Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Leonard Small filed suit seeking ejectment and mesne profits after learning that Appellee Alphonso Irving had built a home on a lot located at 4110 Raybun Street in Savannah, which Small had purchased at a tax sale. A special master was appointed and issued an order adopted by the trial court, recommending that Small recover the premises and pay Irving for the value of the improvements. Small appealed, alleging the trial court's adoption of the special master's order was in error because the evidence was insufficient to support it. He argued further that the special master erred in concluding Small could not recover mesne profits because he held only a tax title to the property. The Supreme Court concluded it was not an error for the trial court to adopt the special master's order. However, the Court found that the trial court erred in adopting the special master's conclusion that Small could not recover mesne profits. The Court partly affirmed, and partly reversed the trial court's decision. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

A package containing 12.46 pounds of marijuana arrived at a post office in Hall County addressed to "Abby at 1830 Vineyard Way." The post office mistakenly notified Abby Massaro of 1930 Vineyard Way. Ms. Massaro collected the package from the post office, discovered the marijuana, and contacted police. A law enforcement officer, dressed as a postal carrier, performed a controlled delivery of the package to 1830 Vineyard Way, with other officers waiting nearby. Appellant Justin Wilson answered the door and told the undercover officer that Abby was not at home but that "the package was expected and he would sign for it." Appellant accepted delivery and was immediately arrested. Appellant told the officers that his roommate, Daniel Park, had mentioned that he was having a package containing marijuana shipped to the apartment. Appellant also stated that he believed the package was ultimately intended to be delivered to David Salinas, a friend of Park. Both Park and Salinas were convicted during separate jury trials of trafficking in marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and possession of marijuana. Their convictions were affirmed on appeal. After a motion for new trial was denied, Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed his convictions and held that "the drug trafficking statutory scheme [did not] require proof of the defendant's subjective knowledge as to the precise weight of the drugs in his possession." Appellant again appealed, and after its review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "even if we believe that the trial court's instruction to the jury that knowledge by Appellant of the quantity of the marijuana he possessed [was] not an element of the offense of trafficking constituted error, it [did] not amount to plain error."

After a jury trial, Appellant Reginald Pulley was found guilty of malice murder, theft by taking a motor vehicle, and felony theft by taking. The trial court entered judgments of conviction and sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment for the malice murder charge and a consecutive ten-year sentence for each of the theft charges. Appellant contended that the trial court erred in failing to give certain instructions, and that the evidence was insufficient to authorize the jury to find that the value of the items he stole exceeded $500, and thus his conviction of felony theft by taking should be reduced to a misdemeanor. Furthermore, Appellant contended that the statements he made during interrogation following his arrest were induced by a promise of benefit and thus the trial court erred in finding that his inculpatory statements in his interview with police were voluntary. Finding no error nor merit to his contentions on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions and sentence.

Defendant Julio Moreno-Rivera appealed his conviction for malice murder (among other crimes), contending that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After a series of escalating arguments between Defendant and the victims (with whom Defendant lived), Defendant shot his victims and fled on foot, later confessing to the arresting officer. Defendant testified at trial that he shot in self-defense. On appeal, Defendant contended he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to adequately investigate and prove prior acts of violence committed by the victims in their native Mexico prior to the three moving and living in the United States. Finding that Defendant's trial counsel was not given information by Defendant himself by which she could conduct an investigation into the prior violent acts by the victims, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.

Appellant was convicted of felony murder and armed robbery in connection with the shooting death of Sean Robinson. Appellant's motion for new trial was denied, and he appealed that decision. On appeal, Appellant asserted, inter alia, the trial court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses by admitting statements made by the victim to the responding officer. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting the victim's statements. "The statements were made to meet an ongoing emergency and were therefore non-testimonial in nature." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial.

Following the denial of his motion for new trial as amended, Dana Gregory McFarlane appealed his convictions for malice murder, kidnapping with bodily injury, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony in connection with the fatal slashing of his fiancee Kinaya Schenese Byrd. His sole contention of error was that the trial transcript was incomplete in violation of statutory requirements. Finding Defendant's challenge to be without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.

