Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of malice and felony murder, as well as possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. A motion for new trial was denied and defendant appealed. The court held that the trial court did not err in rejecting the claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel where defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if his attorney had offered evidence of a prior violent act by a co-indictee. The court also held that the trial court did not err in giving the suggested pattern jury instruction on mere presence and mere association.

Defendant was convicted of the malice and felony murders of two victims. The felony murder verdicts were vacated by operation of law. The trial court entered judgments of conviction on the malice murder verdicts and imposed two consecutive sentences of life imprisonment. A motion for new trial was denied and defendant timely appealed. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder might have been committed in DeKalb County; the evidence adduced at trial and summarized above was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the murders; defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct was without merit; similar transaction evidence at issue was admissible; the trial court's statements were not coercive; claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were without merit or waived; and defendant's severance claim was waived. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendants, Thomasina Beverly Mack and Demario Steven Smith, were convicted of the malice murder of Mack's 30 month old child, who died as a result of blunt-force head trauma and strangulation. The court held that the trial court did not err when it denied Mack's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal or in denying Mack's motion to sever her trial from that of Smith; allowed the testimony of the deputy examiner; overruled Mack's objections to the prosecutor's closing argument; denied the portion of Smith's motion for new trial alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and denied Smith's motion to continue the hearing on the motion for new trial. Accordingly, the judgments were affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of, inter alia, malice murder of his pregnant girlfriend and her sister. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied and he appealed. The court held that, viewed in context, defendant's statement "I can't go on answering these questions" was not an unambiguous and unequivocal assertion of the right to remain silent. Accordingly, agents had no obligation to cease the interview and it was not error to admit defendant's incriminating statements into evidence. The court also held that, even assuming the trial court erred by admitting the challenged testimony based on hearsay, the error was harmless because other admissible evidence covered the same subject matter. The court further held that it was not error to admit bullets and bullet casings found at the scene of the crime into evidence at trial.

Defendant appealed his sentence and conviction involving murder, burglary, and related offenses. The court held that the trial court did not err by excusing potential jurors; convictions for eight of the alleged offenses were proper; defendant's contention that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to state an incorrect interpretation of the law was without merit; the court rejected defendant's contention that a new trial was required because his conviction for malice murder as a party to the crime was mutually exclusive of his convictions of tampering with evidence; the trial court did not fail to instruct the jury on the manner by which he allegedly committed the aggravated assaults in Counts 11 and 12; any issues with regard to the felony murder counts was moot because defendant's felony conviction was vacated by operation of law; the trial court did not err in denying a motion for mistrial; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for continuance; and the trial court had sufficient evidence to sentence defendant as a recidivist.

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial in violation of his rights under the State and Federal Constitutions, as well as the denials of his "plea in bar and motion to dismiss" and "general demurrer," which both asserted that the indictment returned against him was defective because the non-murder crimes charged therein were time-barred. The court held that there was no abuse of the superior court's discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss based on alleged violations of his constitutional rights to a speedy trial; the superior court did not err in failing to dismiss the indictment where neither prejudice nor deliberate adverse action on the part of the State had been shown; and the superior court did not err in failing to grant his "plea in bar and motion to dismiss" and his "general demurrer," where the applicable statute of limitations was tolled under OCGA 17-3-2(2). Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed his convictions for malice murder, aggravated assault, possession of a deadly weapon at a public gathering, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of aggravated assault. The court held that defendant did not cite to any evidence indicating, or evidence that otherwise showed a Brady violation, and thus he failed to meet his burden; to the extent that defendant's enumeration of error embraced the motion for mistrial, without a contemporaneous objection, no error was shown in the denial of the motion; and trial counsel was not deficient. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his convictions for the malice murder of Rocky Heard, the aggravated assault of Ray Dean Heard, possession of a firearm during the commission of the crime of aggravated assault, affray, and simple battery. The court held that review of the record revealed that the conviction for the aggravated assault of Rocky merged into the malice murder conviction as a matter of law. Accordingly, the separate judgment of conviction and sentence for the aggravated assault of Rocky must be vacated. The court held, however, that the trial court did not clearly err by denying introduction of prior acts of violence by Rocky and Ray Dean against third parties; the trial court did not err in giving the jury instructions; and the trial court did not err in determining that defendant was advised of his right not to testify. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Defendant was convicted of armed robbery, kidnapping with bodily injury, hijacking a motor vehicle, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The court granted defendant a certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus to consider whether his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in his consultation with defendant about a pretrial plea agreement offer. The court held that trial counsel did not fail in his duty to offer defendant his informed advice regarding the State's plea agreement offer. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of felony murder, armed robbery, burglary, and aggravated assault. Defendant appealed the denial of a motion for a new trial. The court held that, under Davis v. State, the trial court did not err by failing to grant a mistrial when defendant's co-indictee identified a certain individual in court at the request of the State. The court also held that, under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial under Crawford v. State. The court further held that defendant failed to show that trial counsel's performance was deficient and therefore, his ineffective assistance claims were without merit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.