Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction entered against him on a number of crimes committed in connection with the murder of the victim. On appeal, defendant challenged only the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder, felony murder, robbery, theft by taking motor vehicle, financial transaction card theft, multiple counts of financial transaction card fraud, and concealing a death. The court held however, that the evidence was not sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of aggravated battery. The court noted that defendant suffered no harm from the trial court's action in vacating the malice murder conviction and retaining the felony murder conviction since the sentence imposed, life imprisonment, was appropriate for both crimes. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Defendant plead guilty to two counts of malice murder, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia, that the trial court failed to appoint counsel to prosecute the motions for out-of-time appeal and to vacate a void and illegal sentence. The court held that an indigent defendant was entitled to representation by counsel only for trial and for the direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence. Defendant did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which, if timely, would have triggered the right to appointed counsel. Thus, defendant was not entitled to counsel to pursue either the motion or an appeal from the denial thereof. The court also held that the trial court's order denying the motion to set aside and reenter order was vacated, and the case was remanded to the trial court with direction that it make the necessary findings under Cambron v. Canal Ins. Co. The court further held that the order denying the motion to vacate a void and illegal sentence was reversed with direction that the sentences of life without parole be vacated. If the trial court found the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance as authorized by the provisions of OCGA 17-10-30 and by the court's case law construing that statute, then it could determine whether in its discretion to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendants, Tonya and Jabaris Miller (mother and son), were convicted of malice murder, arson, and other related offenses in connection with the death of the victim. Tonya appealed in Case No. S11A0752 and Jabaris appealed in Case No. S11A0914. Both defendants raised several issues on appeal. The court held that Tonya had no opportunity to cross-examine an unavailable declarant and therefore, the trial court violated her right to confront the witnesses against her by allowing the statements at issue to be read into evidence and that the error was not harmless. Therefore, Tonya was entitled to a new trial. The court held, however, that the admission of the testimony at issue was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to Jabaris. The court held that there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion in admitting the victim's statements to her close friend under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule. The court further held that there was no abuse of discretion where the trial court gave a cautionary instruction for the jury to disregard the victim's friend testimony that she had heard from her ex-husband's mother that defendants had killed the victim. Any claim that the court erred in its instruction on venue was not preserved for review. Tonya's remaining enumerations of error were not likely to recur on retrial and were not considered. Jabaris's remaining enumerations of error were disposed of by the court. Accordingly, Case No. S11A0752 was reversed and Case No. S11A0914 was affirmed.

Defendant appealed his convictions for felony murder and cruelty to children, contending that he received ineffective assistance because his trial counsel failed to object to expert testimony on the ultimate issue in question, whether the baby's injuries were caused by abuse or an accidental fall. The court held that, under the circumstances of this case, the expert testimony that the injuries suffered by the baby could not have been accidentally inflicted was admissible where the question of whether these accidental falls could produce the types of injuries suffered by the baby required the training of an expert to answer. Therefore, there was no ineffective assistance of counsel.

Defendant was convicted of two murders and aggravated assault, as well as related crimes. In case number S11A0937, the warden appealed the vacating of defendant's death sentence and defendant cross-appealed in case number S11X0938. The court held that trial counsel generally performed adequately and that the absence of trial counsel's professional deficiencies would not in reasonable probability have resulted in a different outcome in either phase of defendant's trial. Accordingly, the court refused to disturb defendant's convictions and ordered defendant's death sentence reinstated. The court disposed of defendant's remaining cross claims and reversed the judgment in S11A0937, affirming the judgment in S11X0938.

Defendant was convicted of murder and aggravated assault. On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's admission of a hearsay statement into evidence against him. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court also held that the trial court properly permitted one victim to testify about the other victim's statement, "He got me," under the dying declaration and res gestae exceptions to the hearsay rule because the statement was not testimonial and the Confrontational Clause did not prohibit the introduction of the testimony recounting it. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder and aggravated assault with the shooting death of the victim. Defendant subsequently appealed from the denial of his motion for new trial, arguing that a search warrant for his medical records and the introduction of the records into evidence violated his constitutional rights; the trial court erred in admitting his custodial statements; and his trial counsel was ineffective. The court held that defendant could not claim an expectation of privacy in the medical records to the extent that they contained information he disclosed to medical personnel or they disclosed to him in the presence of two officers and, even if defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the search and seizure of the medical records pursuant to a valid warrant was lawful. The court also held that admitting the medical records into evidence at trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause and, in any event, none of the medical records were testimonial inasmuch as the circumstances surrounding their creation and the statements and actions of the parties objectively indicated that the records were prepared for the primary purpose of facilitating defendant's medical care. The court further held that the trial court's error in admitting defendant's response to an officer's inquiry was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the statement was cumulative of numerous admissible statements defendant made and that defendant's voluntary, unsolicited statements made to or in the presence of officers at the medical center were properly admitted into evidence. The court finally held that trial counsel's strategic decision to forego filing an out-of-time demand for speedy trial to continue to pursue his investigation was reasonable and did not constitute ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

In 1995, a jury found defendant guilty of rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, and six counts of child molestation. The court subsequently granted certiorari in this case to consider whether a trial court had the authority to grant an out-of-time discretionary appeal in a criminal case as a remedy for counsel's failure to timely file a discretionary application. The court held that Georgia courts did not have such authority where, as here, that remedy was not required by a violation of defendant's constitutional rights.

The court granted the interlocutory application of defendant to review the trial court's denial of a motion for bond defendant filed pursuant to OCGA 17-7-50. The appeal required the court to construe the statute to determine what constituted "confinement" that triggered the 90-day period within which the case of an unindicted and confined arrestee must be considered by the grand jury. The court held that, since it was undisputed that defendant was under arrest, was taken to the hospital pursuant to governmental authority, and was physically restrained during his two-day hospital stay as he was handcuffed to the hospital bed under the watchful eye of a deputy sheriff in an area of the hospital that contained jail cells, defendant was "in confinement" during his hospital stay and the 90-day period in which his case was required to be presented to the grand jury commenced on the day he was arrested. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied defendant's motion for bail on the charges for which defendant was arrested and held for 90 days without grand jury action. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment.

Defendant was indicted for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony when he punctured Jeffrey Waldon's femoral artery by a knife he held during a physical struggle between the two men. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that he was immune from criminal prosecution under OCGA 16-3-24.2. The trial court granted defendant's motion finding that Waldon had assaulted defendant by head-butting him in the mouth; at the time of the confrontation, defendant was in fear of death, or in fear of having a forcible felony committed against him by Waldon; and Waldon had placed defendant in reasonable fear for his life, which indicated that defendant had acted in his own self-defense pursuant to OCGA 16-3-24.2. The state appealed and the court affirmed the trial court's findings, holding that defendant would have been justified in using deadly force against Waldon to protect himself, although he was no required to do so in order to be immune from prosecution. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to determine that defendant met his burden of proving that he was entitled to immunity from prosecution pursuant to OCGA 16-3-24.2. Consequently, the state's argument that defendant somehow was not entitled to immunity because he was engaged in the crime of aggravated assault during the confrontation with Waldon was without merit.