Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Following trial, a jury declared that a Will and Revocable Trust executed by Thomas Hines, Sr. in 2002 were invalid as they were the product of undue influence. Steve and Deborah Davidson, executors of the Hines estate, appealed that ruling. The Davisons contended that the trial court erred in denying their motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the evidence did not support the jury's finding. Furthermore, the Davidsons argued that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence upon which the jury ultimately relied in reaching its decision. Finding no error nor abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions and the jury's verdict.

In 2008, a Jones County jury found Appellant Robert Danenberg guilty of malice murder arising out of the 1988 fatal shooting of Deborah Penland Lamb. He appealed, arguing that several rulings made by the trial court constituted reversible error. Among the issues, Appellant contended that the trial court wrongfully denied him the right to represent himself at trial. Further, Appellant contended that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence used against him, and denied him the right to testify in his own defense. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion, and affirmed the trial court's decisions with respect to all issues Appellant raised on appeal.

A jury convicted Leonard Maurice Drane of committing murder and aggravated battery against Renee Blackmon and sentenced him to death. Initially on direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed on a number of issues and held that the evidence for the convictions and for the statutory aggravating circumstances supporting the death sentence was sufficient. However, the Court remanded the case back to the trial court to conduct a hearing regarding the State's use of peremptory strikes during jury selection and regarding the court's exclusion of testimony of a jail inmate to whom Defendant's co-defendant had allegedly confessed during the guilt/innocence phase of testimony. After the hearing, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and death sentence. Defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus in 2000 which was denied in 2009. In 2010, in response to his application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of habeas relief, the Supreme Court remanded Defendant's habeas application for further consideration of two issues (not relevant to this appeal). That same year which the habeas application was still pending, Defendant filed an extraordinary motion for new trial in the original trial court claiming that Defendant's co-defendant had confessed to a parole officer as the sole perpetrator of the murder. This motion was denied, and Defendant appealed that denial to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the "newly discovered" evidence of the parole-officer-confession would not have produced a different result at trial had it been admitted. As such, the Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the extraordinary motion for a new trial, and affirmed the court's judgment.

After a jury trial, Appellant Sam Green was found guilty of the malice and felony murder of Candy Wright, a separate charge of aggravated assault against Ms. Wright, and the rape and aggravated assault of Leanna Ziel. The felony murder verdict was vacated by operation of law, and the charge of aggravated assault against Ms. Wright was merged into the malice murder count. The trial court entered judgments of conviction on the remaining guilty verdicts and imposed consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for murder and for rape and 20 years for aggravated assault. A motion for new trial was denied, and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant contended that the evidence would have been insufficient if, as argued in other enumerations, certain evidence had been excluded and trial counsel had not been ineffective. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence was properly admitted and sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for the crimes of which he was convicted. Furthermore, the Court found Appellant's allegation that his trial counsel was ineffective to be unsupported by the record. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decisions in Defendant's case, and affirmed the final judgment.

Defendant Willie Henry Lewis appealed his convictions for the malice murders of Xavier Dinkins and Kejaun Webb, as well as a variety of other crimes that occurred over a four-day crime spree. On appeal, Defendant argued that a family tie between a prospective juror and the prosecuting attorney was grounds to strike that juror from voir dire for cause. Further, Defendant argued that the admission of certain facts into evidence were improper, and grounds for reversal of his conviction. He also contended that much of the evidence entered against him was insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions with respect to voir dire and the admission of evidence, however, the Court could not determine from the record whether Defendant's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective had merit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for a hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel issue.

