Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with excessive speeding in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 291C-105(a). After the charge was read, Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that it failed to state the requisite state of mind under Haw. Rev. Stat. 702-204. The court denied Defendant's motion, ruling that when a statute does not expressly set forth the culpable state of mind, but rather imports the mens rea element from Haw. Rev. Stat. 702-212 that obviated the need of the State to articulate a state of mind. The district court subsequently convicted Defendant of the charge. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and instructed the district court to dismiss the charge without prejudice, holding (1) the offense of driving at an excessive speed is not a strict liability offense and requires proof that the defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, an thus, the requisite states of mind must be alleged in a charge of this offense; (2) the section 291C-105(a) charge against Defendant failed to allege the requisite states of mind; and (3) the State also failed to lay an adequate foundation to admit a laser instrument reading of Defendant's vehicle's speed into evidence. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

While traveling to California to meet his obligations in a pending matter in that state's courts, Petitioner, who was on release in an unrelated criminal proceeding in the circuit court, was arrested at the Honolulu International Airport. Petitioner's arrest led to the drug charge in the instant court proceedings. Petitioner posted bail and was released from custody. Petitioner proceeded to California, where he was held in custody. Petitioner was not present for his arraignment because he was in custody in California. The circuit filed a a bail forfeiture judgment. The circuit court later denied Petitioner's motion to set aside bail forfeiture and for return of bail. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals and held the that circuit court erred in denying Petitioner's motion because, under the circumstances, Petitioner's incarceration in California established good cause for his failure to appear at his arraignment, and thus for why the bail forfeiture judgment should not be executed. View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree. Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress seeking to preclude the State from introducing methamphetamine obtained during a warrantless search of Petitioner's pockets. The circuit court suppressed the evidence. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the suppression order and remanded to the court for entry of its findings and conclusions regarding whether the State met its burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the methamphetamine would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means pursuant to State v. Lopez. On remand, the court again ordered the evidence suppressed. The ICA ordered the second suppression order vacated and the case remanded for trial, concluding that the circuit court did not make factual findings regarding the events relevant to the issue of inevitable discovery. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding that the circuit court was not wrong in holding that the State failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the methamphetamine would have inevitably been discovered. View "State v. Rodrigues" on Justia Law

Paulette Kaleikini is a native Hawaiian who engages in traditional and customary practices, including the protection of native Hawaiian burial remains. Kaleikini brought suit against the City and County of Honolulu and the State of Hawai'i, challenging the approval of the Honolulu High-Capacity Transit Corridor Project. Kaleikini argued that the rail project should be enjoined until an archaeological inventory survey, which identifies and documents archaeological historic properties and burial sites in the project area, is completed for all four phases of the project. The City moved to dismiss Kaleikini’s complaint and/or for summary judgment, and the State joined in the motion. The City acknowledged that an archaeological inventory survey was required for each phase of the rail project. The City and State contended that as long as an archeological inventory survey had been completed for a particular phase, construction could begin on that part of the project even if the surveys for the other phases had not yet been completed. The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the City and State on all of Kaleikini’s claims. Kaleikini appealed the circuit court’s final judgment in favor of the City and the State. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the City and State failed to comply with State law pertaining to the surveys and its implementing rules when it concurred in the rail project prior to the completion of the required archaeological inventory survey for the entire project. The City similarly failed to comply with State law and its implementing rules by granting a special management area permit for the rail project and by commencing construction prior to the completion of the historic preservation review process. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment on Counts 1 through 4 of Kaleikini’s complaint and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings on those counts. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in all other respects.

In June 2004, Petitioners-Appellants Hui O Na Wai 'Eha and Maui Tomorrow Foundation, Inc. (Hui/MTF), through Earthjustice, petitioned Appellee Commission on Water Resource Management to amend the Interim Instream Flow Standards (IIFS) for Na Wai 'Eha, which had been in place since 1988. Around the same time, several parties, including Appellee Maui County Department of Water Supply (MDWS), and Appellees Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Company (HC&S) and Wailuku Water Company (WWC), filed Water Use Permit Applications (WUPA) for the same area. The Commission held a combined case hearing to resolve the IIFS and WUPA; in addition to the petitioner and applicants, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) applied to participate in the hearing. The appeal before the Supreme Court sought review of the Commission's resulting Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law (FOF/COL), and Decision and Order (D&O), in which the Commission amended the IIFS for two of the four streams, and substantially retained the existing IIFS for the two remaining streams as measured above diversions. The FOF/COL and D&O also resolved several WUPA. Hui/MTF and OHA appealed on related grounds: their primary complaint was that the Commission erred in balancing instream and noninstream uses, and therefore the IIFS does not properly protect traditional and customary native Hawaiian rights, appurtenant water rights, or the public trust. Both parties also contested the Commission’s treatment of diversions, including an alternative source on HC&S’s plantation that could have been used to irrigate HC&S’s cane fields. The parties contested the Commission’s determination that HC&S would not be required to pump the alternate source to its full capacity, a decision that resulted in a higher estimated allowable diversion for HC&S, and lower IIFS for the streams. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. First, in considering the effect of the IIFS on native Hawaiian practices in Na Wai 'Eha, the Commission failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the effect of the amended IIFS on traditional and customary native Hawaiian practices regarding the feasibility of protecting any affected practices. Second, the Commission’s analysis of instream uses was incomplete. Third, the Commission erred in its consideration of alternative water sources and in its calculation of diverting parties’ acreage and reasonable system losses.

