Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Local residents filed a complaint with the governor against appellants, who were elected members of the WCBE, alleging that they had violated OCGA 45-10-3. Appellants subsequently appealed the order of the superior court denying their petition for judicial review under the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act. The court held that the appeal as to Appellant Roberts was moot and must be dismissed; the appeal as to Appellants Brown and Culver were not moot because their terms have not expired; and that appellants were required by section 45-10-4 to proceed under the Act, and no delay seen here warranted the imposition of the doctrine of laches. The court held that OCGA 20-2-50, et seq. did not create county boards of education and the court had previously stated that county school boards were creations of the Constitution. The court rejected appellees' assertion that the the term "boards, commissions, and authorities created by general statute" should be construed expansively to include any and all such entities created by the Constitution. The court also noted that the General Assembly was well aware of how to include members of county boards of education within the ambit of ethics legislation.

Defendant was found guilty of malice murder for killing his roommate and theft by taking his car. Defendant appealed. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of all the crimes for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt; the trial court did not err in allowing alleged hearsay testimony; because the evidence supported the inference that others could have been involved in the murder, and even defendant himself tried to implicate another, evidence supported the trial court's decision to include a charge on parties to a crime; and defendant's counsel's failure to object to the admission of the investigator's testimony on hearsay grounds could not amount to ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted for the malice murder of the victim and other related crimes and was sentenced to life in prison. The trial court denied his motion for a new trial and he appealed. The court held that defense counsel affirmatively stated that he had no objection to the admission of defendant's statements at trial and he has waived review of this issue on appeal; there was no likelihood the omission of a specific charge on transferred justification affected the outcome of the trial and the trial court did not plainly err; because the evidence in this case did not show the sudden, violent, and irresistible passion required to warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, the trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested charge; there was no merit in defendant's assertion that the trial court committed error by refusing to charge the jury on the defense of mistake of fact; and defendant could not demonstrate prejudice in regards to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

The court granted defendant a certificate of probable cause to appeal an order of the Superior Court denying his application for a writ of habeas corpus in order to consider whether the habeas court erred in concluding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to further investigate the actual validity of defendant's prior convictions in the face of the State's notice of intent to rely on those convictions for sentencing enhancement purposes. Finding that it was not error to reject the claims of the ineffectiveness of counsel on the basis urged, the court affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief.

This appeal returned to the court following its grant in 2010 of defendant's pro se application for a certificate of probable cause and its remand of the case to the habeas court with direction "to analyze and make appropriate findings and legal conclusions regarding the prejudice prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel." On remand, the habeas court concluded that defendant did not satisfy the prejudice prong and denied relief. The court held that there was evidence to support the factual findings made by the habeas court and the legal conclusions drawn by the habeas court were sound. Therefore, the court affirmed that court's determination that defendant failed to establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland test and its judgment that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be denied.

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for the 1993 felony murder of the victim. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court improperly curtailed the jury's consideration of a voluntary manslaughter conviction as a possible alternative to convicting him of felony murder. The court held that nothing in the recharge suggested that the jury was required to acquit defendant of malice murder and felony murder before considering whether he committed voluntary manslaughter. Moreover, when the jury initially returned the handwritten verdict sheet not showing a verdict on voluntary manslaughter, the trial court instructed the jury on how to return such a verdict if it so desired. Therefore, there was no Edge v. State violation and the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his 1996 convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the bludgeoning death of the victim. The court held that the trial court did not plainly err in considering the jury's request for recharge to have been tacitly withdrawn; the trial court did not err in allowing the jury to rehear portions of the trial testimony during deliberations where the trial court's instruction adequately addressed defendant's concerns; the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial based on improper juror contact and in denying his new trial motion raising the same claim where that court found that the exchange was momentary and had no effect on the verdict; and defendant's ineffective of assistance of counsel claimed failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder, kidnapping, and other charges arising out of the shooting death of the victim. After the trial court granted defendant's motion for a new trial, he filed a plea in bar contending that double jeopardy prohibited a second trial on the same charges. The trial court granted the plea in bar and the State appealed. Because the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the State's appeal of the new trial order, the court dismissed that portion of the appeal. In regards to the plea in bar, the court concluded that double jeopardy did not bar a second trial since the grant of the new trial was based on the improper admission of evidence. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's grant of the plea in bar.

Defendant challenged the trial court's denial of her motion for discharge and acquittal under the speedy trial statute for capital cases, OCGA 17-7-171. At issue was whether, following defendant's demand for a speedy trial, section 17-7-171(b) required only two, or more than two, full terms of court to pass without a trial before defendant was entitled to discharge and acquittal. Although several prior appellate decisions involving section 17-7-171 have said in dicta that only two terms must pass, section 17-7-171(b) plainly said that "more than two" terms of court must expire, and the court must follow the statutory text instead of the inaccurate dicta. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling.

Defendant was convicted for "Falsely Uttering a State Lottery Ticket" where defendant was accused of taking approximately 65 scratch-off tickets. Defendant stole the lottery tickets by leaning over a store counter and tearing the tickets from their dispenser. He scratched the tickets to see if he had won a prize, and when he saw that he had not, he threw all of the tickets away. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the theft of lottery tickets from a lottery ticket dispenser was sufficient to constitute tampering with lottery materials within the meaning of OCGA 50-27-27. The court held that, by tampering with lottery materials in the manner that defendant did, he could properly be found guilty of violating the statute. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.