Defendant Malcolm Holloman appealed his conviction for felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault and the denial of his motion for new trial in connection with the fatal stabbing of Robert Calloway. He contended that there were violations of the rule of sequestration; erroneous admissions into evidence of certain photographs, his prior convictions, and a prior incident as a similar transaction; and error in regard to the trial court's instructions to the jury. Finding the challenges to be without merit after its review of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.

The Supreme Court granted discretionary appeal to Haralson County to review a superior court's grant of the writ of mandamus. In 2008, Taylor Junkyard of Bremen, Inc. sought to purchase a piece of property in a residential area. Before doing so, it wanted confirmation that the property had a permitted nonconforming use, so Taylor Junkyard asked for, and was issued, a letter written by the County Zoning Administrator, which stated that the business operated by Trawick "falls under the grandfather clause." When Taylor Junkyard applied for a business license for the year 2009, Haralson County administratively rejected the application, with the stated reason that the business engaged in on the property had changed from the original nonconforming business of "used automobiles and parts" to "metal recycling and metal fabrication," and thus violated the County's zoning ordinance. Taylor Junkyard appealed to the County Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA), which, after a hearing, rejected the application for a business license, based upon found zoning violations. Taylor Junkyard then filed its petition for a writ of mandamus in superior court, which the court granted, finding that there was no evidence to support the ZBA's decision. The County contended on appeal to the Supreme Court that the superior court erred in addressing the petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that the County Zoning Ordinance provided a means for Taylor Junkyard to file an appeal from the adverse decision of the ZBA, and thus, mandamus was not an available remedy. "When local zoning ordinances do not establish a means by which an aggrieved party may gain judicial review of an adverse decision by a zoning appeal board, a petition to the appropriate superior court for a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy." Accordingly, as no provision of the Haralson County ordinances set forth an available means of judicial review, the superior court did not err in concluding that a petition for a writ of mandamus was the proper avenue for Taylor Junkyard to seek review of the ZBA's decision.

The Supreme Court granted Appellant Melvin Griffin's application for a certificate of probable cause to examine whether the habeas court erred in rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Appellant was convicted of murder and related offenses for which he was sentenced to life plus 65 years consecutive. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. Appellant subsequently petitioned for habeas corpus, claimin that his right to be present at critical stages of trial had been violated when the trial judge questioned a juror during the trial outside of his presence. Because Appellant did not object at trial the questioning of the juror outside of his presence, that issue was foreclosed on appeal. Thus the Suprme Court reasoned that Appellant could not raise an ineffectiveness claim against his trial counsel for failing to raise the right-to-be-present issue because he failed to establish the requisite prejudice to prevail on that claim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the denial of his probable cause application.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in "Glass v. Gates" to answer whether the definition of "any motor vehicle" in OCGA 33-24-51(a) continued to be the broader definition of the term provided for in prior case law, notwithstanding the 2002 passage of OCGA 36-92-1. As inmates at the Troup County Correctional facility, Jonathan Glass and Tony Smith were operating tractors when Smith's tractor got stuck in a ditch. Donrell Gates, Glass' detail supervisor, instructed the men to attach a chain to the tractors so Glass could use his tractor to pull Smith's from the ditch. As Glass did so, Smith engaged his tractor's bush hog, causing a rock to take flight and pierce Glass' throat. Glass bled profusely and died later that day. Plaintiffs, Glass' minor son and the executor of his estate, brought a wrongful death and survivor action against Troup County and Gates. The county sought summary judgment, claiming plaintiffs' claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The County asserted that by revising OCGA 33-24-51 (b) in 2002 (effective 2005), the legislature demonstrated its intent to apply the more narrow definition of "motor vehicle" found in OCGA 36-92-1 (6) in determining whether a local government waived sovereign immunity by purchasing liability insurance on a motor vehicle. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the county did not waive sovereign immunity because neither a tractor nor a bush hog could be deemed a "motor vehicle" under OCGA 36-92-1. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the broader definition of "motor vehicle" should have been applied under 33-24-51, and that therefore, the County waived its sovereign immunity as long as it purchased insurance for the tractor and bush hog used by Smith. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals' reasoning, and affirmed by answering the appellate court's original question in the affirmative.