Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Darrien Dabney forcibly sodomized two six-year-old boys. At the time, Defendant was a developmentally disabled eighteen-year-old and had been living with the boys’ family less than a month. He had previously resided in foster care in Virginia. He appealed the sentence he received, the trial court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction after a period of retained jurisdiction because there was no community-based facility that could provide appropriate treatment for the defendant and security for the protection of the community; and the court’s order denying a motion to reduce the sentence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Dabney" on Justia Law

In 2013, defendant Andrey Yermola texted his wife asking to meet her so they could talk. She responded that she was at work, but agreed to meet him at the hospital where she worked in Spokane, Washington, during her lunch break. A friend of his was sitting in the back seat. They drove to an apartment complex so the friend could recover his cell phone at someone’s apartment. After he left, Defendant told his wife that his cell phone battery was dead and asked to use hers. The friend returned to the car, and Defendant’s wife asked to be driven back to work. When they arrived at the hospital, Defendant stopped the car and began searching through the contacts on his wife’s phone. She asked for the phone, but Defendant would not give it to her. As they argued, Defendant’s friend got out of the car. Defendant then sped off, with his wife still in the car. He drove recklessly, at a high rate of speed, from the hospital to a casino in Idaho. After entering the casino parking lot, he turned around and drove out of the parking lot and stopped next to the road. Upon stopping, he retrieved a pistol, wiped it off with a sweater, exited the car, and tossed the pistol into the snow. He then drove back to the casino, parked the car, and, after making a loud scene, walked away, tossing his wife’s cell phone into a pond on his way to the casino. Defendant’s wife contacted a security guard, who contacted law enforcement. When the sheriff’s deputies arrived, she related what had happened. The deputies were able to recover the pistol, which had been stolen. Defendant was charged with false imprisonment, unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, grand theft by possession of stolen property, willful concealment of evidence of a felony offense, and possession of drug paraphernalia (which items had been found during a search of his car). Defendant appealed his conviction of felony willful concealment of evidence. For that crime to have been a felony rather than a misdemeanor in this case, the object concealed must have been about to be produced, used, or discovered as evidence in an investigation that involved a felony criminal offense. Because the State did not offer any evidence that the criminal offense at issue was a felony, the Supreme Court vacated defendant’s felony conviction and remanded for entry of a conviction for misdemeanor willful concealment of evidence. View "Idaho v. Yermola" on Justia Law

Appellant Arthur Schmierer filed a motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to correct an illegal sentence. In the underlying action, Schmierer had pled guilty to an amended superseding indictment that charged him with two counts of enticing children over the internet. Schmierer argued in his defense that the prosecutor improperly amended the indictment without resubmitting the matter to the grand jury, thereby depriving the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to convict him on the second enticement count. The district court denied Schmierer’s motion, concluding that Schmierer had waived any deficiencies in the charging document when he pled guilty. Schmierer appealed. The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order and vacated Schmierer’s conviction on the second enticement count. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for review, and affirmed the district court: “[w]here the charging document meets the substantive requirements for an information, but is labeled an indictment, we hold that it may be treated as an information. Here, the prosecutor could have charged Schmierer with enticement by either information or indictment. The labeling of the document as an indictment is a mere defect of form and does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the charges unless it would tend to prejudice a substantial right of the defendant. Here, we find that Schmierer was not prejudiced by the mislabeling of the charging document and, therefore, we hold that the district court had jurisdiction to convict Schmierer of the second enticement count.” View "Idaho v. Schmierer" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason McClure was convicted of criminal contempt after he failed to make restitution payments required under his 1999 conviction for burglary. The contempt charge was based on a “Motion and Affidavit in Support of Contempt Proceedings” signed and sworn to before a deputy court clerk, rather than a notary public. McClure moved to dismiss the contempt charge against him, challenging the validity of the arrest warrant on various grounds. Each was rejected. Ultimately McClure conditionally pled guilty to the contempt allegation, preserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s judgment of criminal contempt, holding that the document did not impart subject matter jurisdiction over the contempt proceeding because it was not notarized. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed: "Here, the document at issue qualifies as an affidavit. A deputy clerk signed it in the presence of a second deputy clerk, whose signature indicated that the document was '[s]ubscribed and sworn to before' the clerk. Because deputy clerks of the court are authorized to administer oaths and affirmations, and because this construction of “affidavit” does no violence to the purpose or spirit of the applicable laws and rules, we hold that the 'Motion and Affidavit in Support of Contempt Proceedings' here was a valid and effective affidavit. As such, it imparted subject matter jurisdiction over McClure’s contempt charge." View "Idaho v. McClure" on Justia Law

Michelle McIntosh appealed her conviction and resulting sentence after she was found guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, two counts of delivery of methamphetamine, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. This case arose out of three separate purchases of methamphetamine by an undercover police officer from McIntosh. The jury found McIntosh guilty of all charges, and the court subsequently sentenced McIntosh to a total unified term of ten years, with four years fixed. McIntosh timely appealed. McIntosh made two arguments on appeal: (1) her conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver should have been vacated because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the charge; and (2) the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a unified term of ten years, with four years fixed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed McIntosh's conviction and sentence. View "Idaho v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

