Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals and addressed the issue of whether a party must make a prayer for prejudgment interest under OCGA 7-4-15 and, if so, whether it could be made without leave of court following the grant of summary judgment. The court held that as long as there was demand for prejudgment interest prior to the entry of final judgment, a trial court should award it. The only requirement for a prejudgment interest award upon a liquidated damages claim was a demand. That is because the party opposing the award must be given an opportunity to contest it prior to the entry of judgment. Inasmuch as Crisler was given an opportunity to contest the award by opposing Haugabook's amendment and motion for the entry of final judgment, the award of prejudgment interest was proper. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was indicted for aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, child molestation, and felony sexual battery. At issue was whether a criminal suspect who was told by police officers that he would be able to return home after questioning regardless of what he said had received a "hope of benefit" that rendered his subsequent confession inadmissible at trial under OCGA 24-3-50. The court held that the answer was no, as long as the officers' statements did not amount to a promise that the suspect would never be charged or would face reduced charges or a reduced sentence based on what he told the officers during the interview. In this case, defendant could not reasonably have construed the officers' statements as such a promise and therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Pin Ups, an adult entertainment business, brought this appeal from an order of the trial court denying its petition for an interlocutory injunction against the Board's "Hours of sale and operation" ordinances. As Pin Ups alleged a violation of free speech rights under the Georgia Constitution, the trial court erred in applying the rational basis test. Such laws could be upheld only "if it furthers an important government interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and if the incidental restriction of speech is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Therefore, the court held that, inasmuch as the trial court made its ruling based upon an incorrect legal standard, the court must reserve its decision and the court remanded the case to that court for it to evaluate Pin Ups's request for injunctive relief using the correct legal standard.

Lewis Dempsey admitted to shooting Dillard Jewell Crane but claimed self-defense. In Case No. S11A1875, the State appealed the trial court's order granting Dempsey's motion to quash indictment number 10-CR-003-DB (second indictment). In Case No. S11X1876, Dempsey cross-appealed the trial court's earlier denial of his motion to quash indictment number 09-CR-325-MM (first indictment). The court agreed with Dempsey that the trial court should have granted his motion to quash the first indictment were the juror at issue was ineligible to serve on a grand jury under OCGA 15-12-60(b)(1) because he was an elected local government officeholder. The court held, however, that the effect of the juror's presence as to the first indictment was to nullify the proceedings at which he was purportedly grand juror. As there was never a proceeding at which a legally constituted grand jury received testimony, the trial court properly quashed the second indictment.

Defendant appealed his conviction of felony murder predicated on a drug transaction and attempted violation of the state's controlled substances act. The court held that the trial court was authorized to instruct the jury pursuant to OCGA 16-3-21(b)(2); given the latitude allowed during closing argument, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant's objection to the prosecution's closing argument; even if it had been error to allow the prosecutor's comments during closing, the trial court's subsequent instructions and responses to the jury's inquiry would render the error harmless; there was sufficient nexus between the violation of the state's controlled substances act and the victim's death to show that defendant's participation in the drug transaction was the proximate cause of the victim's death; the trial court properly instructed the jury; and defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were rejected.

This case arose from the arrest of defendant for various crimes, including an attempted violation of the state's controlled substances act following an exchange of telephone messages between defendant and law enforcement officers who posed as another individual. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals properly determined that a police officer's search of a cell phone incident to arrest was lawful. The court found that the Court of Appeals gave appropriate guidance regarding the scope of a search of a cell phone incident to arrest and reviewing the reasonable scope of the search was largely a fact-specific inquiry. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his conviction for malice murder in connection with the death of a 63-year-old victim. Although the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction, the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce similar transaction evidence without conducting the hearing required by Uniform Superior Court Rule 13.3(b) and making the necessary findings on the record. Accordingly, the court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a Rule 31.1 hearing and entry of proper findings or, if need be, a new trial.

Defendant was found guilty, among other things, of malice murder and attempting to elude a police officer in connection with a shooting death during a failed drug deal and a subsequent high-speed chase involving five police officers. The court held that, based on the evidence supporting defendant's participation in a felony drug transaction at the time of the fatal shooting, the trial court was authorized to instruct the jury pursuant to OCGA 16-3-21(b)(2). The court also held that the evidence supported the jury's conclusion that defendant willfully led police on a dangerous high speed chase after being given clear signals by five separate police vehicles to stop and therefore, the trial court properly sentenced defendant on five separate counts of attempting to elude a police officer. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to strike Juror No. 7 for cause and the trial court did not err in its jury instructions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant, a 73-year-old, appealed his conviction of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault in connection with the death of his elderly and wheelchair-bound ex-girlfriend. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of malice murder; because the similar transaction evidence from his ex-wife and his ex-girlfriends was sufficient to establish the required similarity between the charged crime and the assaults defendant inflicted on his ex-wife and his ex-girlfriends, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to excuse two jurors; the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence a letter written by the victim; defendant has failed to provide a basis for providing him with a new trial or having his conviction overturned; and the court rejected defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This is an interim appellate review of a case in which the State sought the death penalty. Defendant had been indicted for malice murder and false imprisonment. The court granted defendant's application for interim review and directed the parties to address whether the trial court erred in its order granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion to exclude his statements to law enforcement officers, in granting his motion to suppress his clothing, in ruling that the evidence of his prior convictions would be admissible under OCGA 24-9-84.1(b) in the event he testified at trial, in ruling admissible as similar transaction evidence certain prior acts of defendant, and in denying defendant's motion regarding the State's destruction of blood evidence. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with direction.