Petitioner Donald Levell, Jr. was charged with harassment for allegedly shoving the complainant and subjecting her to offensive physical contact. The altercation at issue here arose from whether the complainant stole Petitioner's credit cards and used them after he was arrested. Petitioner contended that the use of the cards was relevant to prove his motive to accuse Petitioner of offensive contact an harassment and to falsely testify against him at trial. Petitioner sought to cross-examine the complainant, but the court found the issue not relevant, and that cross-examination might have caused the complainant to violate her right against self-incrimination as the unauthorized use of the cards was then being investigated. Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision with respect to the cross-examination. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by disallowing Petitioner the ability to cross-examine the complainant. The case was remanded for a new trial.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that mere proximity and power to exercise control over contraband are insufficient to sustain a conviction for possession absent evidence of intent. Petitioner-Defendant-Appellee Raymond L. Foster was found guilty by a jury of, inter alia, one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition. Following the jury verdict, the circuit court granted Petitioner's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal on those two counts, concluding that the evidence adduced at trial did not establish he had the requisite intent to exercise dominion and control over the firearm and ammunition. The State appealed, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA") concluded that there was sufficient evidence of intent, vacated the circuit court's order granting Petitioner's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, and remanded for resentencing based on the jury's guilty verdicts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the ICA erred in vacating the circuit court's order granting Petitioner's renewed motion for acquittal of both the firearm and ammunition charges. The Court reinstated the circuit court's order granting Petitioner's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal of the firearm and ammunition charges.

Defendant Steve Cabagbag allegedly stole a truck from a storage facility as well as several tools from a construction site. A jury found Defendant guilty of unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle and theft in the second degree. The trial court sentenced Defendant to two concurrent five-year terms of probation. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court committed plain error for failing to provide a jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification because the jury's attention was not adequately drawn to the identification issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in criminal cases, the circuit courts must give the jury a specific eyewitness identification instruction whenever identification evidence is a central issue in the case, and it is requested by the defendant; (2) a circuit court may, in the exercise of its discretion, give the instruction if it believes the instruction is otherwise warranted in a particular case; (3) this new rule should be given prospective effect; and (4) Defendant's conviction is affirmed under the rule then in effect when he was tried.

After a jury trial, Petitioner Glenn Keohokapu was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to an extended term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the process by which the jury was selected for Petitioner's trial did not result in substantial prejudice to Petitioner notwithstanding the pretrial publicity to which some jurors were exposed. The Court, however, vacated Petitioner's extended term sentence, holding that, as to the extended sentencing proceedings, (1) where the jury must determined whether an extended term of imprisonment is necessary for the protection of the public, it is error to instruct the jury that the extended term sentence includes the possibility of parole; (2) in this case it was error to admit the statement of one of the witnesses during the sentencing phase as past recollection recorded; and (3) these errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Petitioner Alohacare bid for a health and human services contract under Haw. Rev. Stat. 103F but was denied the contract by Respondent, the Department of Human Services. Petitioner protested and later appealed. The lower courts dismissed Petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that Petitioner was not entitled to judicial review. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the lower courts, holding (1) Petitioner may not appeal the denial of a contract award by Respondent under the procedures set forth in Haw. Rev. Stat. 103D that afford judicial review for bidders denied protests; (2) however, chapter 103F does not prohibit judicial review of the administrative denial of such matters, and review may be afforded under Haw. Rev. Stat. 632; (3) review and denial of a bidder's protest by Respondent as the purchasing agency and subsequent denial of a request for reconsideration by the chief procurement officer housed in a different executive agency do not assuage separation of powers concerns because review is accomplished only in the executive branch of government; and (4) Petitioner was not denied due process or equal protection by chapter 103F, inasmuch as judicial review may be obtained by way of a declaratory judgment action. Remanded.