Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals held that Victor Bruscato was entitled to continue pursing a claim for medical malpractice against his psychiatrist, Dr. Derek O'Brien, based at least in part on an agreement that Bruscato brutally killed his mother as a result of deficient psychiatric treatment from O'Brien. Following the murder, Bruscato brought a malpractice claim against O'Brien and the trial court granted summary judgment for O'Brien, ruling that, among other things, public policy would not allow Bruscato to benefit from his wrongdoings. The Court of Appeals reversed and this court subsequently granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly ruled that Bruscato's claim for damages was not barred by Georgia public policy. After reviewing the case, the court held that the public policy issues were correctly examined and determined by the Court of Appeals and generally adopted the Court of Appeals' analysis where an individual's psychiatric disorder prevented him from exercising a reasonable degree of care to prevent himself from taking improper and illegal actions. In this case, a question of fact remained as to whether Bruscato knowingly committed a wrongful act because there was considerable question regarding his sanity and competency at the time the wrongful act was committed. As of this time, it could not be said that, should Bruscato's claim against O'Brien be successful, he might profit from knowingly committing a wrongful act. Thus, O'Brien's motion for summary judgment based on such an argument could not succeed. Moreover, Bruscato's lawsuit was not wholly related to his act of murder and it was not wholly designed to profit from that act where Bruscato was seeking damages from the allegedly improper treatment he received from O'Brien. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of murder and appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence against him was insufficient, that the long delay in his appeal violated his due process rights, and that his trial counsel's performance and the trial court's self-defense jury instruction was inadequate. The court held that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges for which he was convicted. The court also held that the length of delay in this appeal was excessive but the delay did not violate defendant's due process rights because the Chatman v. Mancill factors all weighed against him. The court further held that it could not say that trial counsel's decision not to seek admission of other portions of defendant's statement had a reasonable probability of affecting the result of the trial and it could not conclude that trial counsel's decision not to cross-examine a government agent at issue was either deficient or prejudicial. The court finally held that the trial court did not give an inadequate jury instruction where there was no requirement that the trial court summarize for the jury all of the circumstances surrounding the shooting. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court held that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges for which he was convicted. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's claim that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated; the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim; the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion for mistrial or denied his motion for a new trial; and defendant's due process rights were not violated when the trial court adopted the State's proposed order denying the motion for new trial verbatim. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant seeking a declaratory injunction that defendant did not have an easement on their property, damages for trespass and conversion for a 2007 and 2008 incident, an injunction against further trespass, and attorney fees. Defendant asserted as a defense that the lawsuit was filed after the one-year statute of limitations under OCGA 46-3-204. At issue was whether summary judgment against plaintiffs was proper. The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the one-year statute of limitations. The court then affirmed in part and reversed in part the grant of summary judgment because issues of material fact remained regarding the existence of a valid prescriptive easement and plaintiffs' trespass and conversion claims based on defendant's 2008 actions were not barred by OCGA 46-3-204.

Defendant was convicted for aggravated assault, concealing the death of another, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a crime. At issue was whether the jury instruction on aggravated assault must include an instruction on simple assault. The court held that there was no need for the trial court to instruct the jury on simple assault in connection with its charge on aggravated assault where, as here, the jury had already been properly instructed on general intent and there was no question regarding the perpetrator's intent in shooting the victim (and then shooting him three more times after that). Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder, burglary and other crimes arising out of the shotgun killing of the victim. Defendant appealed from the denial of his motion for a new trial challenging the admission of the co-indictee's videotaped statements to police officers, the effectiveness of his trial counsel, and the trial court's charge to the jury. The court held that, under the circumstances, it was highly probable that any error in admitting the co-indictee's prior statements did not contribute to the verdict and was therefore, harmless. The court also held that defendant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that the trial court erred in its charge to the jury. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial.

After an automobile driven by defendant struck and killed the victim, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment against defendant. At issue was whether Count I of the indictment was properly dismissed because it lacked any specific facts supporting the reckless driving allegation. The court held that the trial court's order dismissing Count I of the indictment was not a final order and that Count II remained in the trial court. Accordingly, by the plain terms of OCGA 5-7-2, a certificate of immediate review was required. The court also held that the State did not secure the required certificate, and the order granting the special demurrer as to Count I was thus not appealable. Consequently, it was error for the Court of Appeals to affirm the trial court where the appeal should have been dismissed by that court and therefore, the judgment was vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of his stepson. Appellant raised several issues of error on appeal. The court held that the trial court did not err by failing to give the jury appellant's request to charge the jury on defense of habitation; by failing to charge the jury on the defense of justification; by denying the motions for mistrial; and by charging the jury on voluntary intoxication. The court also held that appellant did not have ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

In November 2003, defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity of several crimes, including aggravated assault, and subsequently involuntarily committed to the Northwest Georgia Regional Hospital (hospital). In August 2009, the hospital petitioned the committing court for defendant's unconditional release, alleging that he no longer met "the civil commitment criteria under Chapter 3 of Title 37," OCGA 17-7-131(f). The committing court denied the petition and the Superior Court denied defendant's petition for habeas corpus. At issue was whether the habeas court erred in denying defendant's release where defendant met the standard for involuntary inpatient treatment. The court held that the evidence in the record supported the habeas court's finding that defendant was not entitled to unconditional release where defendant's personality disorders and his schizo-affective disorder qualified as mental illnesses under OCGA 37-1-1(12); where defendant's paranoid and antisocial personality disorders made him an imminent threat of harm to others if he were released; and where defendant had recently committed a violent act toward another patient.

Defendant appealed from his convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. At issue was whether the evidence was insufficient and whether the trial court erred in admitting similar transaction evidence. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to reject defendant's claim of self-defense and to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court also held that the trial court gave a proper limiting instruction regarding the jury's use of the evidence where both shootings occurred in a vehicle and involved the same gun, which defendant took from his roommate without permission and hid from the police after each shooting, and where, on both occasions, defendant gave false statements to the police. Therefore, the admission of the similar transaction was clearly not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.