Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The court granted certiorari to the court of appeals to consider whether that court erred in holding that defendant should have been allowed to present evidence in support of his justification defense about a previous incident of violence allegedly committed by the victim against third parties, where defendant claimed that he had heard of the previous incident but did not witness it or have any other evidence in support of the claim. The court held that the trial court correctly refused to allow defendant to testify about the unsupported alleged violent incident involving the victim and third parties. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder, burglary, and other related offenses in 1998 and was sentenced to death. The habeas court subsequently granted defendant habeas relief, vacating all of his convictions on several grounds. The court held that the habeas court erred in granting defendant relief on his Brady claim; on the ground that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter; on his claim of several instances of prosecutorial misconduct and trial court error in connection with that alleged misconduct; on his claim that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte stop the alleged prosecutorial misconduct; and in vacating defendant's convictions based upon a finding of cumulative error. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment.

After being indicted for certain theft crimes, defendant filed a pre-trial petition for writ of habeas corpus. At issue on appeal was whether the holding in Hicks v. Scott, preventing a pro se prisoner in a post-conviction habeas case from being dismissed for failure to comply with certain appellate procedural requirements unless he was correctly informed of those requirements, should be extended to pre-trial habeas cases and whether the holding in Hicks should be overruled. The court concluded that compliance with OCGA 5-6-35 could not be excused for failure to inform defendant of its requirements and the holding in Hicks could not be applied in this pre-trial habeas case. Accordingly, the application for discretionary review filed by defendant was subject to dismissal as untimely, and the current appeal, not being authorized, must be dismissed.

Defendant and his co-indictee were separately tried for the malice and felony murder of the victim and for other offenses. Defendant subsequently appealed the denial of his amended motion for a new trial after he was convicted of felony murder during the commission of criminal attempt to possess cocaine. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all of the crimes for which he was convicted. However, defendant was erroneously sentenced on both felony murder and the underlying felony. The court also concluded that defendant waived his argument that the trial court should have given his requested instructions regarding inherent dangerousness; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing a juror; the trial court did not err in granting a motion in limine made by the State to exclude certain demonstrative evidence; the trial court did not abuse its discretion under OCGA 17-16-6 in fashioning an appropriate remedy and in refusing the harsh remedy of evidence exclusion for the untimeliness of discovery; and the court rejected defendant's claims that a new trial was required and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of cruelty to children in the first degree, aggravated child molestation, and child molestation. At issue was whether the court of appeals improperly limited the court's holding in Division 3 of Woodard v. State. Woodard struck down, as violation of the equal protection of the law, a 1995 amendment to the Child Hearsay Statute, OCGA 24-3-16, that expanded the scope of the hearsay exception to allow admission of out-of-court statements by all children under age 14 who witnessed sexual contact or physical abuse, as opposed to only children who were themselves the victims of such abuse. The court concluded that Woodard's reasoning could not be sustained. Thus, while it clearly should not be extended to the circumstances of the case, the court thought it was more appropriate simply to overrule Division 3. Accordingly, there was no reversible error and the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was found guilty of kidnapping with bodily injury to a female victim, rape of the female victim, kidnapping a male victim, and armed robbery. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial on general grounds in February 2000 through his trial counsel but his case was then shuffled among several defense lawyers for almost a decade, with little progress made on the pending new trial motion. After defendant's current counsel took over his representation, defendant filed an amended motion for a new trial in April 2000. Defendant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal to the court after the trial court denied the amended motion on the merits in February 2011. The court held that, because defendant's cruel and unusual punishment claim was not timely raised in the trial court, review of its merits had been waived on appeal, and so it did not invoke the constitutional question jurisdiction. Defendant's other constitutional claims were not novel, and because there was no other basis for the court's jurisdiction, the court transferred the case back to the court of appeals.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with a shooting death of the victim. Defendant appealed, asserting, inter alia, that the trial court erred in admitting statements the victim made to a police investigator on the day she was murdered. The court found no error in the admission of this evidence where the victim was not reporting a crime to a policeman, she was not attempting to build a case against defendant, but she was merely seeking advice from a knowledgeable friend who happened to be a policemen about a difficult situation. The court also concluded that even if trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to object to the statements at issue, defendant could not prove that there was a reasonable probability that the trial result would have been different if not for the deficient performance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his conviction for the felony murder and aggravated assault of the victim, contending that the trial court made a number of evidentiary errors. The court held that the trial court did not err by failing give a charge and if there was any error, it was harmless; the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress where the officers had reasonably trustworthy information to conclude that defendant was involved in the murder of the victim; defendant's contention that ten similar transactions were admitted in error lacked merit where they were sufficiently similar to the crime against defendant and were properly admitted; the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict; and the trial court did not err by denying his motion for a mistrial after the jurors watched a portion of his videotaped statement which they were not supposed to view because the jury clearly indicated that it could and would follow the trial court's curative instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was found guilty of felony murder and cruelty to children. The trial court entered judgment of conviction for the felony murder and sentenced defendant to life imprisonment. The cruelty to children charge merged with the felony murder convictions. Defendant subsequently appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court held that defendant made an insufficient showing of prejudice and thus his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must fail and defendant's due process rights were not violated by the 10-year delay between trial and appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant pled guilty to felony murder in connection with the arson that caused his stepfather's death. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. The court found that the plea was voluntary and held that defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not properly before the court on direct appeal because it was not raised below.