Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In these related original proceedings, Petitioners petitioned the Supreme Court for (1) judgment invalidating the 2011 Final Reapportionment Plan (Plan) for the state legislature adopted by the State Reapportionment Commission, (2) a writ of mandamus directing the Commission to prepare and file a new reapportionment plan for the state legislature, and (3) a writ of mandamus directing the Chief Election Officer to rescind the publication of the Plan. The Supreme Court issued orders granting the petitions and (1) invalidated the Plan, determining it was constitutionally invalid where (i) the Hawaii Constitution expressly mandates that only permanent residents be counted in the population base for the purpose of reapportionment, and (ii) the Plan disregarded this constitutional mandate by including nonpermanent residents in the population base that the Commission used to allocate legislative seats among the islands; (2) directed the Commission to prepare and file a new reapportionment plan that (i) allocates the members of the state legislature among the basic island units by using a permanent resident population base and then (ii) apportions the members among the districts therein; and (3) directed the Chief Election Officer to rescind the publication of the Plan for the state legislature.

After a jury trial, Defendant Brandon Valeros was charged with assault in the second degree. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the circuit court's decision. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence of Defendant, holding that the failure of the prosecution to disclose an alibi-rebuttal witness was a violation of Haw. R. Pen. P. 12.1 even though the witness had been previously listed as the alibi witness of Defendant, as the witness apparently unbeknownst to Defendant became the prosecution's witness. Hence, in the absence of a good cause for granting an exception to the requirements of Rule 12.1, it was error for the circuit court to allow that witness to testify in order to rebut Defendant's alibi defense. Remanded.

Hatem Eid was charged with excessive speeding. The charge stemmed from an incident in which an officer paced Eid's car with his own vehicle and concluded Eid was speeding. Prior to that incident, the officer had speed checks conducted on his patrol car, which were intended to establish that the speedometer was accurate. Prior to trial, Eid filed a motion in limine to exclude any speed check or speedometer reading evidence. The district court denied Eid's motion, admitted the evidence, and found Eid guilty of excessive speeding. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) concluded that the district court erred in admitting the speed check and speedometer reading evidence after determining that the State did not meet the foundational requirements set forth by State v. Fitzwater. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and remanded, holding that the State established a sufficient foundation to admit the speed check evidence, and consequently, the speedometer reading in this case.

Daniel Taylor was convicted in federal court of conspiracy to traffic in Native American cultural items that were obtained in violation of the Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act. The items were native Hawaiian artifacts that Taylor and an accomplice took from a cave. A year later the State grand jury indicted Taylor for theft in the first degree in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 708-830(1) and 708-830.5(1)(a) with regard to the same events. Taylor moved to dismiss the indictment, and the circuit court denied Taylor's motion. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to the grand jury to find probable cause that the property taken was "property of another" under section 708-830(1); and (2) Taylor's prosecution in state court was not barred by Haw. Rev. Stat. 701-112 because the theft charge required proof of a fact not required for Taylor's federal conspiracy offense, and the purposes behind the state and federal statutes differed.

A jury convicted Appellant Jenaro Torres of murder in the second degree and found that Appellant possessed, used, or threatened the use of a revolver during the commission of a murder. Appellant had previously pled no contest in federal court to charges stemming from the same incident. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial based on its conclusion that the court erred in admitting evidence obtained by federal officers. The Supreme Court (1) held that where the State seeks to prosecute a defendant in a Hawaii state court and seeks to admit evidence obtained by federal law enforcement officers, the court must give due consideration to the Hawaii Constitution and applicable case law when assessing whether such evidence is admissible against the defendant; (2) corrected the opinion of the ICA insofar as it concluded that federal law alone was to be considered in ruling on the evidence obtained by federal officers and failed to additionally consider whether the evidence also comported with the Hawaii Constitution and applicable case law; and (3) affirmed the opinion of the ICA in all other respects.

Respondent John Veikoso was charged with an eight-count indictment relating to the sexual assault of two complaining witnesses on two separate occasions. The jury found Respondent guilty on all eight counts. On appeal, the intermediate court of appeals vacated the trial court's judgment of conviction, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a doctor who examined the second complaining witness regarding alleged threats made by Respondent against the witness and that such error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate appeallate court and reinstated and affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the error in admitting such testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant Robert Tominiko was near an intersection with a gathering of people who were drinking beer and soda. A police officer arrived but did not see Tominiko drinking beer. The officer asked to see Tominiko's identification, but Tominiko walked to his car and got in. When the officer asked Tominiko to exit his vehicle, Tominiko drove away. The officer chased Tominiko and, while Tominiko was stopped by traffic, the officer approached Tominiko's vehicle and noticed beer bottles in his car. Tominiko was later convicted of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII). Tominiko appealed, contending that the OVUII charge was insufficient and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The intermediate court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals and district court, holding (1) the charge was not insufficient because, when reading the charge as a whole, it could be reasonably construed to charge a crime; and (2) Tominiko was subjected to an illegal seizure, and the evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed.

After a jury trial, the circuit court found Timothy Walsh guilty of assault in the second decree. The intermediate court of appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court, finding that the prosecutor's statements during his closing argument implied that Walsh tailored his testimony because he exercised his right to be present during jury voir dire and other witnesses' testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in the criminal trial of a defendant, the prosecution's statements that a testifying defendant is less credible because he had been present during the trial, heard the testimony of other witnesses, and heard voir dire, constitute prohibited generic tailoring arguments; (2) prohibited generic tailoring arguments are reviewable as plain error; (3) standard jury instructions regarding witness testimony and counsel's arguments do not cure such improper arguments; (4) accordingly, whenever a defendant testifies, the jury must be instructed that the defendant has a right to be present during trial; and (5) in this case, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded.

Eshell Mitchell sued the Yuen family in circuit court for multiple injuries she received when the Yuens' dog bit her. Ms. Mitchell temporarily resided with the Yuens. Petitioner Jennifer Naipo is the half-sister of Naena Yuen. Ms. Mitchell's negligence claim was partly based on a disputed fact that the Yuens' dog had bitten Ms. Naipo several months earlier. The Yuens denied that the dog bit Ms. Naipo. Ms. Mitchell deposed Ms. Naipo, who appeared without counsel. She testified she had never been bitten, and that an injury to her forehead was not from a dog bite but from a fall. The differing testimonies lead to Ms. Mitchell issuing a subpoena duces tecum for Ms. Naipo's medical records. Ms. Naipo retained counsel and sought to quash the subpoena, claiming that the records were protected from disclosure. The trial court ordered the records be produced. Ms. Naipo petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to prevent disclosure of her medical records. The Court held that Ms. Naipo's right to privacy and her physician-patient privilege were not waived. The Court directed the lower court to quash the subpoena for Ms. Naipo's medical records.

In 2007, Petitioner Cornelius Durham was indicted on two counts of sexual assault. He entered a "no contest" plea and was sentenced to five years' probation on each count to run concurrently with special terms and conditions of probation. One of the conditions was that he participate in sex offender treatment. Later that year, Petitioner began to receive treatment from Catholic Charities. In 2008, Petitioner was involuntarily terminated from care with Catholic Charities. The "Termination of Treatment" report cited four reasons. Of note, Petitioner demonstrated "resistance to treatment." Six days following the termination, Petitioner began treatment with a private licensed psychologist. Petitioner's probation officer reported that Petitioner had violated the terms of his probation because of Catholic Charities' involuntary termination. Petitioner's probation was revoked, and he was resentenced to one year in prison and an additional five years' probation. Petitioner appealed his new sentence. The Supreme Court found that Petitioner was not given notice of his probation officer's report. Without that notice, Petitioner's due process rights were violated. The Court vacated the second sentence and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings pertaining to his probation.