Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of felony murder and subsequently appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial. Defendant contended that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance when (a) counsel failed to call a defense expert who could purportedly refute the medical examiner's testimony that the victim only had defensive wounds on his body and thereby corroborated defendant's testimony that he acted in self-defense when the victim "slung" at him with a piece of broken glass; and when (b) counsel introduced the videotape of defendant's interrogation by the police. The court rejected defendant's contentions because defendant failed to show that counsel was deficient where a decision whether to call an expert witness was a matter of trial strategy within the broad range of professional conduct afforded trial attorneys and because counsel was not deficient for introducing the videotape as part of a reasonable trial strategy. Finally, defendant waived his contention that the trial court erred when it did not poll the jury to determine the jurors' continued impartiality. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, with conspiracy to commit robbery as the underlying felony. On appeal, defendant contended, among other things, that the trial judge violated OCGA 17-8-57 when the trial judge gave a pre-evidentiary charge to the jury which contained the statement that "the State would introduce evidence in support of the charges contained in the indictment." The court held that judicial comments "limited to a clarification of procedures and [which] did not address the credibility of witnesses or any fact at issue in the trial" did not violate OCGA 17-8-57. The court rejected defendant's contention that an incriminating statement made by him should have been suppressed where the same issue was litigated and decided in a prior proceeding between the same parties. The court further held that, since there was evidence that defendant and his co-indictees engaged in a conspiracy to rob the victim, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the co-conspirator's statement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant challenged his convictions for malice murder and other offenses stemming from the shooting death of the victim. The court held that the record supported the trial court's ruling that the State did not act in bad faith with regard to disclosure of the witness statement at issue and defendant did not argue that it did, so the more severe remedies that defendant sought were not applicable under OCGA 17-16-6. Because the court concluded that defendant failed to show prejudice, the court need not decide whether the record demanded the conclusion that his defense counsel provided deficient performance by advising defendant that he could not testify at trial. Even assuming that defense counsel should have objected to the investigator's comment at issue, no prejudice resulted. Finally, the trial court did not err in permitting a detective, over objection, to give improper double hearsay testimony. Although the detective's testimony could have been better focused to address the relevant issue without mentioning out-of-court statements, there was no reversible error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of shooting and killing one victim, shooting and wounding the victim's girlfriend, and then driving away in the car that the victim was driving. On appeal, defendant alleged that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance when counsel allegedly failed to craft a self-defense strategy prior to the eve of trial; when counsel failed to invoke the rule of sequestration and allowed the lead detective to remain in the courtroom during trial; and when counsel failed to object to leading questions. At his motion for new trial hearing, defendant did not proffer any evidence regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and the record did not reveal any deficient performance. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion for a new trial.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in connection with a shooting death. On appeal, defendant contended that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel and the trial court violated his right to an impartial jury by a comment during a bench conference. The court held that defendant failed to show that trial counsel was deficient in the handling of bad character evidence or there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different if the testimony had been excluded. The court also held that defendant failed to prove that the trial court's admonition deprived him of a fair trial. Accordingly, the court found no error and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, armed robbery, and other related offenses in connection with the vehicular death of one victim and the armed robbery of three other victims. On appeal, defendant claimed, inter alia, that he was denied ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found no error on the part of the trial court or the jury on defendant's claim that armed robbery could not serve as a predicate for felony murder in his case because the escape phase of the armed robbery had terminated prior to his flight from the police; the prosecutor's remark did not violate the "golden rule" during his opening statement and closing argument; defendant's claim that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to comment on defendant's failure to come forward after his escape from police was waived for purposes of appeal; and defendant failed to carry his burden of proof on the prejudice prong on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Accordingly, the court found that all of defendant's claims lacked merit and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant pled guilty to trafficking in cocaine, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and tampering with evidence. The habeas court subsequently denied relief. With respect to all of defendant's claims besides his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, the habeas court properly determined from the face of the petition that these claims were procedurally barred or defaulted, as they were all previously adjudicated in his direct appeal to the Court of Appeals or have been raised in that initial appeal. Accordingly, the habeas court was not required to hold a hearing to resolve these claims and defendant's argument that he was entitled to a hearing on these claims was without merit. The court held, however, that the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim required a hearing to resolve. While the habeas court was authorized to either deny the claim on the merits following a hearing or dismiss it without prejudice based on defendant's failure to prosecute it, it was not authorized to deny defendant's claim on the merits based on his failure to prosecute it. Accordingly, the court reversed the decision of the habeas court to the extent that it denied defendant's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim on the merits.

Appellant, pro se, brought an action in the trial court against the City, the City Council, and the City's Municipal Clerk (appellees) alleging violations of Georgia's Open Meetings Act, OCGA 50-14-1 et seq. Appellant alleged that the minutes of a Council meeting in February 2010 omitted certain information concerning the outcome of a non-roll-call vote in violation of subsection (e)(2), namely the names of council members who voted, in the minority, to amend rather than maintain certain Council rules. The court found that the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the Act, which must be broadly construed. Therefore, the court reversed in part and concluded that only that portion of appellant's complaint seeking to impose criminal liability upon the individual defendants was properly dismissed.

Defendant was indicted for malice murder, an alternative count of felony murder during the commission of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted felony, and a separate count charging the underlying weapons offense. After a jury trial, defendant was acquitted of malice murder and found guilty of both remaining counts. Following the grant of an out-of-time appeal, a motion for new trial was denied. However, the trial court vacated the separate sentence on the weapons charge pursuant to a concession by the State. Defendant appealed. The court rejected defendant's contention that his right to be present at all stages of the trial was violated when trial counsel waived his presence without his consent where defendant had waived this right. The court also held that defendant waived his rights in regards to his contention that an officer improperly commented on his right to remain silent. The court also rejected defendant's complaint of two omissions from the trial court's jury instructions on felony murder, contention that the trial court erred in giving jury instructions on his justification defense, and contention that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allow him to stipulate to his status as a convicted felon. Finally, the court held that trial counsel was not ineffective. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was indicted for felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder count and five years to be served consecutively for the weapons offense. The aggravated assault count merged into the felony murder conviction. Defendant subsequently appealed the denial of a motion for a new trial. The court rejected defendant's contention that the trial court erred when, after the jury delivered the first verdict finding him guilty of both voluntary manslaughter and felony murder, it instructed the jury to go back and redeliberate without publishing the verdict because defendant failed to show that he sustained any legal prejudice. With respect to whether the trial court should have explained to jurors that they could not find defendant guilty of both felony murder and voluntary manslaughter, defendant opposed the giving of this exact instruction to the jury before the first verdict was rendered and defendant's contention that the jury instructions insufficiently instructed the jury with regard to voluntary manslaughter must also fail because the trial court gave the exact jury charge requested by defendant. In regards to the trial court's colloquy with the jury foreperson after the first verdict was rendered, the court held that such comments were limited to a clarification of procedures and did not constitute a basis for removal. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment.