Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Tony Lamar Thompson appealed his convictions for felony murder and related crimes regarding the death of Reynaldo Jackson. On appeal, he cited several alleged errors at trial, and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him. Finding no reversible error, however, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. View "Thompson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Cornelius Moore was tried by jury and convicted of murder and several other crimes, all in connection with the killing of Jezreel Hammond. Moore appealed, arguing that the trial court erred with respect to the admission of certain evidence at trial. The Supreme Court found no reversible error with respect to the evidence admitted at trial, but concluded, however, that the trial court did err when it convicted Moore of three distinct counts of unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The Court therefore vacated the conviction and sentence as to one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and otherwise affirmed the Moore’s conviction and sentence. View "Moore v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Brandon Johnson was indicted with his uncle, Charles Ellery, on charges of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during commission of a crime. After a joint jury trial, appellant was found guilty of all charges for which he was indicted and sentenced to life in prison. His motion for new trial was denied, and he appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for mistrial made after the State introduced evidence of a similar transaction against Ellery. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Johnson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Dexter Jones was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Kenny Johnson. He appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for new trial. Appellant contended that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to emphasize certain testimony from the State's crime scene investigator in support of a claim of self-defense. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction. View "Jones v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2012, Lewis Carlton made several telephone calls to neighbors of the foster mother of his three children. Representing himself as an employee with the Georgia Division of Family and Children Services (DFCS), Carlton questioned the neighbors regarding the foster mother's treatment of his children. Neighbors brought the foster mother over to listen in on a conversation with Carlton, at which point the foster mother identified the caller as Carlton and telephoned the police. Carlton was indicted on thirteen separate counts; however, orders of nolle prosequi were entered on ten as part of a negotiated plea agreement. The remaining three counts each charged Carlton with impersonating of public employee. Carlton then backed out of the plea deal and decided to take his case to trial. The next day, the parties had lengthy argument as to the constitutionality of the impersonation statute as applied to Carlton. Shortly thereafter, Carlton requested the same plea deal that previously had been offered. The parties then returned to superior court and Carlton entered an Alford plea to all three impersonation counts. At that hearing, Carlton repeatedly expressed to the superior court his concern and understanding that he would retain the right to attack the statute's legality, stating he would not waive a habeas corpus to challenge impersonation statute. Carlton then petitioned the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus, initially asserting ineffective assistance of counsel and violation of his due process right for being convicted of three counts of an indictment which failed to establish a crime. However, he amended his petition to leave only his due process argument and his challenge to the impersonation statute. The habeas court granted Carlton's petition, ruling that OCGA 16-10-23 failed to adequately hold itself out as applicable to public employees as opposed to public officers, and thus, the statute did not provide Carlton with appropriate notice that he could be criminally responsible for impersonating a DFCS employee. The warden appealed the superior court's grant of habeas relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the superior court's reasoning and reversed. View "Kennedy v. Carlton" on Justia Law

Following Willie Lewis' 2003 conviction for malice murder and numerous other offenses, his 2005 appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed as untimely. Lewis filed a pro se extraordinary motion for new trial, and he was appointed new counsel for the purposes of pursuing an out-of-time motion for new trial and a direct appeal. Lewis then filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal, which was granted. In the second appearance of Lewis' case to the Supreme Court, the Court affirmed Lewis' convictions and sentences for two counts of malice murder and other felonies, vacated a conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and remanded for resentencing on that count, and remanded the case for a hearing on Lewis' claims of ineffective assistance of first appellate counsel. This third appeal concerns the trial court's order on remand which found no ineffective assistance of first appellate counsel. Agreeing with the trial court regarding Lewis' ineffective assistance claim, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Lewis v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Charles Warren was indicted for sending an unsolicited text message containing an image of his genitalia to a woman without notifying her in advance that the message contained nudity. Appellant filed a general demurrer, arguing that OCGA 16-12-81 did not criminalize his conduct, and filed three motions to quash the indictment. The trial court denied appellant's demurrer and his motions to quash, and he appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that appellant was correct that OCGA 16-12-81 did not criminalize his conduct: "[t]he specific prohibition is clearly aimed at tangible material that is delivered in a tangible manner . . . and because appellant did not send anything through the mail, he did not violate this prohibition." View "Warren v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Solid wate, recycling, composting and waste water processing facility appellant Wilbros, LLC is subject to the requirements of the Georgia Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Act and related regulations. By Consent Order executed by Wilbros and the Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (EPD), Wilbros agreed to pay the Department of Natural Resources $25,000 in compromise and settlement of various disputed violations referenced in the Consent Order. A few months afterward, Wilbros was charged with violation of Stephens County ordinance sections 34-73 (3) and (4). Wilbros and the state court solicitor filed a written stipulation in the case stipulating that Wilbros had been ordered by the EPD to pay a fine for statutory violations of odor issues at the facility and that the operative dates for those violations encompassed the same dates alleged in the local ordinance violation charge. Wilbros filed a plea in bar of prosecution, raising double jeopardy, a preemption challenge, and a constitutional challenge asserting the ordinance was void for vagueness. The trial court denied Wilbros's plea, specifically concluding there was no Georgia authority that permitted a corporation to assert Fifth Amendment double jeopardy protection under the Georgia or United States constitutions, finding that the preemption argument failed, and finding that the county ordinance was constitutional. The trial court also granted Wilbros the right to pretrial appeal. The case was transferred to the Supreme Court because it raised the constitutionality of the county ordinance, an issue over which the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction. Upon careful consideration, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Wilbros's plea in bar of prosecution. View "Wilbros, LLC v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Lenzie Wilkerson appealed a lower court's denial of habeas relief, contending that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient, under "Garza v. State," (670 SE2d 73 (2008)). He was convicted on kidnapping charges. In addition, Wilkerson contended that the trial court erred by finding that his trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed the habeas court's ruling on the kidnapping convictions but affirmed its finding regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. View "WILKERSON v. HART, WARDEN" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred injunctive relief at common law. Appellees Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc. (and David and Melinda Egan) filed a declaratory judgment suit against Appellants Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR), and DNR's Coastal Resources Division (CRD), by and through its director A.G. "Spud" Woodward. In its suit, the Center sought to enjoin the State from issuing Letters of Permission (LOPs) to third parties authorizing land alterations to property within the jurisdiction of the Shore Protection Act. The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss the Center's petition, finding that the Center was not entitled to declaratory relief because the State had not waived sovereign immunity, and, even if it had, there was no justiciable controversy. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the trial court had correctly dismissed the Center's declaratory judgment claim as non-justiciable but improperly dismissed the injunctive relief claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that sovereign immunity barred injunctive relief against the State at common law. View "Georgia Dept. of Nat'l Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc." on Justia Law