Appellant Paul Mathis was convicted of malice murder and related offenses in connection with the 2006 shooting death of Jurell Williams. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion for new trial, asserting evidentiary errors and ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to support Appellant's conviction. Furthermore, the Court found Appellant's remaining arguments to be without merit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Appellant A.R. Mays, executor of the estate of decedent Gilbert Henry Kinchen, filed a petition to probate the decedent's will, and Appellee Katherine Rancine-Kinchen, the decedent’s widow, filed a caveat thereto. Appellant moved to dismiss the caveat. In its order resolving the motion to dismiss, the probate court granted the motion to dismiss in part by denying two counts raised by the caveat. The probate court declined to grant the remainder of the motion to dismiss when it allowed three counts of the caveat, which raised issues about a non-testamentary trust agreement that was referenced in the will, to remain pending. Because it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve the trust agreement issues, the probate court’s order transferred those issues to the superior court for resolution. Although it determined that appellee had not shown that the will was "incomplete" and "uncertain," the probate court nevertheless reserved admitting the will to probate until the trust issues were resolved by the superior court. It is from this order that Appellant directly appealed to the Supreme Court. Appellee moved to dismiss the appeal contending appellant failed to follow the correct appellate procedure. Finding that Appellee indeed did not follow the proper procedures, the Supreme Court dismissed the direct appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified two questions to the Georgia Supreme Court: "(1) Did the Georgia Insurance Commissioner act within his legal authority when he promulgated Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 120-2-20-.02, such that a multiple-line insurance policy providing first-party insurance coverage for theft-related property damage must be reformed to conform with the two-year limitation period provided for in Georgia's Standard Fire Policy, Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 120-2-19-.01?; and, (2) is this action barred by the Policy's one-year limitation period?" These questions arose from a dispute over Petitioner Ricardo White's purchase of a homeowner's insurance policy from Respondent State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. The insurance policy was a first-party insurance contract that provided multiple-line coverage, including coverage for loss or damage caused by both fire and theft. The policy contained a limitation provision stating that a lawsuit against State Farm must be brought "within one year of the date of loss or damage." After his home was burglarized in January 2008 (within the period of coverage), Petitioner filed a claim for the loss of more than $135,000 in personal property. State Farm denied the claim based on its determination that Petitioner misrepresented material information in filing his claim. Waiting more than one year after his date of loss, Petitioner filed a June 2009 complaint against State Farm in state court alleging claims for breach of contract, bad faith, and fraud. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court found that: (1) the Georgia Insurance Commissioner did not act within his legal authority and (2) this action was barred by the one-year limitation period in his insurance policy.

Following a May 1995 jury trial, Defendant Eric Kelley was convicted of two counts of felony murder (with the underlying felony of aggravated assault) in connection with the shooting deaths of two people at a pawn shop. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions on appeal. In 2006, Defendant filed a habeas corpus petition, amended in 2008 and 2009. Following an October 2009 hearing, in 2011 the habeas court granted Defendant relief on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Specifically, the habeas court found that appellate counsel was ineffective for having failed to argue on direct appeal that the trial court erred in charging the jury on both subsections (a) (1) and (a) (2) of OCGA section 16-5-21 when the indictment stated only that Defendant had committed aggravated assault in connection with felony murder by shooting the victims with a pistol. The Warden of Scott State Prison appealed that ruling. The habeas court relied on "Chapman v. Georgia" (548 SE2d 278 (2001)) in arriving at its conclusion. However, as the Supreme Court "made clear" in "Sharpe v. Georgia" (S12A0677 (2012)), "[w]here the indictment charges a defendant committed an offense by one method, it is reversible error for the court to instruct the jury that the offense could be committed by other statutory methods with no limiting instruction. The defect is cured, however, where … the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the State to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." The Court found that the trial court specifically provided jurors with the indictment and instructed it that the burden of proof was with the State to prove every material allegation. As such, any error in overcharging the jury was cured. Accordingly, the Court reversed the habeas court's decision to grant Defendant the relief he requested.

Following the grant of a petition for habeas corpus relief brought by defendant, the warden appealed, contending that the trial court erred in its finding that cause and prejudice had been shown to raise the procedural bar on defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court concluded that the habeas court erred by reaching defendant's claims of ineffective assistance at all because they had previously been waived. The habeas court then compounded this error by inserting its own additional grounds, namely lack of preparation of trial counsel. Moreover, even if defendant had properly presented a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, his habeas petition would still have to be denied under Strickland v. Washington. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment.