Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The warden appealed the grant of defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus where the petition was granted on the basis that defendant had ineffective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation and re-adjudication hearing due to what it characterized as counsel's failure to investigate defendant's mental health condition. The court held that the determination that counsel was guilty of failure to investigate defendant's mental health condition, and that such ostensible failure constituted a profession deficiency failed as a matter of fact and law. The court held that the habeas court erred in finding actual prejudice under Strickland where defendant did not offer any evidence to establish prejudice. Accordingly, the habeas court's finding of ineffectiveness was contrary to law and the court reversed the grant of defendant's petition.

Plaintiff filed a suit against two county police officers in their individual capacities, contending that the officers negligently operated their vehicles by causing plaintiff to lose control of his vehicle and crash. Plaintiff sustained bodily injuries and plaintiff's son was killed in the crash. At issue was whether OCGA 36-92-3 was unconstitutional because it was not part of the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA), OCGA 50-21-20 et seq. The court held that the trial court properly denied plaintiff's claim and properly granted summary judgment in favor of the officers where the Legislature was not limited to waiver of immunity solely in the GTCA and where the Legislature extended immunity to county employees like the officers in a section of the Georgia Code specifically applicable to counties, demonstrating that it had the constitutional authority to enact OCGA 36-92-3.

Defendant was convicted of and sentenced for the malice murder, aggravated assault, and armed robbery of the victim, as well as possession of a knife during the commission of an armed robbery. Defendant appealed his convictions, contending that the aggravated assault and armed robbery convictions merged into the malice murder conviction and the sentences imposed for aggravated assault and armed robbery should be vacated. The court agreed that the aggravated assault merged into the malice murder conviction and vacated the sentence imposed for aggravated assault. However, using the "required evidence" test of Drinkard v. Walker, the court held that armed robbery did not merge into malice murder because malice murder had an element that must be proven that armed robbery did not, and armed robbery had an element that malice murder did not. Therefore, defendant's conviction and sentence for armed robbery was affirmed.

Defendant was found guilty of malice murder, possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant appealed after the denial of a motion for new trial. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court concluded that it was error for the trial court to refuse defendant's request to charge the jury on unlawful act involuntary manslaughter. The court held, however, that the error was harmless where there was overwhelming evidence inconsistent with defendant's version of events, but supportive of the jury's finding that defendant was guilty of malice murder. The court held that defendant's contention that the trial court erred by not excluding from evidence inculpatory statements made by defendant to the police on the ground that they were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given, was without merit where the officer's comment at issue was simply an encouragement to tell the truth, which did not amount to a "hope of benefit" under OCGA 24-3-50. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendants appealed convictions related to the starvation and extreme malnourishment of their infant son. The court held that evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that both defendants were guilty of the crimes for which they were convicted. The court also held that defendants waived their claim of prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor elicited testimony during cross-examination of a medical expert because neither defendant made any objection at the time of the testimony. The court further held that defendants failed to meet their burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed from a murder conviction in connection with a stabbing death. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions on all counts. The court also held that, because the record showed that every police officer that was on duty that day had actual knowledge of facts sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, the seizure of defendant's bloody clothes after arrest was proper. The court further held that defendant's right against self-incrimination was not violated where defendant did not perform any act against his will to incriminate himself. On the contrary, defendant surrendered his clothes when asked to do so and moreover, the police were entitled to seize the clothes, which were in his immediate possession, because he had already been lawfully arrested. The court finally held that defendant's requested charge was an incorrect statement of law and the trial court did not err in failing to give the requested charge. The court rejected defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Defendant was convicted in 2003 of murder and other crimes. In 2010, defendant filed a post-conviction motion in which he asked the trial court to amend his transcript to reflect that defendant had been restrained during his trial by the use of a stun belt. The court held that defendant never adduced any evidence to support his assertion that he actually wore a stun belt at his trial. Therefore, the court held that because defendant failed to carry his burden of proving by the record that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to amend the trial transcript, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of murder, felony murder, cruelty to children, and aggravated battery for the death of his four-month-old baby. Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The court held that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges for which he was convicted. The court held that defendant failed to support his contention of ineffective assistance of counsel with any evidence other than his own speculation and, as such, his argument in this regard was rejected. The court further held that there was no error in the admission of evidence of defendant's prior difficulty in which he squeezed and threw the baby at his mother where the evidence was properly admitted to show defendant's bent of mind towards and course of conduct with the baby. The court further held that the photographs and testimony regarding the baby's prior healing rib fracture both served as part of the basis of the medical expert's opinion regarding the mechanism of death and was relevant to prior difficulty testimony showing that defendant had improperly squeezed the baby in the past. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this relevant evidence. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed his conviction for felony murder, theft by receiving stolen property, felony fleeing and attempting to elude police, and aggravated assault. On appeal, defendant contended, among other things, that the trial court's instructions to the jury were erroneous. The court held that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges for which he was convicted. The court rejected defendant's contention that the trial court erroneously included an improper definition of the term "collateral" during a re-charge to the jury regarding felony murder where it was clear that the trial court gave jurors the pattern charge on felony murder at least three times. The court also held that the trial court did not err in denying a request to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense which was not before it. The court further held that the trial court's statement regarding the existence of a scrivener's error in the indictment referred only to the incomplete count and did not contain an expression or intimation regarding the remaining counts. The court rejected defendant's contention that his conviction for felony murder based on aggravated assault must be overturned because the trial court omitted the definition of simple assault in its initial charge to the jury and in a subsequent re-charge. Therefore, the court held that, viewing the charges as a whole, there was no error. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, and other offenses in connection with the killing of the victim and his son. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court held that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges for which he was convicted. The court held that the trial court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to read defendant's entire criminal history into evidence because the basis for admitting this evidence was to disprove defendant's lie by omission. The court also held that the trial court did not err in refusing trial counsel's request for jury instructions on the defenses of self-defense and justification where the "slight evidence" standard in Davis v. State did not warrant an additional jury charge of self-defense and defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the broader defense of justification. The court rejected defendant's arguments regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.