The State appealed following the conviction of defendant Benito Razo-Chavez for one count of possession of oxycodone. The State did not not challenge the outcome of the case and did not seek to overturn the verdict or sentence; rather, the State challenged the propriety of the district court’s jury instruction regarding the elements of possession of a controlled substance under Idaho Code section 37-2732(c). Specifically, the instructions given to the jury by the district court stated the mens rea element of possession of a controlled substance as “the defendant either knew it was oxycodone or believed it was oxycodone.” The State argued that this instruction was improper and should have stated the mens rea element as “the defendant either knew it was oxycodone or believed it was a controlled substance.” The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal: if the district court committed error, the Court held such error was harmless. View "Idaho v. Razo-Chavez" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Hasan Icanovic appealed a district court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief brought on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Icanovic argued that his attorney’s advice offered in connection with his consideration and acceptance of a plea bargain was deficient and that but for this advice he would not have pled guilty to felony domestic battery. At issue was his attorney’s advice regarding the immigration-related consequences of his guilty plea. Finding that Icanovic did not meet his burden of proof for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Icanovic’s petition for post-conviction relief. View "Icanovic v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Rayland Brown was charged by indictment with the felony crime of forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object. On October 23, 2012, the second day of Brown’s jury trial, he and the State agreed to a written plea agreement. One of the provisions of the plea agreement was that the charge would be amended to felony domestic battery. On the same date, the State filed an information charging the crime of felony domestic battery, and Brown pled guilty to that charge. The district court sentenced Brown, and in accordance with the plea agreement the court retained jurisdiction for 365 days. On September 3, 2013, the court entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction, which resulted in Brown being required to serve a prison sentence of at least fifteen years and up to twenty years, with credit for 483 days already served. Brown filed a motion for reconsideration, and the court reduced the mandatory portion of the prison sentence from fifteen years to eleven years. Brown then filed this action seeking post-conviction relief on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the Criminal Case. The district court interpreted the alleged ineffective assistance as being that his counsel in the Criminal Case advised him that he would receive probation after the period of retained jurisdiction and failed to object to the court’s alleged deviation from the plea agreement. The district court in this case dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief because the court in the Criminal Case did not deviate from the plea agreement and the plea agreement, which Brown signed, notified him that he may not receive probation because it expressly provided that “[a]t the end of the period of retained jurisdiction, the court would be free to exercise or relinquish jurisdiction in its discretion.” Brown then appealed, the only issue he raised relating to the denial of post-conviction relief was whether the court in his criminal case had subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found that Brown could not raise that issue for the first time on appeal in this civil action, and so it affirmed the judgment in this case. View "Brown v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Ryan Rawlings went into a Wal-Mart store to steal various items. He selected a large tote, placed it in a shopping cart, filled the tote with small items of merchandise, and covered them with the tote’s lid. He also selected a combination floor lamp and table and placed it in a cart. He then pushed the cart through the self-checkout line without paying for the merchandise, hoping that a cart containing two items that were too large to bag would not attract attention. However, a loss prevention officer had observed Rawlings’s actions. The loss prevention officer called law enforcement. When a sheriff’s deputy arrived, he talked with Rawlings after giving him Miranda rights. The Deputy asked Rawlings whether he had previously committed thefts like this, and Rawlings answered that he had back in Ohio. He stated that he had always been able to take items from Wal-Mart stores in the past without getting caught. Rawlings was charged with petit theft, a misdemeanor, and burglary, a felony. He waived his right to a preliminary hearing on the felony, and he was bound over to answer in the district court. Prior to trial, his counsel moved to dismiss the burglary charge on the grounds that the statute, as applied to Rawlings, violated both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Freedom of Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The motion was denied. Prior to trial, the Prosecutor served and filed a notice of the State’s intent to present evidence of Rawlings’s statement regarding his prior thefts, and Rawlings filed and served a motion in limine seeking to exclude that evidence. The evidence was ruled admissible. During a conference in chambers on the morning of the trial, Mr. Logsdon unsuccessfully re-argued the motion in limine. Then the Prosecutor orally moved to dismiss the petit theft charge, and the district court granted the motion. The burglary charge was tried to the jury, which found Rawlings guilty of burglary. He then appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Rawlings" on Justia Law

In January of 2008, a jury convicted Faron Hawkins of two counts of robbery. At trial, Hawkins admitted that he robbed banks but claimed that he did so under duress that stemmed from his previous involvement with various government agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The Court of Appeals determined that the district court erred when it did not “sua sponte order a psychiatric evaluation and conduct a hearing . . . .” The Court of Appeals vacated Hawkins’ judgment of conviction and remanded the case so that Hawkins could undergo a competency evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code sections 18-211 and 18-212. On remand, the district court conducted a competency hearing in late 2010. Two experts had evaluated Hawkins and determined that Hawkins was competent during the entire course of his legal proceedings. In its order of December 6, 2010, the district court found that Hawkins was competent to stand trial in January of 2008. Hawkins appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the district court’s 2010 retroactive determination that he was competent to stand trial in 2008 violated his due process rights. He also argued that he was not competent to waive his right to counsel and represent himself pro se. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Hawkins" on Justia Law