Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of felony murder and two counts of aggravated assault in connection with the shooting death of a three-year-old. Appellant appealed from the denial of his motion for new trial arguing that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter where appellant's testimony showed that he did not shoot the child in the heat of passion because he was not upset and fired out of fear to defend his and his mother's life and where the testimony of the child's parents demonstrated, at most, that appellant could have opened fired in response to their heated or angry statements, which as a matter of law, could not constitute "serious provocation" within the meaning of OCGA 16-5-2(a).

Appellant was convicted of two counts of malice murder and various related offenses in connection with the asphyxiation death of an individual and the bludgeoning death of her daughter. Appellant appealed certain jury instructions and asserted that he was improperly denied a hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed the convictions and held that it found highly probable that the erroneous failure to charge on impeachment by proof of a conviction for a crime of moral turpitude did not contribute to the verdict; that the trial court's jury instruction on theft presented no ground for reversal; and that the trial court did not err in denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without holding an evidentiary hearing where appellant waived his claim when he did not argue it, or offer any evidence in support of it, despite being afforded the opportunity to do so. The court remanded for resentencing and held that, under the circumstances, the three additional life sentences for felony murder were illegal and could not stand.

Defendant was charged with malice murder and concealing the death of another in connection with the killing of his girlfriend. The court granted defendant an interlocutory appeal from an order of the superior court which denied his motion to suppress certain statements he made to law enforcement officers in order to consider whether the superior court erred in concluding that defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary in light of the evidence of his mental disabilities. The court held that the superior court did not err where there was evidence to support the determination that, despite some mild mental impairment, defendant was capable of understanding his Miranda rights, including his right to counsel, and that he never invoked this right.

Defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion in arrest of judgment were he was convicted of felony murder and other crimes where the motion asserted that defendant's indictment was substantively defective because it did not set forth the essential elements of the charged offense. At issue was whether the untimely filing of a motion in arrest of judgment precluded a defendant from appealing the trial court's ruling on the motion. The court affirmed the denial of the motion and held that the untimely filing of a motion in arrest of judgment in the trial court was not a defect in appellate jurisdiction that would subject an appeal from the trial court's ruling on the motion to dismissal, as would an untimely filed notice of appeal, and that instead, the untimeliness of the motion was simply a defect that limited the trial court's authority to grant the motion.