Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the denial of his pre-trial motion for his discharge and acquittal of charges stemming from a double murder, based upon an alleged violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The court did not find an abuse of the superior court's discretion in denying defendant's motion for discharge and acquittal and in refusing to dismiss his pending murder and related charges. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Petitioner was convicted in 2000 of burglary and sentenced as a recidivist to 20 years in prison. At issue was whether a habeas court was required to transfer a properly filed petition for habeas corpus to another county's superior court when the petitioner was transferred to that county for detention. The court held that while a habeas court could in its discretion transfer a habeas petition after the petitioner's county of detention changes, transfer of the petition was not required in every case.

Defendant was convicted on two counts each of child molestation and sexual exploitation of a child and one count each of aggravated child molestation and statutory rape based on sexual acts committed on several occasions with a 15-year-old girl. On appeal, defendant challenged, inter alia, the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress incriminating evidence found in a locked briefcase owned by defendant that was seized from a third party's premises without a warrant and subsequently searched pursuant to a valid warrant. The court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction and denied the motion to suppress pursuant to the "independent source" exception to the exclusionary rule. The court held that the independent source doctrine did not apply in the circumstances presented. The court also declined to decide whether the circumstances would warrant application of the "inevitable discovery" doctrine. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of the murder of his girlfriend's thirteen-month-old. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in interfering with his right to cross-examine a critical witness and in denying his motion for a mistrial after the State mentioned his criminal history in violation of a pretrial order. The court held that because the trial court did not limit defendant's cross-examination of the lead investigator and gave a curative instruction following the reference to the outstanding warrants, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder and four other charges in connection with the death of the victim. The court granted the State's interlocutory appeal in which it challenged the grant of a new trial to defendant as a result of the finding of a fatal omission in the jury charge, to address (1) the circumstances under which an appellate court could review alleged jury instruction errors to which no objection was raised at trial; and (2) assuming such review was appropriate in this case, whether the trial court correctly held that the omission in the jury charge here constituted plain error. The court held that, while the trial court did properly conduct a plain error review of the unobjected-to jury charge, the court erred in holding that the omission in the charge did in fact constitute plain error. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine and sentenced to four years imprisonment. Defendant appealed his conviction and the denial of his motion to suppress drug evidence seized from his vehicle, arguing that the vehicle search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The court held that the State failed to make any meaningful showing that this was the "rare" case justifying a warrantless vehicle search because officers were unable to fully effectuate an arrest. Because the State failed to meet its burden of proving the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, the exception did not apply.

Defendant was found guilty of malice and felony murder of her husband, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, concealing the death of another, and two counts of cruelty to children in the second degree. The felony murder verdict was vacated by operation of law and the district court entered judgments of conviction on the remaining guilty verdicts. The court held that the evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to reject the defense's theory that the victim's death was a suicide and to find defendant guilty of malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that because the trial court correctly entered judgment of conviction on the malice murder verdict and not the felony murder count, the court need not consider the sufficiency of the evidence as to that alternative charge. The court further held that the jury was authorized to conclude that the presence of an unembalmed corpse in the minor children's home for nearly three days was a criminally negligent act constituting an unsanitary condition and to infer from the reaction of the police officers that the resulting stench caused the children excessive mental pains. The court finally held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for change of venue. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of murder and numerous other crimes in connection with a home invasion in 2004. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support four of his five kidnapping convictions and argued that two of his aggravated assault convictions should have been merged. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every one of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court found his remaining contentions to be meritless, except that one of his aggravated assault convictions did merge and so must be vacated.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault for the shooting death of the victim. The trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial and he appealed, challenging the effectiveness of his trial counsel based on counsel's failure to request a jury instruction on the State's burden of proof in a case based on circumstantial evidence. The court held that, even assuming that trial counsel should have requested a jury charge on circumstantial evidence, his failure to do so did not result in any prejudice. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder in connection with the death of a 16-month-girl. On appeal, he argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that he acted with the requisite mens rea and that the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury on his proposed accident offense. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with malice and was guilty of the crime for which he was convicted. The court also held that the jury was properly and fully instructed that the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with the requisite malicious intent to commit each of the crimes charged and the evidence that defendant acted with malicious intent was overwhelming.