Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Kevin Nesmith and Chris Yamamoto were each charged with operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII) pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 291E-61(a)(1) and/or (a)(3). The trial court found Nesmith and Yamamoto guilty as charged. Nesmith and Yamamoto appealed, alleging that the complaints were legally deficient for having failed to allege mens rea. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed, holding that mens rea need not be alleged in a complaint charging crimes under sections 291E-6a(a)(1) and/or (a)(3). The Supreme Court consolidated the cases and held (1) pursuant to State v. Wheeler, a charge of OVUII under section 291E-61(a)(1) must allege the requisite mens rea; (2) an OVUII charge under section 291E-61(a)(3) is an absolute liability offense for which mens rea need not be alleged or proven; (3) the ICA erred by relying on general intent cases to hold that mens rea may be inferred from the allegations in a section 291E-61(a)(1) OVUII charge; and (4) the State v. Nesmith majority erred by extending Haw. Rev. Stat. 806-28 to the district courts.

Defendant Pulumata'ala Eli was convicted of attempted manslaughter. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to suppress a statement Defendant made to a detective in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence, holding (1) the police practice of inviting an arrestee to make a statement and to give his or her "side of the story" or similar entreaties in a "pre-interview" before Miranda warnings are given violates the defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination and right to due process; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the Mirandized statement offered into evidence at trial resulted from the exploitation of the said pre-interview practice, and the Miranda warnings subsequently given did not remove the taint of such practice. Remanded for a new trial.

Kevin Nesmith and Chris Yamamoto were each charged with operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII) pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 291E-61(a)(1) and/or (a)(3). The trial court found Nesmith and Yamamoto guilty as charged. Nesmith and Yamamoto appealed, alleging that the complaints were legally deficient for having failed to allege mens rea. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed, holding that mens rea need not be alleged in a complaint charging crimes under sections 291E-6a(a)(1) and/or (a)(3). The Supreme Court consolidated the cases and held (1) pursuant to State v. Wheeler, a charge of OVUII under section 291E-61(a)(1) must allege the requisite mens rea; (2) an OVUII charge under section 291E-61(a)(3) is an absolute liability offense for which mens rea need not be alleged or proven; (3) the ICA erred by relying on general intent cases to hold that mens rea may be inferred from the allegations in a section 291E-61(a)(1) OVUII charge; and (4) the State v. Nesmith majority erred by extending Haw. Rev. Stat. 806-28 to the district courts.

The circuit court found Samuel Walker guilty of three offenses, including Count I, habitually operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (HOVUII). The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded Walker's case with instructions to dismiss Count I without prejudice, holding that Count I of the felony information failed to allege an essential element, an attendant circumstance, of the charge of HOVUII. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an appellate court's remand for entry of judgment of conviction and resentencing for a lesser-included offense must be based on a jurisdictionally valid lesser-included charge; and (2) under this holding, Walker's HOVUII charge did not adequately allege the lesser-included offense of OVUII as a first offender because his charge failed to allege an essential element, specifically, the attendant circumstance that he operated a vehicle on a public road, way, street, or highway.

Jason Kiese was found guilty by the family court of one count of harassment. After the trial, the family court denied Kiese's motion to stay his sentence pending appeal. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed the judgment of conviction and concluded that the family court's denial of Kiese's stay was erroneous but moot. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and, because Kiese had already served his probationary sentence, affirmed the ICA's judgment on appeal, holding (1) the ICA correctly held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Kiese's harassment conviction; (2) the ICA erred in not addressing the family court's failure to stay Keise's sentence pending appeal based on the mootness doctrine because the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied; and (3) the family court erred by denying Kiese a stay of his petty misdemeanor sentence pending appeal because Kiese, as a petty misdemeanant on bail, was entitled to a continuance of bail as a matter of right pending appellate review, and the family court was without jurisdiction to execute Kiese's sentence.

After a jury trial, Petitioner Blue Lealao was convicted of assault in the second degree. A year and a half after the incident and before trial, Petitioner had said, "I'm so sorry. I made a big mistake" to a relative. Petitioner filed a motion in limine to exclude the statement under Haw. R. Evid. 409.5, which provides that evidence expressing condolences is not admissible to prove liability. The circuit court concluded that the phrase "I'm so sorry" was an expression of sympathy but that "I made a big mistake" was not and was therefore admissible. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) Rule 409.5 applies in civil but not in criminal cases, and accordingly, the circuit court and ICA erred in applying the rule in this criminal case to Petitioner's pretrial statements; (2) however, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of Petitioner's testimony; and (3) moreover, the statement was relevant and admissible as a party admission under Haw. R. Evid. 803(a)(1).

Orlando Pecpec was charged in the family court with twenty-five counts of violation of an order for protection in relation to twenty-five voicemails and text messages he allegedly sent to his former spouse. The jury found PecPec guilty on nineteen counts. Pecpec challenged his convictions on eight counts, arguing they were obtained in violation of his right to an unanimous verdict because the jury was not specifically instructed that it was required to unanimously agree to the specific act that supported each count. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under State v. Mundon, the family court was required to give a specific unanimity instruction in the circumstances of the instant case; but (2) the family court's error in this case was harmless because there was no reasonable possibility that Pecpec was convicted on less than a unanimous verdict.

Peter Bailey was convicted in the circuit court on four counts of attempted sexual assault. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment and sentence, holding (1) the court abused its discretion in denying Bailey's motion for a mistrial because a juror statements regarding Bailey's prior murder charge and/or conviction were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the jury was properly instructed on the offense of attempted sexual assault in the first degree; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support each of Bailey's convictions. Remanded for a new trial on the four counts of attempted sexual assault in the first degree.

Petitioner's ex-wife, Respondent, brought a Haw. Rev. Stat. 586 petition alleging domestic abuse of the couple's daughter. The family court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Petitioner. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) determined, inter alia, that the family court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the TRO. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and order of the family court, holding (1) parents have a constitutional right to discipline children inhering in their liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children, under the due process clause of the Hawaii Constitution; (2) a parent may raise the right of parental discipline in a Haw. Rev. Stat. 586-5 show cause hearing in opposition to the continuation of a TRO issued under chapter 586 on allegations of domestic abuse; (3) in such circumstances trial courts shall consider whether the discipline is reasonably related to the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor in determine whether the parent's conduct constituted abuse or proper discipline; and (4) generally a non-custodial parent retains the right to discipline a child when the child is under his or her supervision.

Governor Linda Lingle filed an executive order unilaterally imposing three-day-per-month furloughs for all state employees and reducing the Department of Education's and University of Hawaii's spending accordingly. The Hawaii State Teachers Association and United Public Workers (collectively, Plaintiffs) brought this action, asserting several causes of action and moving for a temporary restraining order. The circuit court granted in part Plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction and held for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment, holding (1) the dispute in this case ultimately related to a prohibited practice pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 89; and (2) the circuit court erred by deciding statutory issues over which the Hawaii Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction.