Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol per se based on evidence from the Intoxilyzer 5000 that her blood alcohol level was .156 grams, over the legal limit of .08 grams. Defendant appealed the trial court's refusal to issue an order requesting issuance of a summons to the Kentucky corporation which employed the individual defendant sought to have summoned to Georgia where defendant was seeking the source code of the Intoxilyzer 5000. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court's refusal to issue an order requesting issuance of a summons to the Kentucky resident where the trial court had not abused its discretion in declining to issue the order because defendant had not carried her burden of showing that the out-of-state person was "a necessary and material witness to the case." The court held that, in light of OCGA 24-10-97, the court construed "material witness" as a "witness who could testify about matters having some logical connection with the consequential facts, esp. if few others, if any, know about these matters." Since the proper statute was not applied to this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence per se based on evidence that the Intoxilyzer 5000 recorded her blood alcohol concentration as .179 grams, a result over the legal limit of .08 grams. Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied her pre-trial motion to obtain the source code for the Intoxilyzer 5000 possessed by a Kentucky corporation because the evidence was neither material nor relevant. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals properly upheld the trial court's ruling under the "right for any reason rule" and affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the Uniform Act, OCGA 24-10-90, et seq., could be used to obtain the presence and testimony of an out-of-state witness and evidence in the possession of the witness, but it could not be used to request only the production of evidence located in another state. The court held that the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that a request under the Uniform Act, that an out-of-state corporation be required to produce purportedly material evidence in its possession, must be accompanied by the identification as a material witness of the corporate agent through which the corporation was to act. Should the certificate of materiality be issued by the Georgia court, it was for the Kentucky corporation to identify the human agent through whom it would act, perhaps in conjunction with the hearing that would be held in Kentucky upon receipt of the Georgia certificate of materiality. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed his 1984 conviction of malice murder. At issue was whether defendant's guilty plea was invalid under Boykin v. Alabama because the State failed to meet its burden of showing that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right against self-incrimination. The court held that the State did not fulfill its duty to ensure that defendant's guilty plea was constitutionally valid; it apparently did not ensure that he was advised of and had effective representation regarding his right to appeal his conviction; and it did not litigate the merits of defendant's guilty plea in his habeas corpus hearings, where the record might have been expanded. Consequently, defendant's conviction must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of two counts each of murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault and was sentenced to death for each of the murders. At issue was whether the trial court erred in its order addressing what burden and standard of proof should apply to defendant's claim that he was mentally retarded; regarding the order of opening statements and closing arguments in the mental retardation phase; and by ruling that it lacked authority to accept a plea of guilty but mentally retarded. The court held that the trial court erred regarding the burden of proof where Georgia's statutory definition of mental retardation, with its requirement that only mental deficiencies capable of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, was not unconstitutional under Atkins v. Virginia; that the trial court did not err by ruling that standard criminal procedures would apply to defendant's retrial on the issue of mental retardation pursuant to OCGA 17-8-71; and that the trial court erred by ruling that it lacked the authority to consider any plea bargain that the parties might be willing to enter into. The court declined to address any additional issues defendant had raised and affirmed the judgment in part and reversed in part.

Appellant was convicted of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with a March 2004 shooting. At issue was whether the district court erred when it denied appellant's motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act in self-defense and that he was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. The court also held that defendant, while alleging that counsel was ineffective in a number of respects, failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that counsel was deficient and that a reasonable probability existed that the outcome would have been different. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was indicted for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and two counts of burglary and rejected the State's plea agreement. At issue was whether defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise him that if he rejected the State's plea offer, he would face a mandatory sentence of life without parole if convicted on the armed robbery count. The court concluded that, if trial counsel, before the expiration of the State's plea offer, had investigated the facts of the case, informed defendant that his alibi witnesses would not testify, advised defendant that he faced a mandatory sentence of life without parole if convicted at trial, and proffered his own informed opinion as to whether defendant should accept or reject the plea offer, it was quite evident that defendant not only would have been amenable to the State's plea offer but actually would have accepted it. Therefore, the court held that defendant demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of counsel where defendant had shown both that his trial counsel was deficient and that he was prejudiced by these deficiencies. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At issue was whether the trial court erred by not exercising its discretion in its review of the motion for new trial when assessing whether the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence and whether a miscarriage of justice may have resulted. The court vacated the judgment and remanded to the trial court for consideration of the motion for new trial under the appropriate discretionary standard where the sufficiency of the evidence standard and the discretionary standard addressed two distinct legal issues and where the trial court erred by not exercising its discretion pursuant to OCGA 5-5-21.

Appellant was indicted on charges of rape, aggravated assault, and two counts of cruelty to children. At issue was whether the habeas court erred by finding that appellant's guilty plea was valid in light of the multiple statements made by the trial court during the plea proceedings. The court held that the judicial participation in appellant's plea negotiations was so great as to render his guilty plea involuntary where the trial court repeatedly stated that it would impose a longer sentence if appellant went to trial and, indeed would prefer that he go to trial so that the trial judge could "give [appellant] what I would really like to give him." Accordingly, the court reversed the habeas court's denial of appellant's petition where he agreed to enter a guilty plea with terms far less favorable than those originally negotiated after hearing such statements from the trial court.

Defendant was indicted for homicide by vehicle in July 2008 where he was accused of causing the other occupant of the car's death by recklessly speeding and failing to maintain his lane. When defendant's attorney hired an investigator to find the car, the car had been purchased by a salvager in January 2008 who cleaned, repaired, repainted, and resold the vehicle. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in its application of OCGA 17-5-56(a) and in holding that the State committed a due process violation in failing to preserve evidence. The court held that, by holding that OCGA 17-5-56(a) would require governmental entities to maintain not only biological materials but also the sources of such biological materials, the Court of Appeals had gone beyond the plain language of the statute and offered an interpretation that lead to an absurd result. The court also held that there was simply no evidence of record that the police were acting in bad faith when they followed the standard policy of releasing evidence in vehicular homicide cases that they considered to be solved. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals had no basis in the record for disturbing the factual findings of the trial court and judgment was reversed.

Appellee was convicted of numerous felonies stemming from a 1993 bank robbery and was sentenced as a recidivist for life in prison and a number of years to serve consecutively, all without parole. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the ruling in King v. State was applicable in cases where the defendant had been convicted of firearm possession under OCGA 16-11-131 and where the State had sought sentence enhancement under OCGA 17-10-7. The court held that since the sentencing range in OCGA 16-11-131 was not eviscerated by the application of OCGA 17-10-7(c), there was no basis to extend the holding in King to that subsection. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed.