Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and concealing the death of another. The felony murder was subsequently vacated by operation of law, and the trial court merged the aggravated assault count into malice murder and sentenced defendant to life imprisonment for malice murder and to a consecutive ten-year term for concealing the death of another. After a motion for a new trial was denied, defendant appealed. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court also held that the state clearly met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that venue was properly in DeKalb County not only for the murder, but also for the crime of concealing the death of another. The court further held that trial counsel did not err by failing to excuse two prospective jurors for cause and that defendant failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective during voir dire by failing to examine the two prospective jurors. The court finally held that the medical examiner's testimony was admissible and that an audio recording of a prior inconsistent statement made by defendant was admissible. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, reckless conduct, aggravated battery, tampering with evidence, and possession of a firearm. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to reject defendant's justification defense and find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court held, however, that the trial court erred when it sentenced defendant for felony tampering with evidence. Inasmuch as the evidence showed defendant threw the murder weapon away, thereby tampering with evidence in his own case and not that of another, he could not be convicted of a felony, but only convicted of a misdemeanor. Accordingly, it was erroneous for the trial court to impose a five-year probated sentence for the tampering with evidence conviction. The court also held that defendant's claim that the trial court erred when it allowed two witnesses to testify on cross-examination that they did not take seriously the threats made by the victim was without merit; and the charges given on justification, provocation, and voluntary manslaughter did not preclude the jury from considering defendant's claim of self-defense. The court further held that the trial court did not commit reversible error when it did not charge the jury on the issue of lack of a duty to retreat when a person acted in self-defense; when it recharged the jury on malice murder, felony murder, and voluntary manslaughter; and when it refused to give defendant's requested charge on transferred justification. The court finally held that the judgment of conviction and the sentence for reckless conduct must be vacated where the reckless conduct charge should have merged into the aggravated battery charge as a matter of fact. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims of error.

Defendant was convicted of murder and other crimes after a pool hall fight. On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court's refusal to give a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction, the effectiveness of his trial counsel, the admission of his post-arrest statement, and the trial court's sustaining an objection to his cross examination of a state witness. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to reject defendant's justification defense and find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court held that neither fear that someone was going to pull a gun nor fighting prior to a homicide were types of provocation demanding a voluntary manslaughter charge and, moreover, defendant testified that he fired because he was "just scared," and acting out of fear was not the same as acting in the heat of a sudden irresistible passion. The court further held that defendant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; defendant's post-arrest statement was admissible where he was advised of his Miranda rights both verbally and in writing, and he signed a waiver; and the trial court did not err when it limited defendant's cross examination of the detective who interrogated him where the trial court merely imposed reasonable limits on cross examination. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder and other crimes arising out of the shooting death of his wife. Defendant appealed from the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court also held that the trial court did not err by concluding that the search of defendant's residence was authorized due to exigent circumstances and the challenged evidence was admissible at trial. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by holding that a witness's testimony about the victim's statements bore sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to be admissible under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule; that contrary to defendant's assertion, it followed that courts were under no obligation to place a defendant's decision whether to testify on the record and it was not error for the trial court to fail to do so here; that there was no error in the trial court's removal of a juror after concluding the juror slept through the presentation of portions of the evidence; and that defendant received effective representation of trial counsel.

A jury found defendant guilty of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, as well as to a consecutive five-year term for the weapons offense. After a motion for a new trial was denied, defendant appealed. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court also held that defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that trial counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of three counts of burglary, two counts of false imprisonment, two counts of kidnapping with bodily injury, two counts of armed robbery, one count of kidnapping, three counts of aggravated assault, and malice murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus 30 years and, after a motion for a new trial was denied, defendant appealed. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Appellant appealed his murder conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find appellant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that trial counsel was not ineffective and rejected appellant's contention that counsel insufficiently disputed that the attack proximately caused the victim's death; counsel gave appellant bad advice about the risks of testifying at trial; counsel should have called a certain witness; counsel did not prepare adequately to impeach certain testimony; and counsel failed to request a jury charge on the defense of abandonment. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed his convictions for felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with a fatal shooting. On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The court held that defendant was not denied a fair and impartial trial and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the entire jury panel. The court also held that there was no merit to defendant's remaining contention that the trial court erred in not directing verdicts of acquittal as to all counts in the indictment which were submitted to the jury because the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty on those charges. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted.

Appellant was convicted of felony murder during the commission of aggravated assault, as well as a weapons charge. A motion for a new trial was denied and appellant appealed. The court rejected appellant's contention that the trial court violated Edge v. State by failing to make clear in its jury instructions that the jurors were to consider voluntary manslaughter before considering whether appellant was guilty of felony murder. The court also rejected appellant's contention that the trial court erred in failing to admonish the jurors that if they found that the killing occurred as a result of provocation and passion, then they could not find appellant guilty of felony murder. Accordingly, in light of the court's precedents, the court affirmed the judgments.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery for the death of his girlfriend's three-year-old child. Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The court held that the evidence was amply sufficient to enable the jurors to find defendant guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that defendant's initial statements to police that the child went into distress while he was mopping in another room and his statements made after receiving Miranda warnings that he beat the child after the child soiled himself were admissible. The court held, however, that the trial court erred by failing to merge defendant's conviction for aggravated battery based on the fracture of the child's rib into his conviction for murder. As a result, defendant's sentence must be vacated and remanded for resentencing.