Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences for malice murder, aggravated assault, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. At issue was whether the State engaged in unconstitutional gender-based discrimination by using seven of its eight peremptory strikes against women; whether the State engaged in unconstitutional race-based discrimination by using three of its eight peremptory strikes against African-Americans; whether defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel; and whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress his statement to the police. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose based on gender; that the record supported the trial court's finding that reasons offered for the three strikes against African-American jurors were race neutral and not pretextual; that defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel where defendant alleged that counsel failed to elicit sufficient testimony from defendant's expert at the Jackson-Denno hearing, failed to move for mistrial, and failed to object to the State reviewing expert's notes at the Jackson-Denno hearing; and that the trial court did not err in concluding that defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and sentences.

Defendant was arrested on September 11, 2007 for murder and his motion to dismiss was filed on August 27, 2010, almost three years later. At issue was whether the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the charges against him for a constitutional speedy trial violation. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his constitutional speedy trial rights where, under the circumstances, defendant had not shown that he was prejudiced.

Defendant appealed his convictions for felony murder and violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act ("VGCSA"), Title 16, Chapter 13, in connection with the death of a young man. Defendant asserted that the evidence was insufficient to authorize the jury to find him guilty of violating the VGCSA by distributing controlled substances; felony murder; and VGSA by keeping a dwelling for the purposes of using controlled substances. The court held that the evidence authorized the jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of multiple counts of distributing controlled substances by prescribing them in a manner that was not in the usual course of his professional practice and was not for a legitimate medical purpose in violation of OCGA 16-13-41(f). The court also held that defendant's felonies of illegally providing controlled substances through prescriptions were dangerous felonies and the young man's death was a foreseeable result within the meaning of the felony murder statute. The court further held that, while the jury could infer that controlled substances had been kept and used at defendant's home on more than one occasion by the young man, without a showing that a purpose of defendant's maintaining a house was for such use by the young man, a guilty verdict was not authorized. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence on this count was vacated. The court finally held that the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of two other young men who had formed relationships with defendant and that the trial court did not err in failing to give the exact "good faith" jury instructions defendant requested.

Appellant, a 15-year-old, was convicted of murdering her mother and sentenced to life imprisonment plus a consecutive five-year term for firearm possession. At issue was whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State to introduce, over defense counsel's objections, various items of evidence seized from appellant's bedroom during the police investigation, including photographs of her with dyed black hair and dark make-up; a document bearing the words of a "curse;" and seven different inscriptions of song lyrics and quotations attributed to various singers and other artists bearing themes of anguish, enslavement, atheism, and violence. The court held that the evidence was improper prejudicial character evidence where the nature of the evidence was highly inflammatory and evidence of appellant's guilt was entirely circumstantial and not overwhelming. Accordingly, the court could not say that it was highly probable that the error did not contribute to the jury's verdict and therefore, reversed appellant's conviction.

While on probation in Douglas County, defendant was charged with drug-related offenses in Paulding County. The Douglas County Court issued a probation warrant for his arrest based on the Paulding County charges and defendant was arrested on the probation warrant in October 2007. While executing the warrant, officers saw methamphetamine on a table and then obtained and executed a search warrant and found more methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized both in March and October in the Paulding County criminal case. At issue was whether the exclusionary rule applied in probation revocation proceedings. The court held that because application of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings would achieve only marginal deterrent effects and would significantly alter and affect the proper administration of the probation system in the state, the court found the deterrence benefits of the exclusionary rule did not outweigh the costs of the system. Therefore, under the proper balancing test, neither the federal nor state constitutions required application of the exclusionary rule in state probation revocation proceedings.

Appellant appealed pro se the denial of his pre-trial petition for a writ of habeas corpus where he was indicted on charges of aggravated assault, obstruction of a law enforcement officer, criminal damage to property, and simple battery against a pregnant person. At issue was whether the denial of bail constituted excessive bail and was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the United States and Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVII of the Georgia Constitution. The court held that nothing in the record suggested that the trial court abused its discretion in denying bail and thus it was not error for the habeas court to deny appellant's petition where the trial court specifically concluded that he was a flight risk and the habeas court noted that under recidivist treatment, he faced incarceration for a significant period of time.

Appellant was convicted of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. At issue was whether appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and whether he was entitled to a new trial. The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims and held that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to admissible evidence; failing to object to testimony that appellant was part of a gang; failing to contemporaneously object to testimony of a witness who said she visited him in jail; failing to object to in-court identification testimony and had it stricken from the record; and strategically refusing the trial court's offer to give a curative instruction regarding certain testimony. The court also held that, based on the facts and absence of any evidence of specific harm or prejudice to appellant, the trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion for new trial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. Likewise, appellant's claim that the prosecution violated OCGA 17-16-4(a)(1) by failing to turn over the records of his conversations was unavailing. The court also held that where counsel strategically refused the trial court's proffer of a curative instruction regarding testimony about a juvenile court disposition, the trial court's failure to grant a mistrial generally was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion for a new trial.

Appellant was convicted of murder and appealed the propriety of the trial court's dismissal of his appeal from the trial court's order for failure to pay appeal costs. At issue was whether the trial court erred in dismissing appellant's appeal for failure to pay costs because he asked the trial court to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis. The court held that the record conclusively revealed that appellant could not have suffered any harm from such error where, even if the trial court had not dismissed his appeal, appellant's appeal would have failed as a matter of law. In any event, appellant provided no basis for a finding of any inadequacy in his indictment or his conviction, which further revealed that the arguments that he raised with respect to his motion in arrest of judgment were without merit.

This appeal involved a constitutional challenge to the 2008 Georgia Charter Schools Commission Act ("Act"), OCGA 20-2-2081 et seq. Appellants, local school systems whose 2009 and 2010 complaints were consolidated by the trial court, contended, inter alia, that the Act was unconstitutional because it violated the "special schools" provision in the Georgia Constitution of 1983. The court held that the Act was unconstitutional where the constitution embodied the fundamental principle of exclusive local control of general primary and secondary public education ("K-12") and where the Act clearly and palpably violated Art. VIII, Sec. V, Par. VII(a) by authorizing a state commission to establish competing state-created general K-12 schools under the guise of being "special schools." The court's holding rendered it unnecessary to address appellants' remaining constitutional challenges to the Act.

Appellant filed a negligence action against a police officer, in his individual and official capacity, and the City of Waynesboro after appellant was injured when the officer, while conducting a routine patrol, drove his police cruiser into the back of appellant's vehicle. At issue was whether the tort immunity for local government employees for situations covered by OCGA 36-92-3(a) was limited to only those covered situations in which the local government entity remained liable. Also at issue was whether the construction of the statute applied by the trial court rendered the statute unconstitutional because it violated the Georgia Constitution's guaranty of the right to trial by jury by foreclosing entirely any remedy for appellant for her injuries arising out of the underlying tort. The court affirmed summary judgment for appellees and held that, by the passage of section 36-92-3(a), the legislature intended to foreclose all recovery against municipal employees for torts committed within the scope of employment and involving the use of a covered motor vehicle. The court also held that the statute was not unconstitutional where appellant's failure to send ante litem notice, and not section 36-92-3(a), was why she found herself without a remedy; where the issue of immunity for the individual government employee was moot when appellant's constitutional right to a jury trial was satisfied by her ability to seek redress and recover from the city; and where the issue of whether the statutory cap on damages was unconstitutional, was now moot.