Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants were indicted by a grand jury on charges of, inter alia, offering to assist and assisting in the commission of suicide in violation of OCGA 16-5-5(b). At issue was whether OCGA 16-5-5(b) was constitutional under the free speech clauses of the federal and state constitutions. OCGA 16-5-5(b) provided that any person "who publicly advertises, offers, or holds himself or herself out as offering that he or she will intentionally and actively assist another person in the commission of suicide and commits an overt act to further that purpose is guilty of a felony." The court held that the State has failed to provide any explanation or evidence as to why a public advertisement or offer to assist in an otherwise legal activity was sufficiently problematic to justify an intrusion on protected speech rights. Absent a more particularized State interest and more narrowly tailored statute, the court held that the State could not, consistent with the United States and Georgia Constitutions, make the public advertisement or offer to assist in a suicide a criminal offense. The court also concluded that OCGA 16-5-5(b) restricted speech in violation of the free speech clauses of both the United States and Georgia Constitutions. Accordingly, the order of the trial court holding otherwise was reversed.

Defendant, pro se, appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion for out-of-time appeal. In 1984, defendant pled guilty to one count of murder in a negotiated plea deal in which the State agreed to withdraw its intent to seek the death penalty and allowed a second count for cocaine possession to be disposed as a nolle prosequi. In June 2011, defendant moved for an out-of-time appeal which the court denied on July 22, 2011. The court held that defendant could not prevail on his motion for out-of-time appeal based on allegations that could be resolved against him based on the facts in the record; when defendant entered his plea voluntarily, he waived the challenges to the circumstances of his arrest and/or validity of the arrest warrant; and defendant's remaining allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel was not subject to review from a motion for out-of-time appeal. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was indicted in superior court for armed robbery and other offenses even though he was 16 years old at the time of the alleged crimes. Defendant moved to transfer the case to juvenile court. Although the superior court found that no money was actually physically removed from the cash register, the trial court denied the motion to transfer, concluding that a taking and thus an armed robbery had occurred. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the superior court's denial of the motion to transfer where the single act of pulling a cash drawer out from the register constituted the requisite change of location.

Defendant was convicted of aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, and two counts of sexual battery against a person under sixteen. On appeal, defendant asserted, inter alia, the "Child Hearsay Statute," OCGA 24-3-16, was unconstitutional because it violated the Confrontation Clause. The court agreed with defendant that the statute did not, as construed in previous cases and as applied in this case, comport with the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. However, the right of confrontation could be satisfied by construing the statute to require pretrial notice of the Sate's intent to use a child victim's hearsay statements. The court concluded that the child's statements to her mother were nontestimonial, whereas the child's statements to the forensic interviewer, made several weeks after the crimes, was testimonial. The statements made by the child and her mother to the police at the scene of the crime could not be categorized easily because the moment when police neutralized any threat to the public was unclear. Nonetheless, the court need not make that determination because even if the child's statements to the forensic examiner, and the statements made by the child and her mother to the police were admitted erroneously, the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant and co-defendant were found guilty of malice murder and armed robbery, as well as related crimes. The court held that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to sever the parties and in denying a motion to suppress the pre-trial identification of defendant by a victim during a one-on-one show-up. The court also held that the trial court did not violate OCGA 17-8-57 by making comments regarding the reliability of the expert witness and of one-on-one show-ups; and the trial court did not err in removing Juror Number 12 and replacing him with an alternate juror. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed from the denial of his motion for a new trial following his conviction for malice murder and other related crimes. The court held that defendant did not preserve his claim that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his prior drug arrest as similar transaction evidence; an agent's reference to defendant's mug shot from a previous arrest was harmless error based on the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that certain witnesses' testimony bore sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to be admissible under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted for murder of smothering his wife to death and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant appealed after the denial of a motion for a new trial. The court held that the jury was authorized to find that the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder during the commission of aggravated assault in the manner alleged in the indictment. The court also held that the trial court's instruction to the jury regarding voluntary manslaughter was not erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder and the trial court entered an order of nolle prosequi on the remaining counts of the indictment. Defendant subsequently appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion in arrest of judgment, asserting that the indictment failed to allege venue as to each charge. The court held that defendant's motion was not filed in the term at which the judgment was obtained and was thus untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of the motion.

Defendant appealed his conviction for malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm or knife during the commission of a felony in connection with the fatal shooting of one victim and the wounding of another. The court rejected defendant's contention that counsel was ineffective because his counsel erroneously advised him not to testify and because counsel failed to adequately question and impeach the State's witnesses. Accordingly, defendant failed to meet his burden under Strickland v. Washington and the judgments were affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of charges related to the murder of two of defendant's employees. The court held that the trial court did not clearly err in admitting defendant's in-custody statements; defendant's complaint, that his constitutional rights were violated because he was allegedly absent from the courtroom when the attorneys were having a discussion with the judge about the possibility of replacing a juror, provided no basis for reversal; and defendant's contention that the trial court erred when it failed to include certain language in its charge on justification was without merit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.