Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of malice murder in connection with the deaths of two victims. Defendant's amended motion for new trial was denied and defendant subsequently appealed. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the trial court did not err in allowing a medical examiner to characterize the manner of death for the two victims; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding exculpatory evidence when it refused to admit a 911 call defendant made to report the fire; any error as to the felony arson charge did not affect the outcome of the proceedings; and the court rejected defendant's claim that the trial court's charge to the jury failed to inform them that the "not guilty" option could operate as a general acquittal of the murder charges. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in connection with a shooting death. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred by excluding from trial evidence that the victim had been molesting defendant's niece and refusing to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The court held that it was error not to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense under the circumstances and the court could not say the error was harmless. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his convictions for two counts of malice murder in connection with the fatal shootings of two victims, one count of kidnapping with bodily injury as the result of the abduction and rape of a third victim, and one count of kidnapping resulting from the abduction of a fourth victim. The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence photographs of videotapes labeled with violent content which were found in one of the two vehicles in which defendant and his family were attempting to flee at the time of his arrest, in response to defendant's insanity defense; the trial court did not err in permitting into evidence photographs of tattoos on his body taken after he was in custody in response to defendant's insanity defense; and even assuming that a prosecutorial comment raised the specter of defendant's dangerousness in the future, it was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Appellant filed a pro se complaint for a preliminary injunction and other relief, seeking, among other things the return of the records that the Rossville Police had seized during a search, claiming that he needed the records to comply with the annual filing requirements set forth in OCGA 16-12-22.2(j). The court concluded that appellant wanted the trial court in this civil case to interfere with his ongoing criminal prosecution, so the trial court was correct in dismissing the complaint.

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial after he was found guilty of, among other things, felony murder. The court held that defendant's objection that the State did not move for correction of the record and properly comply with the procedural requirements of OCGA 5-6-41(f) was without merit and, moreover, the trial court was authorized to conclude that, to the extent that OCGA 5-6-41(f) was applicable, the required hearing was held with notice to both parties and the oath was administered. The court also held that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the introduction of the transcript of a witness' prior testimony. Finally, the court held that defendant failed to meet his burden of showing any substantial likelihood of a different result but for counsel's deficient performance and the court therefore found that there was no error in the trial court's rejection of defendant's claim of ineffective assistance.

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial after he was found guilty of malice murder. Defendant contended that the trial court erroneously failed to conduct a hearing on his notice of intent to introduce prior acts of violence by the victim against third parties and thus made no ruling as the admissibility thereof. The court held, however, that defendant waived his right to the hearing and ruling under USCR 31.6. The court also held that, assuming that trial counsel's performance was deficient, there was no reasonable probability that the result of the jury trial would have been different even if the evidence defendant now brought forth had been admitted. Finally, the court held that there was no denial of due process related to the delay in holding a hearing on his motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Appellant appealed from an order denying a filing of a petition for writ of mandamus. Appellant sought to file a petition for mandamus to compel judges of the court to dismiss his citation for speeding, to recuse one of them for reviewing his pleading, and to "impeach" certain of them due to alleged misconduct. Because appellant failed to carry his burden and his petition showed on its face "such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact that it cannot be reasonably believed that the court could grant any relief against any party named in the pleading," the court concluded that the trial court did not err by denying the petition.

Defendant appealed his convictions for murder and for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The court held that the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion for a new trial where the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court also held that the trial court did not err when it refused to give defendant's requested charge on mere presence where there was no basis for the trial court to give such a charge. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Appellant appealed from the probate court's ruling that OCGA 15-9-120(2) was not a special law in violation of Article III, Section VI, Paragraph IV(a) of the 1983 Georgia Constitution. The court held that OCGA 15-9-120(b) satisfied the elasticity requirement of a general law, and the probate court erred in construing section 15-9-120(2) to mean that a probate court always would have jurisdiction to hold jury trials once its county passed the population threshold, even if the county's population dropped below the threshold in a future census. It also erred in ruling that, so construed, the statute would not be a special law. However, the probate court reached the right result, and so its ruling that OCGA 15-9-120(2) was a constitutional general law could be affirmed under the right-for-any-reason doctrine. The court also held that the parties' arguments regarding whether a right to a jury trial was triggered when the lawsuit was filed or when they started trial were moot. Finally, the court held that appellee's demand for a jury trial was timely. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed his convictions for malice murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in connection with the fatal shooting of two victims. Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission into evidence of certain testimony. The court held that the challenges were without merit where the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted and where defendant failed to object to the admission of the evidence at issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.