Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Idaho Legislature established the Community Partner Grant Program in 2021, using funds from the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) to address the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on school-aged children. The funds were to be used exclusively for in-person educational and enrichment activities for children aged 5 to 13. In 2023, the Idaho Attorney General received information suggesting that some grant recipients had misused the funds to serve children under the age of five. Consequently, the Attorney General issued civil investigative demands (CIDs) to 34 grant recipients, requesting documentation related to the grant program. The recipients did not comply and instead sought a preliminary injunction in district court to set aside the CIDs.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho denied the preliminary injunction for 15 grant recipients, requiring them to respond to the CIDs, but granted it for 19 others, concluding that the Attorney General had not shown sufficient reason to believe these recipients had misused the funds. The court also reviewed two declarations in camera and provided redacted versions to the recipients' counsel.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that both the Idaho Charitable Assets Protection Act (ICAPA) and the Idaho Charitable Solicitation Act (ICSA) applied to the grant funds, giving the Attorney General authority to issue CIDs. The court determined that the "reason to believe" standard, not probable cause, was sufficient for issuing CIDs. The court found that the district court erred in granting the preliminary injunction to the 19 recipients and remanded the case for further proceedings. Additionally, the court held that the CID issued to Elizabeth Oppenheimer was overly broad and violated her First Amendment right to freedom of association, requiring the district court to reconsider this CID. The court declined to award attorney fees to either party. View "Children's Home Society v. Labrador" on Justia Law

This case involves the termination of parental rights and an adoption proceeding. Jane Doe 1 ("Mother") and John Doe ("Father") had a child out of wedlock. Approximately eight months after the child's birth, Mother and her fiancé filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights and allow the fiancé to adopt the child. Mother did not serve the petition on Father, and he did not participate in the proceedings. The magistrate court terminated Father's parental rights and granted the adoption. Father later filed two motions to set aside the judgment, arguing that his due process rights were violated due to lack of notice. This appeal concerns Father's second motion.The magistrate court denied Father's second motion, finding it barred by res judicata. The district court disagreed, reversed the magistrate court's order, and remanded the matter for the magistrate court to consider the motion on its merits. Mother appealed, arguing that Father's motion was barred by procedural doctrines, including res judicata and waiver.The Supreme Court of Idaho held that Father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion alleged a fundamental error that deprived him of his right to procedural due process, which in turn violated his fundamental constitutional right to raise his child. The Court concluded that the fundamental error doctrine applies to create an exception to the doctrines of res judicata and waiver. The Court affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the matter to the magistrate court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion was timely and, if so, whether the termination and adoption judgment is void. The Court also awarded partial attorney fees to Father for defending against certain arguments raised by Mother on appeal. View "Doe v. Doe" on Justia Law

Chesla A. Scott challenged the Idaho Department of Labor's service of three determination notices, claiming she did not receive them while temporarily working out-of-state. The Department mailed the notices to her last known address, and Scott missed the fourteen-day appeal period. When she attempted to appeal, the Department's Appeals Examiner dismissed her appeal as untimely. Scott argued that the Department's service by mail did not meet constitutional due process requirements.The Appeals Examiner conducted a hearing and concluded that Scott's appeal was untimely under Idaho Code section 72-1368(3) and (5). The Idaho Industrial Commission affirmed this decision, denying Scott's request for a new hearing and conducting a de novo review of the record. The Commission also concluded that Scott had not timely filed her appeal.Scott appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the Department's service by mail was constitutionally inadequate. The Court reviewed whether Scott exhausted her administrative remedies and preserved her constitutional challenge. The Court held that Scott had exhausted her administrative remedies and preserved her due process claim, allowing it to be reviewed.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision, holding that the Department's mailing of the determination notices was reasonable under all the circumstances and did not violate due process. The Court found that the Department's method of service was reasonably calculated to provide notice, and Scott's failure to receive the notices was not due to any fault of the Department. The Court did not award attorney fees to either party but awarded costs to the Department. View "Scott v. Home Depot USA, Inc." on Justia Law

A mother and her fiancé filed a petition to terminate the biological father's parental rights and allow the fiancé to adopt the child. The mother did not serve the father with the petition, and he did not participate in the proceedings. The magistrate court terminated the father's parental rights and granted the adoption. The father later filed two motions to set aside the judgment, arguing that his due process rights were violated due to lack of notice. The magistrate court denied the second motion, citing res judicata. The district court reversed this decision, finding that the father's due process argument warranted consideration.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion, which alleged a fundamental error violating his constitutional right to due process, was not barred by res judicata. The court applied the fundamental error doctrine, which allows for exceptions to procedural bars when a fundamental constitutional right is at stake. The court also rejected the mother's arguments that the father's motion was barred by the doctrines of claim splitting, invited error, appellate waiver, and the law of the case.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to the magistrate court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion was timely and whether the termination and adoption judgment was void. The court also awarded the father partial attorney fees on appeal for defending against certain arguments made by the mother. View "Doe v. Doe" on Justia Law

In this case, the State of Idaho removed five minor children from their parents' home following allegations of physical abuse. The children ranged in age from sixteen years to fourteen months. Law enforcement responded to a report of an altercation between the mother and the eldest child, during which the mother admitted to hitting the child with a plastic hanger. Other children reported frequent physical discipline, including being hit with belts and hands. The children were declared to be in imminent danger and were removed from the home.The Bannock County Prosecutor’s Office filed a petition under the Child Protective Act (CPA) to place the children in the custody of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW). The magistrate court held a shelter care hearing and found reasonable cause to believe the children were in danger, placing them in temporary custody of IDHW. The parents objected, arguing that the removal violated their constitutional rights and that the magistrate court’s findings were unsupported by substantial evidence.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the magistrate court’s adjudicatory decree. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the initial removal because the parents failed to raise the issue in the lower court. The Court also found that the challenge to the shelter care order was moot because it was supplanted by the adjudicatory decree. The Court held that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the older children to remain in the courtroom during the hearing and found that substantial and competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s decision to vest legal custody of the children in IDHW. The Court also declined to consider the parents' argument under the Idaho Parental Rights Act because it was raised for the first time on appeal. View "IDHW v. Doe" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the sale of surplus state property owned by the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD). The property, located at 3311 West State Street in Boise, was declared surplus after a flood rendered its largest building unusable. The Idaho Department of Administration (DOA) initiated a bidding process, and the petitioners, a group of business entities, submitted the highest bid. Despite negotiating a purchase and sale agreement, the DOA did not finalize the sale due to legislative actions that revoked its authority to dispose of the property and transferred control back to the ITD Board.The petitioners filed an original action in the Idaho Supreme Court seeking writs of prohibition and mandate. They argued that the legislative provisions revoking the DOA's authority were unconstitutional, violating the single-subject rule of the Idaho Constitution. They sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate these provisions and compel the DOA to complete the sale. The Idaho House of Representatives and its Speaker intervened, and the State Board of Examiners disclaimed further participation, having fulfilled its statutory duties.The Idaho Supreme Court held that the petitioners lacked standing to bring the action. The court found that while the petitioners demonstrated a distinct and palpable injury from the halted sale, they failed to show that a favorable decision would redress their injury. The court noted that the petitioners did not have a legally enforceable right to purchase the property, as the DOA had discretion in concluding the sale. Additionally, the court determined that the petitioners did not meet the criteria for relaxed standing, as other parties, such as the DOA and ITD, could potentially bring the constitutional claim. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for writs of prohibition and mandate. View "Hawkins Companies, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, BABE VOTE and the League of Women Voters of Idaho, challenged two amendments to Idaho's election laws, House Bills 124 and 340, which modified the forms of identification voters can use to prove their identity when registering to vote and voting at the polls. The plaintiffs argued that the bills violated the Idaho Constitution's guarantee of equal protection and unduly burdened the right of suffrage. The Idaho Secretary of State, Phil McGrane, counterclaimed, seeking a judgment declaring that the bills did not violate these rights under either the Idaho or the United States Constitutions. The district court granted the Secretary’s motions and entered judgment in favor of the Secretary.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the decisions of the district court. The court held that the bills were a valid exercise of the legislature’s power to enact conditions on the right of suffrage under Article VI, section 4 of the Idaho Constitution. The court applied the rational basis test and found that the new laws were rationally related to their stated purpose to clarify and create uniformity by requiring only generally accepted, authentic, and reliable forms of identification as a reasonable condition to exercise the right of suffrage. The court also found that the bills did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Idaho Constitution. View "BABE VOTE v. McGrane" on Justia Law

In this case, the Idaho State Athletic Commission and the Idaho Division of Occupational and Professional Licenses sought a declaratory ruling that provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requiring legislative approval of pending administrative fee rules violated the Idaho Constitution. They also sought a Writ of Mandamus directing the Office of the Administrative Rules Coordinator to publish the Athletic Commission’s 2022 administrative rules in the Idaho Administrative Code. The Idaho Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the case, but dismissed the petition for a declaration of unconstitutionality and denied the petition for a Writ of Mandamus. The court concluded that the APA requirement for legislative approval of pending administrative rules did not violate the Idaho Constitution's separation of powers, enactment, presentment, or administrative rules provisions. In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that administrative rulemaking authority was a legislative delegation, not a constitutional power, and that the legislature was free to modify the process by which administrative rules were enacted. View "Idaho State Athletic Commission v. Office of the Administrative Rules Coordinator" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, the plaintiffs, Dallen and Rachel Worthington, filed an expedited unlawful detainer action against the defendant, Carlene Crazy Thunder, for failure to pay rent. Crazy Thunder requested a jury trial, which was denied by the magistrate court. Following a bench trial, the magistrate court ruled that Crazy Thunder had unlawfully detained the Worthingtons’ property and ordered her to vacate the residence. Crazy Thunder appealed to the district court, arguing she had a right to a jury trial under Idaho’s constitution and Idaho Code section 6313. The district court agreed, concluding that section 6-311A conflicted with section 6-313, and that section 6-311A violated Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution. The Worthingtons then appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho.The Supreme Court of Idaho held that Idaho Code section 6-311A does not violate the Idaho Constitution. The court reasoned that an action for unlawful detainer is an equitable claim, and under Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution, the right to trial by jury only exists for legal claims, not equitable ones. However, the court also ruled that Crazy Thunder was entitled to a jury trial on her legal claims. The court held that in wrongful detainer cases like this one, when issues of fact are presented by the pleadings, those issues must be tried by a jury, unless such a jury is waived. As such, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision, though on different grounds. The court further ruled that Crazy Thunder, as the prevailing party on appeal, was entitled to costs, but neither party was entitled to attorney fees. View "Worthington v. Crazy Thunder" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented centered on a non-summary contempt proceeding arising out of a divorce, and former litigation in Oregon over spousal support Steven Abell owed his ex-wife Debra Abell. After a judgment of contempt was entered against him in Oregon for failure to pay support, Steven allegedly continued to refuse to pay Debra. Roughly one year later, Debra brought the underlying contempt proceeding in Idaho, charging Steven with contempt for failure to comply with the payment terms in the Oregon contempt judgment, and requesting relief from the Idaho district court, where Steven resided. The district court found Steven in willful contempt of the Oregon contempt judgment, and imposed an unconditional sanction of $5,000, making both determinations through a summary judgment procedure. Steven appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court found the sanction imposed by the district court was criminal in nature, and it was imposed in error because Steven was not afforded certain protections owed an alleged contemnor in a criminal contempt proceeding. In addition, regardless of whether a civil or criminal sanction is sought or imposed, when an alleged contemnor is not in default and denies the charge of contempt, the non-summary contempt proceeding cannot be adjudicated through a summary judgment procedure. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75 requires a trial. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment of contempt was vacated, its decisions underlying its judgment were also vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings that had to start over, at the initial pleading stage, in order to proceed appropriately. View "Abell v. Abell" on Justia Law