, Reginald L. Lynch appealed his conviction for malice murder, felony murder, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no merit to Appellant's claims, the Supreme Court affirmed.

A jury convicted William David Riley of murdering his three children and of first degree arson, and the jury imposed death sentences for the murders. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed Riley's convictions and sentences in 2004. Riley filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 2005, and he amended his petition in 2007. The habeas court held an evidentiary hearing in 2008. The habeas court granted Riley's petition in an order filed in 2012, vacating both Riley's convictions and his sentences. The Warden appealed in case number S12A0910, and Riley cross-appealed in case number S12X0945. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the habeas court’s decision to vacate Riley's convictions and sentences in the Warden's appeal, the Court affirmed the habeas court's denial of relief on the grounds addressed in Riley's cross-appeal, and remanded for the consideration of Riley's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.

Antonio Faniel appealed his convictions for felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in connection with the fatal shooting of Doreen Young. He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of his guilt, the admission into evidence of other transactions, and the effectiveness of his trial counsel. Finding the challenges to be without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Appellant Torrance Dunn was convicted of malice murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and five counts of felony obstruction in connection with the shooting death of Ramon Smith. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial, in addition, he raised an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Furthermore, his motion for new trial was denied, and he appealed that too. Finding that Appellant's claims lacked merit based on its review of the trial court evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions.

In February 2003, appellant Leviticus Burns entered a negotiated guilty plea to a murder charge stemming from his indictment for the October 2001 shooting death of Reginald Berry. Appellant's other charges were placed on a dead docket and he was sentenced to life in prison for murder. In May 2011, appellant moved for an out-of-time appeal which motion the trial court denied. Appellant timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no abuse of the trial court's discretion, and affirmed its denial of appellant's out-of-time appeal.

A jury convicted Donald Hugh Gamble, Jr., of the murder of Quamaine Rickman in Richmond County. Gamble contended on appeal that the evidence was insufficient and the trial court erred in its jury instructions. The Supreme Court affirmed because the evidence was sufficient and there was no error in the jury charge, but vacated the conviction and sentence for felony murder due to a sentencing error.

The State filed an in personam action pursuant to OCGA 16-14-6 (b) of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against Hargurtag Singh and his company Rajan Singh, LLC (collectively, "Singh"), seeking equitable relief including injunctive relief to stop the alienation of Singh's property and the appointment of a receiver over Singh's business and property. The complaint also sought the forfeiture of certain property as defendants in rem pursuant to OCGA 16-14-7. The complaint alleged that Singh was engaging in illegal gambling activity at its Clayton County business, Pure Gas Station, by paying out cash winnings to persons who played electronic gaming devices located in the store. On the same day the action was brought, the trial court granted the State's request that cash and equipment be seized and that certain assets be frozen; granted the State's request for a temporary restraining order; and granted the State's request that a receiver be placed in control of the business. The State and Singh subsequently entered into a consent agreement whereby Singh was allowed to resume operating the business under certain conditions and under the receiver's supervision. Hargurtag Singh later moved to dismiss the action on two grounds: (1) that the complaint failed to state a claim under the Georgia RICO Act, and (2) that the State's in personam forfeiture claims were unconstitutional. The trial court declined to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, reasoning that the State had sufficiently alleged violations of OCGA 16-12-22 and 16-12-28. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in, inter alia, "Cisco v. Georgia," (680 SE2d 831) (2009)) the trial court dismissed the State’s in personam claims because it determined that all civil in personam claims under the RICO statute were unconstitutional. The State appealed and Singh filed a cross appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Singh moved to dismiss contending that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction based on its view that the State failed to file an application for interlocutory review; the State contended that the trial court erred in dismissing the claims against the in personam defendant on grounds that claims under Georgia's RICO act were unconstitutional; and in the cross appeal, Singh contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) it had jurisdiction over this case; (2) the Court reversed the decision pertaining to the in personam defendants, finding none of the subsections of OCGA 16-14-6 require proof of criminal conduct on the part of the in personam defendants, but allowed the superior court to enjoin any violations of OCGA 16-14-4 until the case was resolved; and, (3) Singh failed to show that there was no set of provable facts that would entitle the State to relief. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA 9-11-12(b)(6) was sustained.

Appellant Horatio Zamora was convicted of malice murder and first-degree cruelty to children in connection with the death of 19-month-old Jonathan Castillo. Appellant contended that the evidence at his trial was insufficient to prove him guilty, that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, and that his right to be present during trial was violated by the dismissal of a juror as a result of bench conferences in which Appellant did not participate. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellant acquiesced in the limited trial proceedings that occurred in his absence, and that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to convict him. Accordingly, the Court affirmed his conviction.

Appellant Jamaal Williams was indicted along with Alex Marshall, Melvin Daniels, Bennie Durham, and Kyle Oree for numerous crimes related to the shooting death of Robert Daughtry, Jr. Marshall and Daniels pled guilty to murder and other charges, and they testified for the State at the joint trial of Appellant, Durham, and Oree. The jury found Appellant guilty of felony murder, kidnapping, and other crimes. Durham and Oree were also found guilty of felony murder and other charges. The Supreme Court already affirmed their convictions. In this appeal, Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the kidnapping felony that served as the predicate offense for his felony murder conviction, as well as the trial court's admission of alleged hearsay statements. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence ultimately admitted at trial established that Appellant, the other three attackers, and Oree were part of a conspiracy to assault and kill the victim. Furthermore, there was no error in the district court's admission of the alleged hearsay statements at issue. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction.

Appellant Mathew Wilkins was found guilty of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery in connection with the death of Marlisa Wells. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial, and the admission of certain items. Furthermore, Appellant contended that the State engaged in unconstitutional race-based discrimination by using three of its peremptory strikes during voir dire, and that the State's display of several nondescript boxes, paper evidence bags and a foam exhibit board tainted the venire and denied him a fair trial. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The record in this case supported the trial court's finding that the reasons offered for the State's strikes were race-neutral and not pre-textual. The Court found no abuse of the trial court's discretion when it determined the view of the State's boxes did not prejudice the venire. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence.