Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Senor Iguana's, Inc. appealed the cancellation of its liquor license. The district court found that Iguana's failed to pay the license renewal fee before the end of a grace period, so the license expired by operation of law. Iguana's argued on appeal that the license constituted a property right and that because the Alcohol Beverage Control bureau failed to provide notice and a hearing before cancelling the license, Iguana’s was denied its constitutional and statutory rights. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Senor Iguana's v. ISP - ABC" on Justia Law

This was an appeal of a district court order affirming in part an order issued by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources (“IDWR”). In response to a delivery call filed by Rangen, Inc., the Director had issued an order curtailing certain junior-priority ground water pumping in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer (“ESPA”). The order provided that the junior-priority ground water users could avoid curtailment by participating in an approved mitigation plan. The Idaho Ground Water Appropriators, Inc. (“IGWA”) filed several mitigation plans for approval. The Director issued an order conditionally approving IGWA’s Fourth Mitigation Plan, which proposed leasing water from another surface water right holder and piping the water to the Rangen facility. Rangen petitioned for review. The district court upheld the Director’s order in significant part. Rangen appealed. Finding no reversible error with the district court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rangen, Inc. v. Dept of Water Resources" on Justia Law

In 2012, Rayland Brown was charged by indictment with the felony crime of forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object. On the second day of Brown’s jury trial, he and the State agreed to a written plea agreement. One of the provisions of the plea agreement was that the charge would be amended to felony domestic battery. On the same date, the State filed an information charging the crime of felony domestic battery, and Brown pled guilty to that charge. The district court sentenced Brown, and in accordance with the plea agreement the court retained jurisdiction for 365 days. A year later, the court entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction, which resulted in Brown being required to serve a prison sentence of at least fifteen years and up to twenty years, with credit for 483 days already served. Brown filed a motion for reconsideration, and the court reduced the mandatory portion of the prison sentence from fifteen years to eleven years. Brown then filed this civil action seeking post-conviction relief on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his criminal case. The district court interpreted the alleged ineffective assistance as being that his counsel advised him that he would receive probation after the period of retained jurisdiction and failed to object to the court’s alleged deviation from the plea agreement. The district court dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief because the court in the underlying case did not deviate from the plea agreement and the plea agreement, which Brown signed, notified him that he may not receive probation because it expressly provided that “[a]t the end of the period of retained jurisdiction, the court would be free to exercise or relinquish jurisdiction in its discretion.” Brown then appealed, challenging whether the court in his criminal case had subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court concluded Brown could not raise that issue for the first time on appeal in this civil action, and affirmed the judgment in this case. View "Brown v. Idaho" on Justia Law

The Board of Trustees of the Mountain Home School District No. 193 appealed the district court’s denial of the its request for attorney fees. This case arose when School District employee Terri Sanders claimed that the Board breached its contract with her by hiring a candidate less qualified than her for a teaching position that Sanders had also applied for. After a jury found the Board did not breach its contract, the district court held the Board was not entitled to attorney fees because Sanders presented a legitimate issue for trial. The court also held that because I.C. 12-117 was the exclusive source of attorney fees for a school district, I.C. 12-120(3) could not apply. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that attorney fees under I.C. 12-117 were not exclusive. Because fees were available under I.C. 12-120(3), the Court remanded the case for the district court to enter the appropriate award of attorney fees under that statute. The Court also vacated the district court’s award of arbitration costs to the Board. Neither party received attorney fees on appeal. View "Sanders v. Bd of Trustees - Mt. Home School Dist 193" on Justia Law

A certified question of law from the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho was presented to the Idaho Supreme Court. Karen White and her development company, Elkhorn, LLC, sought to recover $166,496 paid to Valley County for "capital investments for roads in the vicinity of [their] White Cloud development." Phase I of White Cloud was completed and it was undisputed by the parties that the tax monies paid for Phase I were used by the County to complete capital investments for roads in the vicinity of the White Cloud development. The County conceded that it did not adopt an impact fee ordinance or administrative procedures for the impact fee process as required by the Idaho Development Impact Fees Act (IDIFA). The County also conceded it did not enact an IDIFA-compliant ordinance, because, at the time, the County believed in good faith that none was required. Plaintiff filed suit against the County claiming that the road development fee imposed by the County as a condition for approval of the White Cloud project violated Idaho state law and deprived Plaintiff of due process under both the federal and Idaho constitutions. In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff raised two claims for relief. The first claim for relief alleged that “Valley County’s practice of requiring developers to enter into a Road Development Agreement ("RDA," or any similar written agreement) solely for the purpose of forcing developers to pay money for its proportionate share of road improvement costs attributable to traffic generated by their development is a disguised impact fee, is illegal and therefore should be enjoined." The first claim for relief also alleged that, because the County failed to enact an impact fee ordinance under IDIFA, the imposition of the road development fees constituted an unauthorized tax. Plaintiff’s second claim for relief alleged that the County’s imposition of the road development fee constituted a taking under the federal and Idaho constitutions. The County argued Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to pay the RDA monies. Plaintiff denies that the payment was voluntary since it was required to obtain the final plat approval. The issue the federal district court presented to the Idaho Supreme Court centered on when the limitations period commences for statutory remedies made available under Idaho law to obtain a refund of an illegal county tax. The Court answered that the limitations period for statutory remedies made available under Idaho law to obtain a refund of an illegal county tax commences upon payment of the tax. View "White v. Valley County" on Justia Law

Medical Recovery Services, LLC (MRS), a licensed collection agency, appeals from the district court’s order affirming default judgments entered by the magistrate court. Each Respondent’s account indebtedness was assigned to MRS. MRS filed suit to recover payment from each Respondent and also sought $350 in attorney fees from each, based on a contractual provision. None of the Respondents answered the complaints filed by MRS, so MRS filed for default judgments to be entered in each case. The magistrate court entered default judgments as to all Respondents but granted attorney fees in amounts less than the $350 that MRS was requesting under the contracts. MRS asserted that the magistrate erred in awarding attorney fees in the amount of the principal owed by the Respondents for medical services, as opposed to $350, which was the minimum amount that each Respondent contracted to pay. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Medical Recovery Services v. Strawn" on Justia Law

In 2011, plaintiff-respondent Jamee Wade was shot twice by a Fruitland police officer after an altercation. Intending to file a claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Wade sought copies of investigatory records related to the incident pursuant to the Idaho Public Records Act (IPRA). This appeal arose from a Petition for Access to Public Records filed by plaintiff seeking the disclosure of investigatory records in the possession of the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office (CCPA). The district court ordered CCPA to produce the records pursuant to the request, but limited disclosure to Wade and his counsel. CCPA timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment: the district court applied an erroneous legal standard in its analysis under I.C. 9-335. The records Wade requested were active investigatory records. View "Wade v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was a judgment dismissing an action wherein the plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained as a result of contracting certain infections. The district court employed a differential diagnosis analysis and held that plaintiff's medical experts were required to rule out possible sources of the infections, other than the defendant's care. The district court determined that plaintiff's medical experts' opinions were inadmissible because they did not address the other possible sources of the infections that were suggested by defendant's medical expert. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court's determination was in error. Accordingly, the Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Nield v. Pocatello Health Services" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the dismissal of a petition for adoption filed by Jane Doe, the long-time domestic partner of Jane Doe I. Jane Doe I is the legally recognized parent of the two children subject to the adoption: John Doe and John Doe I. The magistrate court dismissed on the grounds that "petitioner must be in a lawfully recognized union, i.e. married to the prospective adoptee's parent, to have legal standing to file a petition to adopt that person's biological or adopted child." The magistrate dismissed the petition "sua sponte, without any motion or opposition to the Petition, without prior notice to any of the affected parties, without inviting legal briefing, without any apparent consideration of the Pre-Adoptive Home Study and without hearing." A Final Judgment was entered the same day. Jane Doe moved for reconsideration, but before a ruling on that motion was made, I.A.R. 12.2 compelled her to file a Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court violated Jane Doe's rights to due process by dismissing the petition without the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. Furthermore, the Court found that Idaho's adoption statutes unambiguously allow a second, prospective parent to adopt, regardless of marital status. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Adoption of John Doe" on Justia Law

The State appealed the district court’s decision to affirm the magistrate court’s holding that it did not have jurisdiction over John (2012-10) Doe because he was twenty-one years of age when the State filed its petition in juvenile court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court. View "Idaho v. John Doe (2012-10)" on Justia Law